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In response to patient safety concerns, a number of NHS hospitals have developed 
and implemented quality dashboards. The aim of this research was to examine how 
quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards.  
Methods: A literature and scoping review were used to develop the initial theories to 
explain how quality dashboard influence care. These theories were refined using a 
realist interview technique with 11 stakeholders. Three case study sites were 
selected according to their dashboard performance and a mixed method approach 
was used to gather data to test the refined theories. In total 30 staff and 6 visitors 
were interviewed, 18 hours of non-participant observation of a patient safety board, 
safety huddles and handovers were undertaken and a review of 3 years outcome 
data were used to test the theories.  
Findings: The evaluation found ward leaders play an important role in promoting 
staff engagement with quality dashboards and are responsible for developing 
strategies to improve performance. Staff were more likely to change practice if the 
information from the dashboard was seen as important, meaningful and given with a 
specific focus for change. While staff enjoyed receiving positive performance 
information, change was more likely in response to performance data that caused 
dissonance. During the periods of observation a total of 123 staff and 72 visitors were 
observed walking past a patient safety board displaying information from a QD. 
During this time 0 staff and 9 visitors were seen interacting with the board.  
Conclusion: The three interrelated programme theories of Importance, Disruption 
and Avoidance could be used to explain why and how quality dashboards influence 
care delivery within hospital wards. The evidence suggests, best practice guidance 
to support ward managers to use QD information should be developed, information 
from QD should be incorporated into daily team discussions, auditors should engage 
with staff during the audit visit as outcomes are triggered by disruption rather than 
compliance, regular updates to the standards and metrics is needed and where 
possible QD data should be automatically generated to remove the risk of auditor 
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Chapter 1 Background 
1.1 Introduction, the importance of context  
While working as a Matron within a large NHS teaching hospital in the North of 
England, a member of staff knocked on my door to tell me that a scan request had 
gone missing and a patient’s scan had been delayed. The staff member was upset, 
as he knew the result of the scan would determine if further cancer treatment was 
possible. We discussed how we could improve the system and agreed to monitor 
the number of scans requested and performed each week.  
As he left, he asked ‘I wonder if we attached a photograph of the patient to each of 
the request cards, less would go missing?’ 
Although attaching a photograph to a request card would not be practical or 
possible, the point the staff member was highlighting was how do we raise 
awareness of the importance of medical tests and what they mean to patients. 
Scans and tests often represent a  significant step in a patient’s journey, in this 
particular case the scan was to decide if cancer treatment was possible, for others it 
represents being cancer free for another year or is the first step in explaining 
symptoms or diagnosing a condition. The supposition from this conversation was if 
request cards were individualised or contextualised, staff would see them as 
important, take greater care and lose less of them. While this was a hypothetical 
proposition, it did make me reflect upon the recent introduction of quality 
dashboards (QD) into NHS organisations, the reason for their introduction, and how 
they influence care delivery.   
This chapter will therefore describe what quality dashboards are, and using key 
texts from public inquires and healthcare reports, present a historical perspective of 
quality and safety in health care. Using evidence from government responses to 
healthcare scandals and corresponding reports, it will explain why improvements in 
the quality and safety of health care was needed and outline the steps 
recommended in those reports to achieve this (Appendix A). It will present the 
rationale for the development of quality dashboards and the role they are expected 






1.2 What are quality dashboards 
Dashboards are described as  tools to drive change and make improvements 
(Strome, 2014). They consolidate and arrange the information needed to achieve 
one or more objectives so it can be monitored at a glance (Few, 2004). Okes (2013) 
describes dashboards as summary views of multiple metrics that allow a quick 
assessment of overall performance.  
Quality dashboards within healthcare often displays a range of structure, process 
and outcome measures relating to safety, experience and effectiveness (Okes, 
2013). Strome (2014) in his work on healthcare analytics, uses Fews (2004) 
definition to remind the reader to see dashboards as much more than a collection of 
charts, graphs and numbers but tools to communicate complex data to individuals, 
teams or organisations. The aim of dashboards is to provide information at an 
organisational, departmental, ward, and individual level to track progress against 
pre-determined objectives or goals and identify areas for improvement (RCN, 2012, 
Heslop and Lu, 2014). Initially within healthcare, objectives were often linked to cost 
reduction or financial performance, however in more recent times, dashboards have 
been developed to assess performance against quality and safety goals (Lloyd, 
2017).  
1.3 A historical view of quality in healthcare 
In North America, the growing demand for healthcare data started in the 1980s 
when healthcare regulators and insurance companies wanted information that 
would allow them to assess which providers could offer the highest quality care for 
the lowest cost. These initial reports were known as report or score cards  (Nelson, 
1995)  and were further developed by Kaplan and Norton (1992) to become 
balanced scorecards (Lloyd 2017). Although a new development in the 1980s and 
1990s, throughout the history of healthcare, data gained from measuring the safety 
and quality of care have been used to inform and drive change.  
In 1858, Nurse, Florence Nightingale published data showing soldiers injured in the 
Crimean war were dying from iatrogenic reasons and nosocomial infections rather 
than their battle injuries. Nightingale used this information to create a coxcomb 
(polar diagrams) to raise awareness and make the case for better sanitation and 





In North America, Dr Ernest Codman a surgeon from Boston, suggested hospitals 
develop an ‘end result system’ to allow the public to decide where they should have 
treatment. From 1911 to 1916, he reviewed the treatment of 337 patients and their 
outcomes once they left hospital. He recorded 123 errors caused by a lack of 
knowledge, skill, surgical judgement, and equipment. He published this information 
in an annual report for patients and the local community and urged other hospitals 
to do the same. The purpose of Codman’s end result system was to recognise 
where errors had been made, learn from them and improve practice. He believed 
publishing the results would allow the fee paying public to judge the quality and 
outcomes of care and make informed choices about where to have treatment 
(Neuhauser, 2002). While not popular with his colleagues at the time, his ideas 
continue to pervade healthcare today (Lloyd, 2017).  
Some years later the need to assess the quality of healthcare care was highlighted 
by Cohen (1964) and Robb (1967) when they published their concerns about the 
standard of care within elderly, mental health and paediatric hospitals in United 
Kingdom (UK). These reports gave examples of cruel, undignified, institutionalised 
practice and care within hospital building that were not fit for purpose. Robb’s 
(1967) report highlighted hospital management teams who had lost sight of their 
primary purpose of providing safe and effective healthcare and had become 
involved in self-serving rituals. Recognising this dichotomy Robb (1967, 87) wrote 
‘Doctors and nurses have two contracts, one to their board which is written, and 
one to their patient which is unwritten, when conflict between the two arise, it is the 
unwritten contract that should be observed’.  
The report drew public and professional attention to the role of the nurse and the 
quality of nursing care. Staff shortages, low staff morale, poor organisation of care, 
and deficiencies in human relationship skills were identified as specific areas for 
improvement.  In response, the Ministry of Health commissioned the Royal College 
of Nursing to undertake the “Proper Study of the Nurse” project (McFarlane, 1971). 
The study was tasked with developing techniques for measuring the quality of 
nursing care as none were available in the published literature at that time. 
The project, acknowledged the infancy of nursing research, reviewed the available 
evidence and interviewed nurses about their roles and responsibilities. The study 
found that nurses reported that safe care was dependent upon the experience of 





existed that could verify or prove the assumptions (McFarlane, 1971).  McFarlane 
(1971) concluded that as nursing care takes place within a system, it was difficult to 
isolate antecedent factors and show a causal relationship. The study recognised 
that work was needed to develop research techniques for measuring the quality of 
nursing care with ‘cybernetic models’ (an automated communication and control 
system) a consideration for future data capture. The study suggested hospitals 
should start to measure variables such as factual incidents, aspects of nursing care 
that had an impact upon patient welfare, and the ward environment. This 
information could be used to assess the performance of hospital wards and control 
the quality of care provided. The variables recommended by McFarlane (1971) 
were similar to those identified by Donabedian’s (1966) structure-process-outcome 
conceptual framework for examining the quality of health care.  
Avedis Donabedian, one of the world’s leading authors on quality (Best and 
Neuhauser, 2004) found assessing the quality of health care to be remarkably 
difficult. He suggested “quality healthcare could be anything anyone wishes it to be, 
but should reflect the values and goals that are current in the medical care system 
and the society of which it is a part” (Donabedian, 1966 , 167).  
As a solution he offered a framework based upon ‘structure-process-outcome’ 
which uses the attributes of the care setting (Structure), activities related to giving 
and receiving care (Process) and the effect of care on the person and wider 
population (Outcome) to assess the quality of healthcare. He recommended that an 
assessment of quality should be more than a measurement of medical outcomes, 
as “what is the benefit of using patient survival as a criterion of success if the 
patient is left with a crippling condition” (Donabedian, 1966 , 168). 
Over the next 20 years healthcare providers (HCP) continued to collect large 
quantities of administrative data such as number of patients admitted, treated, 
length of stay in hospital, deaths following operations, and waiting time for tests. 
The information was generally used by insurance companies, regulators and 
managers to inform strategic decision making and submitted to government 
departments for planning and funding considerations. Very little of this information 





1.4 Concerns regarding the quality and safety of healthcare 
in North America and the United Kingdom. 
The quality and safety of healthcare was brought into sharp focus in 1992 when a 
British newspaper drew attention to the higher than expected mortality rates for 
children undergoing cardiac surgery in a UK National Health Service (NHS) 
hospital. Internal audit data identified death rates significantly higher than expected 
with no action taken by hospital management to investigate the root cause. A 
member of the medical team made his concerns known to the media and a national 
healthcare scandal was uncovered (Nashef, 2016) . The Department of Health, the 
UK’s government department responsible for health, commissioned a public inquiry 
to investigate surgical outcomes at cardiac unit between 1984 and 1995. The report 
identified 171 children who may have survived complex cardiac surgery if it had 
been performed at another hospital. The inquiry also found the hospital ‘awash with 
data’ from 1980s onwards, showing mortality rates significantly higher in Bristol 
than other centres in the UK. Unfortunately this information was not shared with 
patients, parents, or the public.  
The inquiry made 198 recommendations, many of which were focused upon 
developing clinical standards and assessing the performance of individual surgeons 
and hospitals. The aim was for cardiac surgery in the UK to become more 
transparent by sharing individual surgeons outcome data with patients, parents and 
the public. The information was to be used to challenge paternalism and start to 
create a culture of candour and transparency for all aspects of healthcare within the 
UK  (Department of Health, 2002, Nashef, 2016).  
As the UK was reflecting upon the concerns identified at Bristol, the safety of 
healthcare in the United States of America was also identified as a concern when 
the Institute of Medicine (1999) published their landmark report ‘to err is human: 
building a better health system’. The report suggested several thousand patients 
died each year due to errors in their care and hundreds of thousands experienced 
non-fatal injuries. The significant human and financial burden of those errors 
demanded action was needed to improve the quality and safety of healthcare.  
In response, the Institute of Medicine’s Committee on Quality of Health Care, 
(2001) published ‘Crossing the Quality Chasm’ a comprehensive series of reports 
and recommendations to address the concerns outlined by the Institute of Medicine 





 Safe: avoiding injuries to patients from the care that is intended to help 
them. 
 Effective: providing services based on scientific knowledge to all who could 
benefit and refraining from providing services to those not likely to benefit. 
 Patient-centred: providing care that is respectful of and responsive to 
individual patient preferences, needs, and values and ensuring that patient 
values guide all clinical decisions. 
 Timely: reducing waits and harmful delays for treatment. 
 Efficient: avoiding waste, including waste of equipment, supplies, ideas, and 
energy. 
 Equitable: providing care that does not vary in quality because of personal 
characteristics such as gender, ethnicity, geographic location, and 
socioeconomic status. 
The reported suggested if health care systems could make improvements in each 
of these domains, patients would experience care that was safer, more reliable and 
responsive. The committee recognised significant change would require substantial 
improvement in health care and health care systems. It urged clinical leaders, front 
line staff, and management teams to work together to identify the scope and 
significance of healthcare errors, and develop strategies and recommendations to 
advance and encourage improving the quality and safety of patient care.  
The report identified one of most significant barriers to improving patient safety was 
a lack of awareness of the extent to which errors occur. It suggested this was 
because the vast majority of errors were not reported, as staff feared they would be 
punished or disciplined. The report placed significant emphasis on the role leaders 
would play in encouraging and supporting staff to report errors. The aim was to use 
this information to develop process and outcome measures to understand the 
degree to which performance is consistent with best practices, and the extent to 
which patients are being helped or harmed when receiving care (Institute of 
Medicine, 2001). As with the Bristol Heart Surgery inquiry, the Institute of Medicine 
(2001) asked for transparency from hospitals, to allow patients and families to make 
informed decisions when selecting a health plan. The report asked for guidelines 
and evidence to be developed and used to design quality measures which could 
continuously monitor the quality and safety of care. The information needed to be 
comparable between HCP and include performance information on safety, evidence 





Similar themes also emerged from a review of patient safety in the NHS published 
in 2000. The report ‘An organisation with memory’, estimated that 400 patients died 
or were seriously injured due to the incorrect use of medical devices each year in 
the NHS. The cost of adverse drug reactions, hospital acquired infections and 
pressure ulcers was also estimated to cost the NHS £1Billion per year (Department 
of  Health, 2000). It found the culture within the NHS, did not encourage errors to be 
reported, or lessons learned to be widely shared. Often recommendations and 
learning from patient safety issues were not embedded into clinical practice and 
performance data were difficult for front line staff to access.  
As with previous reports, the recommendations were once again focused upon 
creating a culture of honesty and transparency and developing systems to allow 
harm to be reported and performance to be compared  (Vincent, 2013).  
1.4.1 The Shipman Inquiry  
Despite recommendations from the various inquiries and reports in previous years 
(Appendix A), the safety of healthcare in the UK was once again called into 
question in 2000 when a General Practitioner (GP) was found guilty of murdering 
15 patients and may have been responsible for the deaths of over 200 patients over 
a twenty five year period.  
Once again a public inquiry was commissioned and a comprehensive report and 
recommendations were published in 2004 (Smith, 2004). In 2007, the UK 
government published ‘Learning from tragedy, keeping patients safe’, its response 
to the Shipman Inquiry. As with previous inquiries, a theme within Dame Smith’s 
report was the need for greater oversight and transparency within healthcare. 
(Smith, 2004, Department of Health, 2007).  The Shipman Inquiry found very little 
systematic data was collected on the performance of health professionals in 
general practice. At that time the routine data collected by general practitioners 
were focused upon cost effective prescribing patterns rather than looking at the 
quality or safety of care. The inquiry also found no systematic arrangements for 
sharing information between healthcare organisations. The findings were similar to 
those identified in the Bristol Inquiry (Department of Health, 2002) which 
recommended hospitals began to measure and report surgeons outcome data and 
hospital mortality rates.  
Hospital mortality rates had been available to the public via Dr Foster Intellegence 





healthcare data, would publish an annual report comparing the peformance of 
hospitals in England against a range of indicators, including Standardised Mortality 
Rates (SMR) (Vincent 2013). SMR or standard hospital mortality indicators (SHMI) 
is the ratio between the expected and actual number of patients who die in hospital 
(or within thirty days of discharge from hospital) (NHS Digital, 2018). While there 
was critisim of the methodology used by Dr Foster, there was recognition that 
although the SMHI was not a measure of quality of care, a higher or significantly 
lower number of deaths would require further investigation by the HCP and their 
regulator (Illingworth, 2014). Research carried out on behalf of the Shipman Inquiry 
suggested if mortality data on the number and pattern of patient’s deaths had been 
analysed, some unusual features would have come to light and an investigation 
may have been started sooner.  The Shipman inquiry concluded that routine 
monitoring of mortality rates should be extended beyond hospitals to include GP 
practices and the NHS needed to adopt a systematic approach to collecting and 
monitoring information on the performance of doctors and the safety of healthcare 
(Department of Health 2007). 
1.4.2 The Mid Staffordshire Public Inquiry 
Unfortunately concerns regarding the quality and safety of healthcare in the UK 
were once again brought to the attention of the public when mortality rates at the 
Mid Staffordshire NHS Hospital Trust were found to be higher than expected for 
patients admitted for emergency procedures in 2009 (Mid Staffordshire NHS 
Foundation Trust and Robert Francis QC, 2013). What followed was an 
investigation into the care at the hospital by the Healthcare Commission, a regulator 
at that time. This investigation found the organisation had poor governance 
arrangements, lacked data on quality and safety, and chose to discredited poor 
outcome data rather than understand its root cause.  
Concerns regarding the standards of care at the hospital led to the government of 
the time commissioning a public inquiry. The Mid Staffordshire Public Inquiry, 
chaired by Robert Francis was published in 2013 and describes in detail the failings 
of an organisation which did not provide the most basic standards of care for 
hundreds of patients, subjecting them to appalling and unnecessary suffering. The 
report suggests patients and their relatives were failed by a system which ignored 
the warning signs and put corporate self-interest and cost control ahead of safe 
care (Mid Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and Robert Francis QC, 2013).The 





managers prioritising achieving financial targets over providing safe healthcare. The 
report gave 290 recommendations, with many of them focused upon improving the 
quality and safety of healthcare. 
The UK Government response to the report was to commission the National 
Advisory Patient Group for Patient Safety (NAPGPS) lead by Dr Berwick, a leading 
expert in patient safety. The aim of  NAPGPS, was to review the quality of care and 
safety of patients in the NHS and develop a whole system approach to achieving 
harm free care throughout HCP in England. The aim of the group was to ensure 
patient safety was an ever present and constant concern for every NHS funded 
employee, ensuing risks to patient safety were recognised and always acted upon 
as soon as they were identified. To achieve this shift in culture a new approach to 
patient safety was set out in three key documents, A promise to learn- A 
commitment to act (National Advisory Group on the safety of patients in England, 
2013), Safe staffing for nursing in adult inpatient wards in acute hospitals (NICE, 
2014), Hard Truths: The Journey to Putting Patients First. (Department of Health 
and Social Care, 2014). 
As with previous inquiries (Smith et al 2004, Department of Health 2002) the 
response was to commit to improving the quality and safety of healthcare through 
actions focused upon the themes of organisational culture, compassionate care, 
leadership, standards, information and openness, transparency and candour  
(Department of Health and Social Care, 2014). It suggests the quality of care 
should be measured and monitored via a single set of nationally agreed measures. 
This would allow the public, parliament and those who work within the NHS to have 
a single version of the truth about the quality and safety of health care. The National 
Advisory Patient Group for Patient Safety (2013) report recognised the importance 
of engaging front line staff in measuring and monitoring safety within their wards 
and departments, encouraging them to interrogate, scrutinise, and use the 
information to improve care. When front line staff engage with performance data on 
a day to day basis they can react to the early warning signals which lead to quality 
and safety concerns, acting  as ‘smoke detectors’, identifying problems much earlier 
than mortality rates do (National Advisory Group on the safety of patients in 






1.5 Summary  
This chapter has provided a brief introduction to quality dashboards and a historical 
summary of concerns regarding the quality and safety of healthcare in the UK and 
USA (Appendix A). The evidence suggests, throughout history, patients have at 
times experienced care which has caused distress and harm. While the root cause 
of the published healthcare failings have differed, all have called for HCP to 
encourage staff to report errors and concerns to create a culture of transparency 
and candour. To achieve this, HCP were asked by their governments to begin to 
measure and monitor the quality of the care they provide and to make this 
information available to healthcare regulators, staff, patients, and the public. The 
reports suggest this would allow patients to make an informed choice of where to 
receive care and health care regulators to identify HCP, surgeons, and general 
practitioners who need support. Measuring the quality and safety of health care is 
complex, understanding what to measures and how this information can be used to 
create a quality dashboard will be explored in Chapter 2.  
1.6 Thesis structure 
As dashboards are tools which consolidate data to create a visual summary of 
performance, their development and use within health care has increased over 
time. The purpose of this research is to understand why quality dashboards have 
been developed and how they influence care delivery within hospital wards. To 
present this research the thesis will be organised into the chapters set out below, 
the steps taken to define, refine and test the programme theories is set out in 
Figure 1 . 
Chapter 2: This chapter presents an overview of safety within healthcare and 
describes the Ward Healthcheck-Quality Dashboard and rationale for its 
development and implementation. Unintended consequences of performance data 
and quality dashboards are also presented.  The chapter concludes by setting out 
the aims and objectives of this research study.   
Chapter 3: This chapter presents the results of a scoping review designed to 
examine the evidence to explain how quality dashboards influence care delivery 
within hospital wards. As QD are mechanisms or tools for audit and feedback, this 
literature was also considered with reference to best practice frameworks and two 





Chapter 4: This chapter introduces realism and realist evaluation and the rationale 
for the use of this approach to answer the research questions. The central 
principles of Context, Mechanism and Outcomes and the need to generate initial 
programme theories about how a programme is expected to work are explained. 
The chapter sets out the three phases of the study and the steps taken to recruit 
stakeholders and participants. Data collection and analysis techniques are outlined 
for Phase one and Phase two of the study. The rationale for using a mixed 
methodological approach to capture information from three case study sites is set 
out with reference to ethical approval and how the case study sites were selected. 
Case study site data, non-participant observation and participant and visitor 
interviews were used to capture data for analysis. Consideration is also given to 
how the researcher may influence the study.  
Chapter 5: This chapter describes how evidence from a scoping review, board 
papers, audit and feedback literature, and unintended consequences concerns, were 
brought together to develop seven context, mechanism outcome configurations to 
describe the initial programme theories  
Chapter 6: This chapter describes the process for refining the initial programme 
theories set out chapter 5 with key stakeholders. This process allows the initial 
theories to be refined before they are tested. 
Chapter 7: This chapter presents the findings from the realist evaluation of the 
programme theories. The theories were tested in three case study sites using multiple 
research methods to test and refine the theories 
Chapter 8: This chapter brings together the findings from all phases of the research 
to bring understanding to how quality dashboards influence care delivery within 
hospital wards. Unintended consequences are considered and the strengths and 
limitation of the study presented. The chapter concludes with recommendations for 






























Phase One Stakeholder interviews
Identify initial programme theories  





Chapter 2 The development of a quality dashboard 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the drivers for quality dashboards in the UK 
and a summary of health care information available to the public. Using a case 
study from a large hospital in the North of England, the steps taken to develop and 
implement a quality dashboard are presented. The intended consequences of the 
quality dashboard are discussed and potential unintended consequences are 
identified. The chapter will conclude with setting out the research aims and 
objectives of this study.  
2.2 The drivers for quality dashboards in the UK  
To address quality and safety concerns (Appendix A), the UK government 
published ‘High Quality Care for All’, a document setting out a shift in approach to 
health care policy. Previous targets and metrics were largely focused upon how 
quickly care was given, such as waiting times in emergency departments and time 
taken for patients to receive treatment. The government’s aim was to broadened 
the metrics to also measure the quality of care provided (Hood, 2006, Department 
of  Health, 2008). 
As previously identified, assessing the quality of healthcare can be difficult 
(Donabedian’s 1966). Lord Darzi, the principle author of High Quality Care for All, 
recognised this and defined quality in healthcare using three criteria: 
 Patient safety; doing no harm to patients. 
 Patient experience; care should be characterised by compassion, dignity and 
respect. 
 Effectiveness of care; to be measured using survival rates, complication rates, 
measures of clinical improvement and patient-reported outcome measures. 
As with previous reports, the collection and publication of information on the quality 
of care was a central theme. The report suggested quality improvement in 
healthcare was going to be achieved predominantly through the publication of 
comparable performance data. The suggestion was this would encourage clinicians 
to improve their practice and systems, and place new emphasis on professionals’ 





To support the collection and publication of comparable data, a National Quality 
Framework (NQF) was created which set out the type of quality indicators for 
primary and secondary care providers to consider. The framework asked HCP to 
capture patient safety, patient experience and effectiveness of care data. 
Recognising the challenges associated with developing methodologies for 
collecting and collating information to allow meaningful comparison between HCP, 
the government commissioned ‘Quality Observatories’. Quality Observatories were 
expected to enable and support benchmarking between hospitals, support the 
development of metrics to enable frontline staff to effectively monitor safety, identify 
opportunities for clinical staff to innovate and improve services, and provide 
quantitative evidence to support change and progress (Riley and Cheema, 2010). 
2.2.1 Financial incentives and penalties  
Financial incentives known as Commissioning for Quality and Innovation (CQUINS) 
were also introduced, to reward hospitals for improving their performance against 
pre-determined indicators. Healthcare regulators such as the Healthcare 
Commission which would later become the Care Quality Commission (CQC) were 
given powers to issue healthcare providers with financial penalties if they failed to 
reduce the number of patients with specific gastrointestinal or blood stream 
infections (Care Quality Commission, 2021) . HCP had to develop systems and 
processes to collect information on incidences, infections, and surgical 
complications to demonstrate their compliance with targets and allow them to 
receive financial incentives or avoid financial penalties. 
2.3 Availability of information on the quality and safety of 
healthcare in the UK 
As transparency was a fundamental principle of the NQF, HCP were required to 
submit data to approximately 80-100 national clinical audit databases. 
Advancement in data warehousing and the introduction of electronic platforms to 
organise care within hospitals has also allowed vast quantities of electronic data to 
be generated and made available to the public. Patients can access hospital 







Figure 2 Example of information available from the CQC website 
 
(Care Quality Commission, 2019) 
As well as hospital performance data, it also became possible to access the 
performance data for individual cardiac surgeons (Figure 3) (Bridgewater et al., 
2007, Keogh and Bridgewater, 2007, Bridgewater et al., 2013). 
Figure 3 The outcome data for a cardiac surgeon in the North of England 
 





Building on the work of cardiac surgery the UK government also set out plans to 
publish similar data by consultant for ten more surgical specialities (Department of 
Health and Social Care, 2014). 
2.3.1 Quality of nursing care  
As the Francis report raised concerns about the standard of nursing care, in 
response the National Institute of Health and Care Excellence (2014) (NICE) 
published guidance on nurse staffing levels for adult in-patient wards in an acute 
hospital setting. While the guidance fell short of identifying specific nurse to patient 
minimal requirements it recommended hospitals were required to monitor ‘safe 
nursing indicators’ (Appendix C). Hospital Boards were also  asked to be given a six 
monthly update on nurses staffing levels and hospital wards were required to 
display the planned vs actual number of nurses available each day (Mid 
Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust and Robert Francis QC, 2013).  
In addition to reporting safe nursing indicator data and nurse staffing levels, 
hospitals were require to submit information to a national database called the NHS 
safety Thermometer  (ST), the use of the tool was incentivised via CQUIN 
payments.   Hospital wards could track their performance against a range of 
measures based upon the potential harm patients’ face when receiving care. Data 
were analysed and made available to the public and staff via a website, information 
could be seen by organisational or by ward (Figure 4) (Morris-Thompson et al., 





Figure 4 An extract from ST showing a ward’s performance over time 
 
(Power et al., 2012) 
2.3.2 Patient feedback; patient reported outcome measures  
A recommendation from the Francis report was to give patients an opportunity to 
provide feedback on their experience of receiving care (Department of Health and 
Social Care, 2014). Within the NHS, Patient Reported Outcome Measures 
(PROMs) data has been collected since 2009 from patients who have undergone 
hip and knee surgery, minor vascular procedures and hernia repairs. The aim was 
to calculate the health gains after surgical treatment using pre- and post-operative 
surveys. PROMs measure a patient’s health status or health-related quality of life at 
a single point in time. The information is collected before and after a procedure and 
provides an indication of the outcomes or quality of care (NHS England, 2019 ). 
Although limited to a small number of procedures in the UK, PROMs have been 
used to assess the quality of care for a number of surgical procedures around the 
world. How the feedback from PROMs is used by HCP to influence care delivery is 
not clear (McGrail et al., 2011, Breckenridge et al., 2015, Greenhalgh et al., 2018, 
Turner et al., 2019). 
Greenhalgh et al. (2018) sought to identify ideas or programme theories about how 





international evidence to examine how performance data leads to intended and 
unintended changes in HCP provider behaviour and this can be influenced by 
contextual factors.  
Greenhalgh et al. (2018) found patients rarely used publicly reported information to 
inform their choice of HCP, instead they used previous personal experience or the 
opinions of friends and family. HCP were concerned about the consequences of 
being labelled as a poor performer and the impact this would have on their 
reputation. Financial incentives were found to lead to only short-term improvement 
in care and efforts to maintain performance dwindled when financial incentives 
stopped. The use of financial incentives and performance indicators with limited 
validity with clinicians had a greater propensity to gaming or data manipulation to 
ensure the target was achieved. HCP also had the potential to focus upon 
achieving the target (tunnel vision) at the expense of other competing needs. The 
credibility, timeliness and accuracy of data were also found have an impact on the 
believability of the information. As PROMs data do not provide information on the 
cause of poor care or why HCP became outliers, HCP also need to have the ability 
to interpret, and react to the information they receive. The study found not all HCP 
had experience of quality improvement or access to their own quality data to 
investigate the root cause of their issues. The paper recommends HCP should 
disseminate information to staff closest to the patient and allow them to provide 
insight into how improvements in patient care could be made. 
The realist synthesis showed there was limited research evidence to support 
theories of how PROMs data stimulate quality improvement. It did however identify 
three programme theories (supporting patient choice, improving accountability, and 
performance comparison) and influencing contextual factors to guide how to 
maximise the impact PROMs data can have on improving patient care (Greenhalgh 
et al., 2018). 
2.3.3 Patient feedback; friends and family test 
As PROMs data are limited to only a few surgical procedures in the UK, NHS 
England launched the Friends and Family Test (FFT) in April 2013. The FFT is a 
tool to collect patient feedback on their experience of care. A number of questions 
are asked including the Net Promoter Score question ‘How likely is it that you would 
recommend our service to a friend or colleague?’ respondents indicate the 
likelihood on a 10-point rating scale. Net Promoter Scores (NPS), are a 





loyalty metrics. Since its launch, FFT has generated more than 75 million pieces of 
feedback and receives approximately 1.3 million more every month. Feedback data 
are captured via on line surveys, hand written post cards left on wards or 
departments at the end of a patients care episode, or via a telephone survey.  The 
aim of the FFT is to use feedback to identify what is working well and what can be 
improved. It provides a mechanism to highlight both good and poor patient 
experience (Maben et al., 2012, Sizmur et al., 2015, NHS England, 2019).  
Sizmur et al. (2015) undertook a secondary analysis of FFT data to investigate the 
impact of demographic factors such patients’ age and sex, and the mode of 
feedback. The study used data from 38,998 inpatients and 29,610 emergency 
department attendees at 429 wards or units in 32 hospitals. It found, women gave 
less positive ratings than men and telephone responses were found to be the most 
positive followed by post card responses. Online responses were significantly less 
positive than postcard and telephone responses. The study concluded suggesting 
FFT data are vulnerable to bias from demographic factors and can be influenced by 
the method of data capture. Unlike PROMs, comparisons between organisations 
should be avoided until a national approach to data capture was in place. The study 
suggested FFT scores may be useful at a local level but did not identify how data 
are used by HCP to improve care.  
The FFT and PROMs programmes have captured vast quantities of patient 
feedback, at considerable cost (NHS Confederation, 2013, NHS England, 2019). 
Power (1997) predicted, as healthcare and education moved from central 
government control to increased autonomy for hospitals and schools, there would 
be an ‘audit explosion’. Information from audits would become the primary focus for 
regulatory inspections and allow organisational and individual performance to 
become visible to a wider audience. Currently there has never been as much 
information on the quality and safety of care available for patients, staff, and the 
public to access. (The Health Foundation, 2013, Illingworth, 2014, Randell et al., 
2016, Keen et al., 2018b). How this information influences care delivery within 





2.4 Development of a quality dashboard; a case study 
presenting the Ward Health Check Quality Dashboard (WHC-
QD) 
To highlight the impact of national initiatives on HCP, the development of a QD at 
the case study site will be presented as a case study. The aim is to highlight the 
challenges, development, and implementation of the programme and the intended 
consequences of its implementation. Information to support the text is taken from 
the researcher’s personal experience of working as a senior nurse within the HCP 
at the time of its development, transcripts from phase one data, which will be 
presented later in the thesis, and from publicly available patient information leaflets 
and HCP board papers.  
As shown earlier in this chapter, HCP in the UK, were required to submit 
information to a number of national databases, (ST, FFT, PROMs, surgeons 
outcome data) and have information available for regulators, patients, and the 
public. Despite this wealth of information, very few had access to routine data that 
could be used to identify specific aspects of care that needed improvement or 
wards in need of support (Greenhalgh et al., 2018, Keen et al., 2018b). This specific 
issue was highlighted in 2012 when the CQC undertook an unplanned inspection of 
a large NHS Teaching Hospital and the case study site for this research. During the 
inspection, several patients raised concerns about nurse staffing levels and the 
quality of the care they received.  
Recognising the need for more robust assurance processes, the organisation’s 
response to the CQC visit was to undertake a review of nurse staffing levels and set 
up a working group to develop a dashboard (QD) to monitor the quality and safety 
of patient care. A cross-section of nurses joined analysts and informatics experts to 
develop the Ward Health Check (WHC-QD). The aim was to create a dashboard 
that could report on structure, process and outcome measures of care, to act as a 
smoke detector to identify wards in need of support and provide assurance to 
senior managers care within the organisation was safe (National Advisory Group on 
the safety of patients in England, 2013). The WHC-QD was launched at the case 







Figure 5 Timeline of WHC-QD development and implementation 
 
2.4.1 What should the WHC-QD measure? 
Power (1997) suggests audit for the purpose of certification, assurance or as a 
vehicle to drive change only works if processes can be made auditable. Making 
things auditable is a practical issue, rather than a scientific process. You have to 
audit against an agreed standard, if the standard is incorrect or contested, then the 
information from the audit is less useful (Power, 1997).  
As previously highlighted, assessing the quality of healthcare can be difficult, HCP 
have evolved into complex organisations, managing complex issues caused by the 
dynamic environment in which healthcare exist. The need to respond to population 
demands,  introduction of new treatments and technologies, and reassure 
regulators, professional groups, governments, funders, and patients the care 
provided is safe, appropriate and cost effective places considerable demands on 
HCP (Donabedian, 1966, Strome, 2014).  
To measure and monitor care across a number of hospitals with different specialist 
wards and departments was complex. The metrics chosen by the case-study site 
for the WHC-QD were a selection of structure, process and outcome measures that 




























Structure metrics reflected the attributes of the ward such as staffing levels, process 
metrics captured the interaction between the HCP and patient in the course of 
providing care, and the outcome metrics reflect individual quantifiable end points or 
events. As an example, the structure metric reports the number of staff working on 
the ward per shift, the process metric reports compliance with completion of a falls 
risk assessment tool designed to identify patients at risk of falls, and the outcome 
metric reports the numbers of patients who had fallen. Looking at all three metrics 
allows a better understanding of the quality of care provided by the ward. A 
summary of the metrics are shown in Figure 6. 
Figure 6 Specific metrics inputted into the WHC-Q 
 
The metrics chosen by the case-study site, were similar to the key findings from a 
task and finish group set up to bring together evidence and theory to define key 
indicators of high quality nursing (Maben et al., 2012).  
This report was commissioned by the chief nurse of England to support the 
development of metrics to measure the quality of nursing care. The aim was to 
have all HCP using the same metrics to assess quality of care. The report found 
outcome measures such as healthcare associated infections, pressure ulcers, falls, 
drug administration error, and patient complaints were key metrics. Workforce data 
such as staffing levels, sickness rates, and staff experience were also considered 
important contextual or structural measures. The report found there was variation in 
dashboard maturity between HCP in the UK and limited bench marking 




























The evidence from the USA and Canada suggested it was possible to link up 
hundreds of hospitals to share information on nurse staffing levels, number of falls, 
pressure ulcers, medication errors, and patient satisfaction data. This information 
was used to monitor the status of hospitals, identify risks or areas for improvement, 
and track progress on initiatives or interventions. Evidence from international QD 
also suggested it was possible to risk adjust patient level data to allow meaningful 
comparison between healthcare systems and specific specialities (Maben et al., 
2012). The report suggested the development of QD in the UK would need 
significant investment in the informatics infrastructure to capture data across HCP. 
It would also need to develop standards and definitions of care to support the 
development of metrics to allow comparison and benchmarking of HCP 
performance (Maben et al., 2012).   
Recognising the recommendations from the Maben et al. (2012) report, the case 
study site aimed to capture much of the structure and outcome metrics through 
existing electronic platforms within the organisation (incidents, infection, workforce, 
friends and family test). Assessing the process metrics needed an audit programme 
to capture the care given to patients in each of the wards. A summary of the 
expected standard of care was created from existing policies and procedures, 
agreed by the chief nurse and shared with ward managers. A monthly audit visit by 
an independent senior nurse (someone who would normally work in another area of 
the hospital) was agreed and the information was uploaded to an electronic 
database. The monthly audit visit was known as the ‘Ward Metrics Audit 
Programme’ (WMAP) and would require the auditor to review the care records of 5 
patients and assess key safety features within a ward. The audit reviewed logbooks 
to assess compliance with daily checks of the emergency resuscitation equipment 
and the safe storage of medication. Training on how to undertake the audit was 
given and periodic quality control checks for the purpose of validation were 
undertaken by a corporate nursing team. 
2.4.2 Output from the WHC-QD  
Once the standards of care, metrics and data collection methods were agreed, it 
was important to decide how information from WHC-QD would be used within the 
organisation.  
The WHC-QD offered an opportunity to fundamentally change the visibility of the 





case study site only staff working in the macro and meso levels of the organisation 
(Table 1) would review performance information.  
Table 1 Organisational structure in healthcare 
Levels of an Organisation 
Macro Regulator, Commissioner, Hospital Board, Chief Nurse/Medical 
Officer/Executive, Directors of Nursing/ Directors of Quality 
Meso Head of Nursing, General Manager, Clinical Directors, Matron, 
Allied Health Professional Lead, Clinic Lead, Manager. 
Micro Ward manager, Ward Clerk, Staff Nurse, Clinical Support 
Worker, Student Nurse, Patient, Relative, Allied Health 
Professional, Medical staff.  
 
The WHC-QD was designed to allow all staff access to the same performance 
information as the chief nurse. At the microsystem level of the HCP, once a month 
data from the WHC-QD was used to create performance information that could be 
graphically displayed for staff patients and visitors to see on an information display 





Figure 7 Photograph of a PSB on a Case Study Site Ward 
 
(Reproduced with permission from the case study site, IRAS Reference Number: 
196077)  
Performance data were graphically represented as dials and a speedometer and 
displayed on the PSB (Figure 8 and Figure 9). In figure 8, it is possible to see that 
venous thromboembolisation performance is below a red line set at 80% and 
therefore would be an area to consider for improvement. Figure 9 displays an 
overall assessment or composite score of performance and the previous month’s 
position. Composite scores are multiple metrics rolled into a single figure, they 
reduce the amount of information needed to allow a judgement to be made and 
offer a snapshot of performance. Care must be taken with composite scores as 
variation in an important metrics could be masked with over performance in other 
areas. Consideration should be given to weighting key metrics, and further 






Figure 8 Example of performance data displayed on PSB 
 
(Images taken from a patient information leaflet explaining the WCH-QD. 
Reproduced with permission from the case study site, IRAS Reference Number: 
196077) 
Figure 9 Example of performance data displayed on PSB from WHC-QD 
 
(Images taken from a patient information leaflet explaining the WCH-QD. 






In addition to the information displayed on the PSB, a comprehensive data set was 
available via networked hospital computers. The functionality of the WHC-QD 
allowed ward-to-ward comparison, and specific metrics could be interrogated. This 
information was often used by staff working at the micro and meso level of the 
organisation (Table 1) and used to generate reports, provide a focus for discussion 
between management teams such as matrons and ward managers and display a 
summary of performance on a wide range of measures and initiatives, such as FFT, 
ST, staffing levels and number of infection by ward (Figure 10). 
Figure 10 Types of metrics displayed by WHC-QD 
 
(Images taken from a patient information leaflet explaining the WCH-QD. 
Reproduced with permission from the case study site, IRAS Reference Number: 
196077) 
Information from the WHC-QD was also presented at management and governance 
meetings within the HCP and used to assess the performance of wards. An 
escalation policy was developed which used six core metrics to identify when a 
ward needed additional management support. When performance against these 
metrics fell below a certain threshold, this would trigger an escalation process that 





The WHC-QD was also used to highlight when a ward was successful in making 
improvements or consistently achieved their targets. When wards had improved 
their position or achieved a consistent level of performance for a period of longer 
than 12 weeks, they received recognition for their achievements. Recognition of 
success would take the form of reducing frequency of WMAP visits, a sign that an 
area could be trusted to maintain standards of care. Ward managers would receive 
certificates of achievements from nurse directors with recognition of their success 
shared via social media and internal hospital newsletters.  
Information from the WHC-QD was also used to generate information for patients and 
the public via a six monthly Board report presented at public board meetings and 
available via the hospital website (Figure 11).  
Figure 11 Extract WHC-QD found in HCP publicly available board paper 
 
(Images taken from a board paper display data from WHC-QD. Reproduced with 





The publication of performance information in board reports is in line with findings 
from Keen et al. (2018a) who investigated the progress acute NHS hospitals had 
made in developing technological infrastructures to enable them to monitor the 
quality and safety of care within their organisation. The team reviewed publicly 
available board reports for 152 HCP in the UK and found all had data on waiting 
times, ST, FFT, complaints and incidents within the paper. Although board level 
dashboards were an integral part of HCP management information systems, it 
found ward managers and those at the micro level of the organisation were often 
receiving limited information regarding performance.  
A field study was undertaken in four HCP and found although the development of 
real time ward management systems was limited, HCP were publishing more data 
on their performance than ever before. The study found the quality and safety of 
care was reported to have improved in the 4 case study sites and technological 
infrastructures developed to capture and share data had contributed to this 
improvement (Keen et al., 2018a, Keen et al., 2018b).  
The WHC-QD developed by the HCP was an electronic platform that allowed data 
to be captured, and shared with staff all levels of the organisation (Figure 12). As 
Keen et al. (2018a) identified QD can contribute to improvements in safety and 
quality, although how this is achieved is not clear.  
































2.5 Unintended consequences of quality dashboards  
Although QD have the potential to improve the quality and safety of care within 
HCP, consideration must be given to the time and cost of their development (Keen 
et al., 2018a). QD have the potential to improve the quality and safety of care within 
HCP, consideration must be given to the time and cost of their development. Power 
(1997) reminds the reader that information is never free and is often expensive in 
ways that rarely occur to those who demand it. The cost of data collection and 
analysis is estimated at £500 million per year in the UK’s NHS, with over one 
thousand clinical datasets, mortality statistics and information on productivity, 
responsiveness, and quality of care (NHS Confederation, 2013, NHS Digital, 2018).  
Once it has been decided what and how to measure quality and safety in 
healthcare, what to do with the information must also be carefully considered. It is 
recognised that measurement and public reporting carries risks and is far from 
problem free. Paradoxically, instruments to enhance visibility and transparency are 
themselves interpretations and are therefore at risk of misrepresentation and 
manipulation (Lilford et al., 2004, Hood, 2006, Raleigh, 2010).  
While the intention of QD development is based upon making improvements and 
providing reassurance, many authors have warned of the unintended 
consequences that rise inadvertently from health performance measurement 
(Power, 1997, Lilford et al., 2004, Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012, Dahler-Larsen, 
2014, Beer, 2016, Greenhalgh et al., 2018, Muller, 2018).  
Mannion and Braithwaite (2012) published ‘a taxonomy of dysfunctional 
consequences’ of performance measurement in healthcare (Appendix V). They 
identified 20 lessons to consider under the broad headings of poor measurement; 
misplaced incentives and sanctions; breach of trust, and the politicisation of 
performance systems. The main concerns are centred on measurement fixation, 
tunnel vision and the manipulation of data or gaming that has the potential to 
invalidate the veracity of a QD.  
Measurement fixation is the emphasis on meeting a target rather than considering 
the true intent of why the target was introduced. Mannion and Braithwaite (2012) 
and Muller (2018) cite examples from UK emergency departments who introduced 
steps which would achieve the 4 hour emergency admission standard but added 





becomes focused upon achieving particular targets, at the expense of other 
important issues that may be unmeasured or unmeasurable.  
The motivation for gaming by individuals or organisations are driven by the 
incentives created by making performance information visible (Lilford et al., 2004, 
Beer, 2016). Outcome based performance data that risks organisation or individual 
reputational damage or leads to financial rewards or avoids financial penalties have 
been shown to lead to dysfunctional behaviour such as gaming and data 
misrepresentation. Misrepresentation is the deliberate manipulation of data, and 
ranges from creative accounting to fraud. Gaming is the alteration of data to obtain 
an advantage or avoid a penalty. While there was not always evidence put forward 
that could identify deliberate attempts to manipulate performance metrics, the use 
of financial rewards in healthcare to achieve targets has the potential to raise 
suspicion and cast doubt upon the credibility of the performance data (Hood, 2006, 
Greenhalgh et al., 2018, Muller, 2018). 
The credibility of QD data was seen as important as change was more likely when 
staff understood what was being measured and were working towards a 
professional goal. Muller (2018) uses the example of the Cleveland Clinic who 
reduced the incidence of sepsis from central line infections within their organisation 
using quality measurement. Muller (2018) suggests the improvement was likely due 
to the peer pressure created by the metrics and the team working together to solve 
a complex problem. Lilford et al. (2004) suggests the key to improvement is 
knowledge and to drive out fear from performance metrics as reward and 
punishment strategies often lead to distortion of the data or the process. Successful 
audit and feedback only takes place in a culture that does not attribute blame 
(Power, 1997).  
It is therefore recognised the measurement and public reporting of performance 
data has been shown to include risks, it is therefore recommended that QD metrics 
should be reviewed to keep negative consequences to a minimum, and incorporate 






2.6 How does the WH-QD influence care delivery within 
hospital wards? 
The WHC-QD was implemented within 74 inpatient wards in December 2013 and 
extended into over 100 wards and departments by 2018. The programme was 
updated, with new metrics added often in response to NHS England priorities, new 
standards of care or patient safety alerts, for example, the WMAP was updated to 
ensure wall air outlets were not used within wards, due to an incident that identified 
a potential risk when one was mistaken for an oxygen outlet.  
Prior to the introduction of the WHC-QD, although vast quantities of information 
about the quality and safety of healthcare was available, this information was 
generally accessed by managers, commissioners and regulators with limited 
evidence to suggest it was shared with nursing staff working within hospital wards 
or accessed by patients prior to their admission to hospital (Dixon-Woods et al., 
2013, Lloyd, 2017, Keen et al., 2018a) 
The aim of the WHC-QD was to develop a programme that could measure standards 
of care, patient outcomes and patient’s experience of care and make this information 
accessible to staff and patients (Case study site board paper 2013). Lord Darzi, 
(Department of  Health, 2008) suggested this would provide a lever for change, as 
transparency about performance will facilitate meaningful conversations about how 
staff working in the NHS can continuously improve the quality of care they deliver. 
However QD can only be effective if the knowledge gained from the information they 
present influence actions, decisions, and behaviours. Dashboards themselves have 
no inherent value if people do not engage or respond to them (Okes, 2013).  
2.7 Research objectives  
While hospital wards may have similar policies, procedures, and staffing structures 
they are not homogenous units delivering homogenised care to patients. Each ward 
is a complex micro system with complex interplay between staff members, 
hierarchies, and teams working together to provide individualised care for patients 
with a range of social, physical, psychological and spiritual care needs. The impact 
of new initiatives or interventions when introduced into hospital wards can therefore 
vary. As Realist Evaluation (RE) is a methodological approach which aims to 
advance understanding of why complex interventions work, how, for whom and in 





an intervention or programme fails to achieve its anticipated outcomes it seemed an 
appropriate approach to understand how and why QD influence care delivery within 
hospital wards and if they make healthcare safer. 
The aim of this research is therefore to use RE to understand how and why quality 
dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards. 
The specific objectives of the study are to   
1. Critically review the evidence for QD within hospital wards.  
2. Explore with those responsible for the development and management of the 
WHC-QD their perceptions of the intended consequences and possible 
unintended consequence of its deployment within wards.  
3. Use a range of approaches to explore the impact of QD within hospitals 
wards including staff interviews.  
4. Explain how and why QD influences care delivery within hospital wards and 
to understand the influence of contextual factors. 
2.8 Chapter summary 
This chapter has set out the need for HCP within the UK to develop strategies to 
capture data on the quality and safety of healthcare and the incentives given to 
make this information available to governments, regulators, staff, and patients. 
Advancements in data warehousing and an increased use of electronic platforms to 
organise care has made capturing healthcare data increasingly possible. A vast 
array of electronic information about the safety of hospitals and surgical procedures 
is now available and is presented. In response to local and national concerns 
regarding standards of care, the development of a QD was presented as a case 
study to highlight the challenges and considerations needed to capture data on 
structure, process and outcome measures of care within a HCP and explains how 
this information was used.  
The intention of the WHC-QD is to improve the quality and safety of care within the 
organisation, however consideration must be given to the unintended 
consequences of its development and the impact this may have on its ability to 
influence change. Although patients are expected to receive the same standard of 
care while in hospital, the complex interplay between staff members and hierarchies 
suggest the impact of the WHC-QD was likely to vary from ward to ward, 





interventions work, in some circumstances and are less successful in others. With 
this in mind, the aims and objectives of the study are presented and Chapter 3 will 
explore the evidence to explain how and why quality dashboards influence care 







Chapter 3 Scoping review 
3.1 Introduction 
As RE requires initial theories to explain how QD influence care delivery within 
hospital wards a review of the literature will be undertaken. This chapter will discuss 
the concept of dashboards and their application within healthcare and present the 
results of a scoping review. As the WHC-QD is also a system of audit and 
feedback, this literature will also be critically reviewed to identify theories that may 
explain how QD influence behaviour. 
3.2 What are dashboards? 
Dashboards provide a graphical display of aggregated data to enable rapid 
assessment of performance against a range of pre-determined metrics. They are 
used to communicate complex data to individuals, teams or organisations and their 
development draws on theories from information systems, accounting and cognitive 
psychology (Few, 2004, Okes, 2013, Velcu-Laitinen and Yigitbasiouglu, 2012). 
A quality dashboard within healthcare often displays a range of structure, process 
and outcome measures about safety, experience and effectiveness (Okes 2013). 
Strome (2014) in his work on healthcare analytics, uses Few’s definition to remind 
the reader to see dashboards as much more than a collection of charts, graphs and 
numbers but tools to achieve objectives. 
As a concept, dashboards were often used within the financial and sales sectors of 
organisations as visual and functional performance management tools, developed 
from their intrinsic purpose of monitoring performance to allow more analytical 
functions such as drill down capabilities, flexible visual presentation styles. Within 
the healthcare literature, dashboards generally fall into two categories, clinical 
dashboards and quality dashboards. Although these terms are often used 
interchangeably, quality dashboards refer to a tool that visually displays outcomes 
and process measures or metrics that enable managers and staff at an 
organisational, departmental or ward level to identify areas for improvement (RCN, 
2012, Heslop and Lu, 2014). This is in contrast to clinical dashboards that provide 
individual clinicians with relevant and timely information to inform clinical decisions 





The genesis of modern healthcare dashboards can be traced to the development of 
hospital reports or scorecards in the 1980s (Nelson, 1995), Kaplan and Norton 
(1992) work on balanced scorecards in the USA in the 1990s and the drive to 
improve cardiac surgical outcomes by Nugent (1994). Drivers for the development 
of quality healthcare dashboards in more recent times have come from a number of 
authors (Institute of Medicine, 2001, The Health Foundation, 2011, Makary and 
Daniel, 2016, Shojania and Dixon-Woods, 2017, Lloyd, 2017). As information 
technology within hospitals has evolved, electronic platforms such as staff rosters, 
e-observations, and medication administration are being used to organise, monitor 
and deliver care within wards and departments. These systems capture vast sums 
of data that are being used to develop quality dashboards. The research literature 
has largely been focused upon clinical dashboards and there are limited numbers of 
empirical studies that explore how quality dashboards are being used in practice 
and the circumstances that enhance or inhibit their impact (Dowding et al., 2015). 
For that reason, a scoping review rather than a systematic review has been 
undertaken (RCN, 2012, Ramsay et al., 2014, Dowding et al., 2015). 
When Dowding et al., published a review of the literature in  2015,  547 articles 
were identified, 68 were conference abstracts’ suggesting that research is being 
undertaken, 11 articles were included in the synthesis, one was rated as high 
quality and only one was identified as a quality dashboard. The conclusion of 
Dowding et al., (2015) review suggests dashboards appear to be associated with a 
positive effect on outcomes and care processes but limitations with the study 
designs should be considered. The review showed a limited  numbers of empirical 
studies had been published that explored how quality dashboards are used in 
practice and the circumstances that enhance or inhibit their impact. The review also 
suggested future research should focus on how quality and clinical dashboards 
influence the behaviour and actions of staff and to consider the intended and 
unintended consequences of their introduction. As Dowding et al., (2015) review 
included clinical and quality dashboards, and the focus of this research is to 
understand how quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospitals wards a 
scoping review limited to QD and hospitals was undertaken. 
3.3 Method 
This scoping review follows the framework developed by  Arksey and O'Malley 





methodological approaches including data from the grey literature (Anderson et al., 
2008, Levac et al., 2010, Armstrong et al., 2011, Tricco et al., 2018). To understand 
how QD influence care delivery, a search strategy was guided by the broad 
research question of “do quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospital 
wards?” This review is reported according to the PRISMA extension for scoping 
reviews (PRISM-ScR) (Tricco et al. 2018).  
An initial search was carried out using eight electronic databases (Cochrane, 
Embase, Ovid Medline, Web of Science, Scopus, Proquest, PsycInfo and Health 
Management Information Consortium) as these are known to focus their search 
within the relevant areas of healthcare, management, and psychology. The search 
terms used (Table 2) were chosen as they describe the core concepts relating to 
the use of performance data and dashboards within healthcare. Although the focus 
of the review is quality dashboards, the term clinical dashboard was included in the 
search as an initial review of the literature identified the terms quality and clinical 
dashboards are often used interchangeably (RCN, 2012). No year restrictions were 
added to the search strategy.   
Table 2 Initial search terms 
Dashboards, Balanced scorecards, Analytics, Audit and feedback, Performance 
metrics, Clinical dashboards, Nursing metrics, Safety thermometer, Harm free 
care,  Safety express,  Quality dashboards  
 
All citations were electronically imported into Endnote 7 (reference management 
software) and duplicate articles were removed. An initial search and the title and 
abstract of the remaining articles were reviewed for eligibility. Articles were selected 
if they referred to a QD or clinical dashboard within a hospital ward. Full text 
versions of the selected articles were downloaded and underwent a second stage 
review. The second stage review excluded studies describing or suggesting the 
type of metrics that could be used to design a healthcare dashboard and focused 
upon those used in practice. Once the papers were selected, information was 
tabulated according to the country and area of healthcare. The intended purpose of 
the QD was noted with any reported outcomes measures. The articles were 
reviewed for suggestions of how quality dashboards influenced care delivery within 
hospital wards. A quality assessment was undertaken using the Mixed Methods 
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In total 27 articles were included for review and presented in Appendix B. All 
of the articles published from 2010 onwards and explore a range of the 
healthcare systems from around the world, although the majority are from 
the USA and the UK (Figure 14). 
Figure 14 Breakdown of published articles by country 
 
 
The selected articles have been categorised into four main groups:  
1. Medication Safety. (MS) Number of articles = 5  
2. Hospital Dashboards. (HD) Number of articles = 8 
3. Speciality Specific Dashboards (SSD) Number of articles = 9 
4. Initiative Evaluation. (IE) Number of articles = 5 
A quality assessment tool; Mixed Methods Appraisal Tool (MMAT) was used to 
review 11 of the studies that used a mixed method approach (Pluye et al., 2009, 
Souto et al., 2015). The tool is used to appraise the methodological quality of the 
studies not the quality of the article.  Three of the 11 articles met 100% of the 
MMAT criteria ((Benning et al., 2011, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Ramsay et al., 
2014) in that the research design and results addressed the research question with 
appropriate limitations identified. The remaining 8 articles, three achieved a  75% 
quality score (Coleman et al., 2013, Redwood et al., 2013 Christiansen et al., 
2014), four achieved a 50% (Daley et al., 2013, Clark et al., 2014, Jeffs et al., 2014, 






















3.4.1 Medication Safety 
Five articles within the review focused upon dashboards designed to improve 
standards of medication prescribing and reduce omitted doses of medicines 
(Coleman, 2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2014, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Ramsay et 
al., 2014, Rostami et al., 2016). Only two studies demonstrated an improvement in 
performance over time with both using dashboards as part of a wider initiative to 
drive change (Coleman, 2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2014). Dixon-Woods et al. 
(2014)  undertook an ethnographic study within a large hospital in the UK to explore 
work undertaken to improve medication administration performance. The hospital 
used information from electronic prescribing and decision support tools to generate 
a dashboard that displayed 34 indicators that provided a summary of a ward’s 
performance against the hospital’s average. Clinical staff could access the 
dashboard at any time by logging into a hospital computer with feedback on 
performance also given via email and in performance and management meetings. 
The dashboard made practice, behaviour and performance visible and led to the 
introduction of initiatives to reduce the number of missed medication doses for 
patients. The number of omissions of prescribed medications was monitored over 
an eighteen-month period, reducing from 12% to 5%.  
Those interviewed for the study suggested that improvements are caused by 
highlighting individual’s performance through email and the introduction of monthly 
root-cause analysis meetings. The root-cause analysis meetings were chaired by 
senior managers within the organisation and were used as an opportunity to 
emphasise the organisation’s commitment to improving patient care.  Crucial to the 
success of the meeting was assurance that the data were credible, contemporary 
and accurate so the team could focus on what had gone wrong rather than whether 
it had gone wrong. Dixon-Woods et al. (2014) study demonstrated improvements in 
performance against predetermined metrics could be achieved, with dashboards 
playing a role in highlighting areas for improvement and providing focus for root 
cause analysis meetings.  
In a similar study Coleman (2013) demonstrated improvements in reducing the 
number of omitted medications in a large hospital over a four year period following 
the introduction of an electronic prescribing system, a dashboard showing visual 
metrics on overdue doses and the introduction of root cause analysis meetings to 
investigate missed medication doses. The study used a retrospective time series 





omissions over a four-year period. The results revealed that the introduction of a 
dashboard with feedback via weekly emails to senior management, with escalation 
to executive level if an unacceptable threshold was reached did achieve an 
immediate 0.60 percentage point reduction in delayed antibiotic administration and 
0.41 percentage point reduction in delays to non-antibiotic medication. As with the 
Dixon-Woods et al. (2013) study, Coleman (2013) also identified that the greatest 
improvements in practice were seen when dashboard information was used to 
implement a targeted intervention such as a root cause analysis meeting. Coleman 
et al.’s (2013) study found the introduction of the dashboard and root cause 
analysis meetings resulted in a reduction of missed medications doses by 1112 per 
week across the organisation and therefore had the greatest impact on reducing the 
numbers of omitted medications. Coleman et al.’s (2013) study suggests that data 
from electronic prescribing systems can be used to help reduce overdue drug dose 
rates when used in a proactive way. If there is board level involvement with a 
specific quality improvement goals, quality dashboards can lead to improved 
organisational performance.  
In a smaller scale study, Ramsay et al. (2014) developed medication safety metrics 
based upon compliance with drug prescription and administration standards. 
Compliance with the standards were audited across three wards in Hospital A and 
three wards in Hospital B over a seven-week period. In Hospital A, feedback on 
performance was given weekly to the ward manager and discussed at each nursing 
shift handover. In Hospital B, feedback was given via established staff meetings. 
The audit and feedback cycle continued over a seven week period with the data 
analysed using a difference in difference, quasi-experimental technique designed to 
measure the effect of the introduction of an intervention. Interviews were also 
undertaken with staff working in the sites to discuss their experiences of providing 
and receiving dashboard feedback. The study found that patients were exposed to 
medication safety risks in all six wards with no significant improvements identified 
following seven weeks of dashboard feedback. Interviews with staff identified that 
competing priorities, resource issues and a lack of engagement from the ward 
management team may have limited the effect of the feedback. 
3.4.2 Hospital Dashboards  
Eight papers within this review describe the introduction of quality dashboards 
within hospitals (Brown et al., 2010, Davis et al., 2010, Clark et al., 2013, Jeffs et 





Brown et al. (2010), Russell et al. (2014), Jeffs et al. (2014a), Ratwani and Fong 
(2015) describe the development and implementation of quality dashboards within 
North America and the UK. While limited outcome data is reported, motivation for 
dashboard development, specific aspects of their design, and the intended 
consequences of their introduction and impact on patient safety is evident. Brown et 
al. (2010) describe how quality indicators and nurse sensitive indicators were 
monitored in 196 hospitals in the USA over a seven-year period. Aggregated data 
demonstrated a 5% reduction in the number of patients who developed pressure 
ulcers or who had a fall while in hospital. While a 5% reduction over a seven-year 
period seems somewhat limited, when the data are broken down by organisation, 
the impact of the quality dashboard varied significantly between hospitals. Brown et 
al. (2010) suggest the improvements were due to linking performance to payments 
and making the data available to staff and patients, although it is not clear from the 
paper how staff and patients receive the dashboard information.  The article 
suggests the publication of data allowed hospitals to benchmark performance and 
patients to choose the healthcare provider with the best outcomes. However, 
systematic reviews undertaken by Fung et al. (2008), Henderson and Henderson 
(2010), Ketelaar et al. (2011), Henderson and Henderson (2015) found limited 
evidence to establish the relationship between the publication of performance data 
and improvement in patient safety. 
Russell et al. (2014) discuss the introduction of a nursing dashboard into 70 wards 
across three hospitals in Scotland.  While the focus of the article is on design and 
implementation, feedback from ward managers and senior nurses highlight the 
usefulness of the dashboard and its impact on improving practice. It suggested 
dashboards assist clinical teams to interpret quality improvement information and 
provide structure to management meetings, thus helping ward teams to target 
areas of care which need to improve and encouraging staff to take ownership, 
resulting in action.  
Jeffs et al. (2014) found similar themes when interviewing staff following the 
introduction of a nurse led audit and feedback dashboard in a large teaching 
hospital in Canada. Dashboards were implemented in 22 hospital wards with the 
information displayed on smart boards in staffrooms, on ward computers, and on 
hard copies on notice boards. Jeffs et al. (2014) undertook 56 interviews with staff 
nurses and ward managers. Key themes from the study were that the dashboard 





experience, providing a visual update of how their ward was performing. The 
dashboard provided reassurance that their effort was making a difference in 
improving patient care and gave them a sense of pride in the work they were doing. 
Some participants described how important it was to see their ward’s performance 
over time as it allowed patterns to emerge. The information formed a focal point for 
discussion and identified areas of practice to improve. The staff used the 
dashboards as aide memoirs, reminding them of where improvements were 
needed. Overall, the nursing staff interviewed in this study found quality dashboards 
to be a useful tool for keeping track of process, outcome and experiential indicators, 
but recognised nurses needed capacity to interpret and use data in a meaningful 
way to make improvements or change practice.   
Clark et al. (2014) describe the development and implementation of electronic 
patient journey dashboards designed to track a patient’s journey while in hospital. 
Following an initial pilot, dashboards were installed in a number of medical, surgical 
and maternity units across fourteen hospitals in Queensland, Australia. The study 
used a mixed methods approach to evaluate the impact of the dashboard. The 
results found in the study sites there was improved compliance with documenting 
estimated date of discharge data, improved communication between teams and a 
reduction in length of stay by an average of 1.86 days across the study sites. The 
article suggests the reduction in length of stay was due to improvement in the flow 
of information, discharge planning, referral alerts and handovers between clinical 
teams.  
Patel et al. (2018) undertook a cluster randomised controlled trial comparing giving 
standard audit and feedback information with an intensive approach. A group of 40 
doctors were involved in the study over a four-month period. The aim of the study 
was to identify factors that would promote the use of dashboard data to facilitate 
behaviour change and identify any potential barriers. The intensive feedback group 
were given access to an online data dashboard and a weekly face-to-face review of 
their performance data. The findings from the study revealed those who received 
intensive feedback significantly increase their performance against composite 
metrics designed to assess performance of discharge planning, record keeping and 
compliance with best practice standards. The difference was found to be 
statistically significant (P<0.0001) between the two groups during the intensive 
feedback period but was not sustained once the intervention ceased. The paper 





from the intensive to the usual feedback group during the study due to clinical 
commitments. This study does however suggest that dashboard data alone is not 
sufficient to drive improvements; rather, performance improves when dashboard 
data are combined with face to face feedback (Patel et al., 2018). 
3.4.3 Speciality Specific Dashboards  
Changes in aspects of practice within hospital wards as a result of the introduction 
of a dashboard have also been demonstrated in studies by Daley et al. (2013), 
Smith et al (2014), Weiner et al (2015), and Field et al. (2018). Daley et al. (2013) 
evaluated the introduction of a quality dashboard in an older person’s mental health 
unit. The study used a questionnaire to explore staff perceptions of the dashboard 
three months after its introduction. The response rate for the questionnaire was 
60% with 21 included for analysis. Although limited by the number of participants, 
those who did take part in the study identified that a dashboard improved 
communication within the unit and increased staff awareness of information. There 
was also improved compliance with completion of documentation with, for example, 
completion of patient fall risk assessments increasing from 0% to 82% within a six-
month period. However, some staff had concerns regarding their ability to access 
the data, its accuracy, and its perceived focus on management priorities.  
Smith et al. (2014) evaluated the introduction of a quality dashboard alongside an 
integrated care pathway and improvement plan for patients undergoing orthopaedic 
surgery within 12 hospitals in Canada. The study reviewed the results of 10,000 
orthopaedic procedures performed across the hospitals in the 12-month period 
following the introduction of the dashboard. The initiative reduced the length of stay 
following a procedure by 16 hours per case, creating capacity for a 17% increase in 
cases and reducing waiting times from 43 to 39 weeks. The dashboard was found 
to be a useful tool for setting goals, measuring results and providing regular 
feedback to teams.  
Weiner et al. (2015) also reported improvements in compliance with pre-determined 
standards following the introduction of a quality dashboard in a hospital in the USA. 
The paper describes the introduction of a dashboard designed to measure a 
patients length of stay in hospital following hip surgery and turnaround time for 
radiology requests. Although the length of a time a patient stays in hospital can be 
affected by many factors, the paper suggests over a 24-month period, the 
introduction of a QD led to a one-hour reduction in length of stay following hip 





hours. Although no evidence is provided, the paper describes a cultural change 
within the organisation following the introduction of the dashboard, with staff 
discussing performance and the dashboard metrics. As the metrics reflected the 
organisations priorities and values, frontline and managerial staff engaged with the 
metrics with some experiencing peer pressure to improve the performance of their 
ward or department.   
Field et al (2018) describe the development and implementation of quality 
dashboards into two children’s wards within one hospital in the USA. The 
dashboard was designed to be displayed on a large electronic visibility board and 
ward desktop computers. Real time information, drawn from the patient’s electronic 
health record was visually designed to be used by nursing staff during patient safety 
huddles. Safety huddles are meetings or gatherings used to exchange key patient 
information. The article reports that since the dashboard was implemented, 
compliance with nursing documentation standards improved from below 95% to 
98% and there was improvement in performing spirometry tests. No specific 
reasons for the improvements are given (Field et al., 2018).   
Phull and Hall (2015) designed and implemented a quality dashboard within two 
mental health wards in the UK. The impact of the dashboards was evaluated 
through questionnaire data from 25 staff members and 8 patients. Participants 
found the dashboard to be an efficient way of collecting and summarising data that 
created a degree of focus and structure to clinical practice, highlighting areas for 
improvement and promoting local engagement and ownership of challenges. 
Patients viewed the information as helpful and it increased their confidence in the 
service and the ward. Although limited by sample size and the method of exploring 
the patient’s experience, the paper provides useful insight into the patient’s 
perspective and is the only study in the review which attempts this.  
Crofts et al. (2014) evaluated the introduction of a quality dashboard in a 
Zimbabwean maternity hospital. The dashboard presented maternity audit data 
monthly using a red, amber, green format. A review of 28 months of data was used 
to improve staff training and enforce compliance with existing procedural 
requirements. This change resulted in an 8% reduction in the number of babies 
admitted to specialist care beds and alerted hospital managers to peaks in infant 
mortality leading to the development of action plans and additional training.  
Anand et al. (2015) describe the design and implementation of a quality dashboard 





engaging with patient groups to support their development. This paper suggests 
that the implementation of dashboards increases staff awareness and interest in 
quality improvement and reduces the spread of misinformation through anecdotal 
reporting and unmonitored information streams in the public domain. While no 
evidence is offered to support these claims, it does offer an interesting area for 
future research.  
Other studies which have described the successful introduction of quality 
dashboards into their departments have been published by Khemani et al. (2010), 
Guha et al. (2013) and Pemberton et al. (2014). While Khemani et al. (2010) 
provide the briefest of summaries they do suggest that the introduction of a quality 
dashboard led to an increase in managerial engagement with clinical issues. Guha 
et al. (2013), Pemberton et al. (2014) also report similar results when describing the 
introduction of an acute gynaecological dashboard and a dental clinical 
effectiveness dashboard.  
3.4.4 Initiative evaluation  
Five of the papers evaluated three patient safety initiatives in the UK that included 
quality dashboards as one component of the initiative:  the Patient Safety 
Thermometer (ST), Safer Patient Initiative, and Open and Honest Care (Benning et 
al., 2011, Morris-Thompson et al., 2012, Power et al., 2012, Buckley et al., 2014, 
Christiansen et al., 2014, Power et al., 2014). 
3.4.4.1The Patient Safety Thermometer 
The Safety Thermometer (ST) requires data to be submitted on a monthly basis 
from hospital wards in England and generates information on the number of 
patients who have fallen, developed pressure ulcers, acquired urinary catheter 
associated infections or experienced a venous thromboembolism while in hospital. 
From an initial pilot of 23 hospitals, the programme was developed to include 
metrics for community, maternity and mental health providers and was available for 
all NHS healthcare providers to participate (Morris-Thompson et al., 2012, Power et 
al., 2012, Buckley et al., 2014, Power et al., 2014). Healthcare organisations were 
given financial incentives by NHS England to use the ST from 2013 onward. The 
initiative required wards and healthcare providers to monitor their performance 
against a range of measures based upon the potential harm patient’s face when 
receiving healthcare. The data were analysed and made available to the public via 





The papers identified in this review describe the results of initial pilots (Morris-
Thompson et al., 2012, Power et al., 2012), its implementation within a hospital 
(Buckley et al., 2014) and an evaluation of the ST contribution to improving patient 
safety (Power et al., 2014). Morris-Thompson et al. (2012) reviewed data from over 
10,000 patients over a nine-month period across three study sites. As each site 
approached the implementation of the initiative differently, with some study sites 
including executive walkabouts, face-to-face teaching sessions, and documentation 
changes, it was not clear from the evidence which aspect of the initiative resulted in 
the greatest improvement in reducing harm. All three study sites did however at the 
end of the initiative show a reduction in the number of falls, pressure ulcers and 
urinary catheter acquired infections, although no statistical modelling was applied. 
Buckley et al. (2014) suggest the success of the ST was due to its ability to raise 
awareness of the importance of patient safety which encourages staff to focus 
attention on particular aspects of patient care.  
3.4.4.2 Safer Patient Initiative 
Benning et al. (2011) undertook a large scale evaluation of the Health Foundation’s 
Safer Patient Initiative (SPI). Four hospitals were identified in the UK with the aim of 
improving safety through targeting high risk clinical issues, the promotion of safety 
as an organisational priority, increasing the effectiveness of senior leadership in 
relation to safety and instilling knowledge and principles of safe practice among 
staff. The initiative emphasised the importance of measurement to improve safety 
and used quality dashboards to generate graphs and charts to allow staff to 
visualise changes on selected measures over time. Using a controlled before and 
after design and information from 18 control hospitals, the evaluation of the initiative 
was complex and comprehensive, providing considerable additional insight into the 
challenges of evaluating large scale quality improvement initiatives. The study 
concluded that the SPI resulted in an improvement in only one type of clinical 
process (observation measurement) and raised awareness of organisational 
priorities but had no additional effect on targeted issues or measures of 
organisational strengthening (Benning et al., 2011). 
 
3.4.4.3 Open and Honest Care: Driving improvements initiative 
Christiansen et al. (2014) formally evaluated the Open and Honest Care: Driving 
Improvements initiative, which is a commitment for hospitals in the UK to publish 





healthcare organisations to give their opinion on how the programme was 
implemented, how the information was shared with staff and the public, and how 
the initiative was used to drive improvements in patient safety. Questionnaires were 
sent to 1368 employees with 383 responding, giving a response rate of 28%. 
Thirteen telephone interviews were also undertaken with senior nurses. The report 
identified, all healthcare organisations included in the study had information 
available on their hospital website, just over half displayed the information within 
their hospital wards and only one fifth of the respondents said that the public had 
asked them about the information. The report also identified that while 82% of staff 
agreed that transparency was important there was some uncertainty with respect to 
whether the programme offered useful information to the public or how it would be 
used.  
3.4.5 Availability of information  
Only three of these studies displayed quality dashboard information within hospital 
wards and departments for patients and relatives to view (Christiansen et al., 2014, 
Anand et al., 2015, Phull and Hall, 2015). While there was some uncertainty by 
professionals about how this information would be received, all three studies 
reported that relatives and patients found it reassuring that departments were being 
transparent. Other dashboards in this review did make information available to the 
public via hospital and NHS England websites but it is unclear how staff or patients 
use this information (Power et al., 2012, Buckley et al., 2014, Christiansen et al., 
2014, Power et al., 2014, Anand et al., 2015, Phull and Hall, 2015).  
 
3.4.6 Organisational priorities and raising awareness 
Several studies have reported that staff use the information from quality 
dashboards to frame the discussion in management and audit meetings, with the 
information raising awareness of organisational and patient safety priorities or 
initiatives (Pemberton et al., 2014, Ramsay et al., 2014, Russell et al., 2014, Phull 
and Hall, 2015). In areas where quality dashboards identify underperformance or 
resourcing challenges, information was used to prioritise and develop business 
cases for additional resources, and target teaching programmes. These outcomes 
led to the perception that managers became more engaged with patient safety 
initiatives and a sense of greater transparency in decision making (Brown et al., 
2010, Davis et al., 2010, Khemani et al., 2010, Clark et al., 2013, Clark et al., 2014, 






3.4.7 Unintended consequences 
Only three papers in this review identified the possibility of any unintended 
consequences of introducing a quality dashboard and the impact upon staff working 
under the panoptican gaze of performance measurement (Dixon-Woods et al., 
2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2014, Crofts et al., 2014). Dixon-Woods et al. (2013) 
identified that activities not related to the dashboard were not prioritised and staff 
sought to ‘game the system’ to avoid managerial scrutiny. Because the 
performance data only reflected certain aspects of care and contextual data was 
missing, nurses felt that they had limited capacity and opportunity to change or 
make improvements. There was also a sense amongst nursing staff that, when 
poor performance was identified, responsibility was disproportionately placed with 
them.  
Redwood et al. (2013) also identified similar themes during their evaluation of a 
quality dashboard designed to provide feedback to junior doctors about medication 
prescribing practice. The junior doctors expressed some anxiety about the 
surveillance and auditing of their practice and how this information could be used to 
performance manage or discipline them. Similarly, in Crofts et al. (2014) evaluation 
of the introduction of a maternity dashboard staff feared they would be to blame if a 
poor outcome was highlighted via the dashboard.   
3.5 Limitations and summary  
The review was limited by the type and quality of studies included, in that several of 
the studies reported the introduction of a hospital wide dashboard, but provided 
limited contextual information regarding its introduction or the views of those 
responsible for care delivery within hospital wards. As quality dashboards are often 
introduced as part of hospital wide initiatives, their specific impact on the complex 
social structures within hospital wards is not fully understood. Few of the studies 
included in the review attempt to report the patient’s perspective of quality 
dashboards and their influence on their perception of care.  
The purpose of this review was to explore the evidence for quality dashboards 
within healthcare and provide insight into how they influence care delivery within 
hospital wards. Overall, the evidence suggests that QD influence care delivery by 





effort. To drive change information has to be timely, accurate, and believable with 
consideration given to the unintended consequences of using dashboards linked to 
performance. This review suggests the act of measurement and presenting 
information is not sufficient to drive improvements on their own. 
3.6 How quality dashboards drive improvement  
The scoping review has shown making improvements in the safety of healthcare is 
more complex than providing information from QD to healthcare professional and 
expecting behaviour to change (Scott and Phelps, 2009, Vincent, 2013). While 
there may be an abundance of data, to be useful it needs to be processed and 
turned into information which triggers actions (Strome 2014). Consideration must 
also be given to contextual factors which influence how and why people engage 
with information. Staff working within healthcare have access to more data than 
ever before, it may however be a case of ‘water, water everywhere, nor any drop to 
drink’ (Coleridge, 1798), in that staff are surrounded by something they are unable 
to benefit from (Mannion et al., 2015, Keen et al., 2018b). 
The Health Foundation (2013) suggest the intention of making information more 
widely available should be made explicit as it is unclear if QD have been developed 
to inform patient choice, embarrass staff into making improvements, to be used as 
a tool to drive competition or a combination of all three (The Health Foundation 
2013). The Department of Health and Social Care (2014) wanted to use information 
to encourage patients to engage with HCP, give feedback on their experience of 
care, and restore public confidence in the quality and safety of healthcare. 
Collecting and analysing data would also allow areas for improvement to be 
identified, resources and support prioritised, performance to be tracked, and allow 
the performance of HCP to be compared (Department of Health and Social Care, 
2014). 
The aim was to build on the success seen within cardiac surgery and the 
improvements in patient outcomes reported by Bridgewater et al (2007, 2013) 
following on from the work of Nugent (1994) in North America. Bridgewater et al, 
study reviewed the data from 25,730 patients undergoing cardiac surgery in the UK 
and could demonstrate a decrease in the 30-day risk adjusted mortality following 
the publication of outcome data by surgeon and hospital. Although previous papers 
had highlighted gaming and risk aversion behaviours from cardiac surgeons in 





Bridgewater et at (2007, 2013) study showed, high risk patients were still getting 
access to surgery, and more patients were surviving the operation, but offers very 
little explanation as to how or why this improvement was achieved. Nashef (2016) 
reflecting upon this success suggests it was most likely due to standardisation in 
protocols, engagement with performance information, and the ‘Hawthorne effect’. 
The Hawthorne effect is in reference to a workplace behaviour study undertaken at 
the Electricity Company’s Hawthorne plant in the 1930’s. The study was concerned 
with the effect of workplace changes on productivity. It was initially thought 
increased productivity was due to changes to rest periods and lighting within the 
plant but the study suggested the increase was due to improved personal 
relationships between workers and management as a result of being involved in an 
experiment  (Wickström and Bendix, 2000). While many have dismissed the 
findings from the original experiment, it remains a common phrase to describe the 
effect of observation on behaviour. 
Publishing information about the performance of a HCP or surgeon to inform 
patients choice is not always possible in the NHS, however there was an 
assumption that patients would choose to be referred to hospitals with the best 
outcomes. This would encourage other hospitals to improve their performance so 
they could compete for referrals (Berwick et al., 2003, Keogh and Bridgewater, 
2007). Henderson and Henderson (2010) undertook a systematic review examining 
the effect of providing surgeon’s performance data to patients prior to their planned 
surgery. The review found no evidence to suggest that providing mortality outcome 
or performance data directly to patients influences the decisions they make when 
choosing a surgeon or healthcare provider. This may be because the true level of 
patient empowerment has been over-estimated as patients choice of HCP has been 
found to be influenced by socioeconomic factors such as the cost of travel to use 
other hospitals, previous experiences, a recommendation from friends and family, 
an ability to pay for treatment and the complexities of the doctor patient relationship 
(Henderson and Henderson, 2015, Greenhalgh et al., 2018). 
 Ketelaar et al. (2011) undertook systematic reviews to determine the effectiveness 
of the public release of performance data in changing the behaviour of patients, 
professionals and organisations. The review could find no consistent evidence to 
suggest making information about the performance of the HCP available to the 
public changed the behaviour of patients or healthcare professionals or improved 





literature search based upon Berwick et al. (2003) conceptual model to explain how 
public reporting of data could improve the effectiveness of care and patient safety. 
This review identified 33 articles which suggested that the public release of 
performance data often stimulated quality improvement activity within HCP and this 
may have been driven by concerns about a negative public image. The review 
found a lack of evidence to suggest the public reporting of performance data 
improves the safety of healthcare.  
3.6.1 Audit and feedback 
As audit and feedback is an established strategy within healthcare to improve 
quality and safety and QD provide an audit and feedback function, it was important 
to critically review the audit and feedback literature to understand how it can 
influence behaviour. Audit and feedback in the context of healthcare provides a 
summary of performance over a specified period of time to healthcare professionals 
to allow them to assess and adjust their performance  (Flottorp et al., 2010).  
Flottorp et al. (2010) reviewed the evidence for using audit and feedback as part of 
a strategy for improving the quality and safety of healthcare in European health 
care systems and reported on several systematic reviews which assessed its 
effectiveness. The review found evidence to suggest that audit and effective 
feedback improves compliance with standards but the effects were limited. The 
greatest impact on outcomes was found when practice was furthest away from the 
desired standard. The report identified the opinion of local leaders may be more 
effective than audit and feedback, and found no empirical evidence to suggest an 
internal audit or an audit imposed from a regulator or senior manager made a 
difference to outcomes. The report did however suggest that theories on how to 
improve the effectiveness of audit and feedback should be considered and 
identified Feedback Intervention Theory (FIT) and Control Theory as two possible 
lenses through which to view why and how audit and feedback influences 
behaviour.  
Feedback intervention Theory was also identified by Hysong et al. (2009) as a 
framework to guide the design of feedback interventions following a meta-analysis 
of 19 articles from 519 selected from an audit and feedback systematic review 
previously undertaken by Jamtvedt et al. (2006). Hysong et al. (2009) found that the 
effectiveness of audit and feedback was improved when feedback was given with 
suggestions for improvement, in writing and frequently. This study was notable for 





synthesis. Gardner et al. (2010)  did however identify a number of methodological 
shortcomings highlighting the results reveal little about the effectiveness of 
supplementing feedback with additional behaviour change techniques, despite 
feedback being used in conjunction with other techniques in many of the studies. 
Gardner et al. (2010) also questioned the lack of guidance for the systematic 
identification of appropriate theories upon which to base theory-based evidence 
synthesis.  
Ivers et al. (2012) published a systematic review of the effects of audit and 
feedback on professional practice and healthcare outcomes. Randomised 
controlled trials of audit and feedback that reported objectively measured 
healthcare professional practice or patient outcomes were included in the review. 
The results from 140 studies were reviewed, concluding that only 25% of studies 
had a positive effect on quality of care. They did however identify that, feedback 
was more effective when baseline performance was low, the source of feedback 
was from a supervisor or colleague, feedback was provided more than once, and 
given in verbal and written formats which included explicit targets and action plans. 
Ivers et al. (2014) recognising that there had been little progress with respect to 
identifying the key ingredients for a successful audit and feedback intervention or 
understanding their mechanisms of action, arranged for a consensus meeting to 
bring together key academics in the field of audit and feedback. The aim of the 
meeting was to establish a best practice framework. Twenty four experts from eight 
countries attended a two day meeting to discuss findings from systematic reviews, 
theory informed intervention design, and the methodological options for 
investigating the effectiveness of audit and feedback in healthcare.  The published 
paper from the meeting recognised an increase in audit and feedback interventions 
within healthcare and offered best practice guidance for designing audit and 
feedback interventions to maximise their effectiveness (Table 3). The paper also 
suggests research strategies to be considered to explore the impact of the 









Table 3 Best practice for audit and feedback 
Best Practice Suggestions for Audit and Feedback Interventions 
Audit Components Data are valid and based on recent performance 
 Data are about individual or team behaviours 
 Audit cycles are repeated with new data presented  
Feedback 
components 
Presentation is multi-modal including text, talking and 
graphics 
 Delivery comes from a trusted source  




Targeted behaviour is likely to be amenable to 
feedback 
 Recipients are capable and responsible for 
improvement 
Target Goals  The target performance is provided  
Action plan  Goals set for the target behaviour are aligned with 
personal and organisational priorities  
 Goals are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant 
time-bound 






3.6.2 Audit and feedback theory 
The success of audit and feedback is dependent upon the volition of individuals 
responsible for providing care (Flottorp et al., 2010, Ivers et al., 2014, Colquhoun et 
al., 2017, Ivers and Barrett, 2018). Colquhoun et al., (2017) suggest the gaps in 
understanding are due to a lack of theory to investigate the causal pathways which 
lead to behaviour change because of audit and feedback. They argue that applying 
theoretical perspectives may help to understand mechanisms that lead to change. If 
this is understood the evidence could be used to design more efficacious 
interventions or explain why some interventions fail and others succeed  (Flottorp et 
al., 2010, Michie et al., 2013, Colquhoun et al., 2017). 
One of the challenges has been deciding which theory or theories should be 
considered. Colquhoun et al. (2017) reviewed the studies identified in Ivers et al. 
(2012) systematic review to explore the extent theory was reported to have been 
used in the study design. The review found that only 20 out of the 140 studies 
reported using theory in any aspect of the design and in total 18 different theories 
were identified with the Bandura’s Social Cognitive Theory and Rogers Diffusion of 
Innovations theory the most widely used. The review falls short of recommending 
which theory to use when considering audit and feedback designs but does point to 
Hysong et al. (2006) Actionable Feedback as a model to use when considering how 
to feedback audit information.   
3.6.3 Actionable feedback  
Hysong et al. (2006) presented their model of Actionable Feedback following 
research into adherence with clinical practice guidelines and effectiveness of audit 
and feedback within six medical centres in North America (Figure 15). They 
undertook a cross sectional purposeful sample and interviewed one hundred and 
two employees working in a HCP outpatient setting. The study found the 
effectiveness of feedback was dependent upon how the information is given to 
individuals. High performing HCP provided timely, individualised, non-punitive 
feedback to staff, with low performing HCP using an unstructured generic approach 
to feedback. Their research showed that simply reporting performance data rarely 
leads to behaviour change and therefore gave several recommendations for how 
feedback should be given. The characteristics shown to influence the effectiveness 
of feedback were set out in a proposed model for actionable feedback which could 
be used to guide the design of feedback interventions (Hysong et al., 2006, Hysong 





Figure 15 Model of Actionable Feedback 
 
Hysong et al. (2006) found their model was consistent with propositions set out in 
Feedback Intervention Theory which was developed by Kluger and DeNisi (1996).  
3.6.4 Feedback Intervention Theory 
Feedback Intervention Theory (FIT) was developed by Kluger and DeNisi (1996) in 
response to the variation in results published in numerous studies aimed at 
assessing the effect of feedback on performance (Balcazar et al., 1985, Latham 
and Locke, 1991). FIT was based upon a meta-analysis of papers which reported 
the effect of feedback interventions. Although 3000 papers satisfied the search 
criteria only 131 were included in the review. They define a feedback intervention 
as ‘actions taken by an external agent to provide information regarding some 
aspect of one’s task performance’(Kluger and DeNisi, 1996).  The definition was 
originally developed to explore the effect an external source such as a teacher, 





Kluger and DeNisi (1996) used existing theory (control theory, goal setting theory, 
action theory, learned helplessness theory and action identification theory) to 
develop FIT. The five principles underpinning the theory are 
1. An individual’s behaviour is regulated by comparison of feedback to goals or 
standards 
2. Goals and standards are organised hierarchically  
3. Attention is limited therefore only feedback standard gaps that receive 
attention actively effect behaviour.  
4. Attention is normally directed to a moderate level of hierarchy  
5. Feedback interventions change the locus of attention therefore affect 
behaviour   
FIT suggests that people regulate their behaviour by comparing it to goals, 
standards or benchmarks to which they are committed. If a discrepancy is identified 
between the standard and their behaviour, they will try and resolve it by adjusting 
their effort in a particular direction. The degree of increased effort a person makes 
to reduce a deficit can be influenced by feedback.   
3.6.4.1 Feedback Comparison Standard 
Feedback-standard comparison is found in several theories including goal setting 
theory and control theory (Carver and Scheier, 1981, Latham and Locke, 1991) 
Although there are theoretical differences between the two theories, goal theory 
suggested if a discrepancy in performance is identified people are motivated to 
reduce it, and goal setting theory suggests people are motivated to achieve a goal 
rather than reduce a discrepancy, FIT suggests people have behavioural options in 
response to a feedback- standard discrepancy. They can change behaviour to 
influence future feedback by changing the standard (which is not always possible), 
reject or dismiss the feedback or the importance of the standard to avoid the 
cognitive dissonance caused by the deficit, or address the feedback deficit by 
attempting to achieve the standard. Kluger and DeNisi (1996) were aware the 
evidence to support their theory has limitations in the context of multiple competing 
standards and fails to identify the feelings involved in receiving performance 
feedback information. They recognised feedback can produce feelings of 
pleasantness and this in itself can influence behaviour, therefore a model that 





consideration for affective reactions is too simplistic and requires further research 
(Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, Hysong et al., 2012).  
3.6.4.2 Hierarchy 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) second principle, hierarchy, was based upon identification 
theory and hierarchy theory and refers to meaning attached to the feedback. 
Feedback loops are cause and effect processes which are organised hierarchically. 
At the top of the hierarchy are goals of self and those at the bottom contain physical 
action goals or tasks. When feedback is aimed at goals of self, this can cause 
anxiety and therefore lead to behaviour change. As tasks lower in the hierarchy 
have the potential to drawn attention to self, they also influence behaviour as the 
person wants to avoid managerial scrutiny which may negatively impact goals 
higher in the hierarchy. As self is subjective, this may also explain why people at 
different levels of an organisation experience the same feedback in very different 
ways. 
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) recognised people often have competing priorities and 
multiple discrepancies may occur at different points of the hierarchy. Only deficits 
that receive attention and are acted upon will result in change. This reinforces the 
point that it is not enough just to provide information and expect change to occur. 
FIT works by providing new information that redirects a person’s locus of attention 
either towards or away from a task. When attention is directed towards at task, 
change is more likely to occur to address the standard deficit gap. 
The ability for feedback to influence where attention is focused is dependent upon 
characteristics of how feedback is given. The frequency of feedback, feedback 
given in writing and graphically had a positive impact on performance. Using 
comparative performance data, public displaying information and verbal information 
alone were not shown to have augmented effect on performance of an individual 
(Kluger and DeNisi, 1996, Hysong et al., 2006, Hysong et al., 2012). 
3.7 Discussion 
From this review, the evidence would suggest that the introduction of quality 
dashboards influences care delivery within hospital wards by making information 
about practice, behaviour and performance visible and accessible. The greatest 





person with individual staff members or became visible to senior managers via root 
cause analysis or performance meetings.  
Using dashboards to raise awareness of the challenges within wards reassured 
staff that senior managers would support and were engaged in efforts to improve 
the quality of care. The engagement of senior management signalled collective 
responsibility for improvement and gave permission for all staff members to make 
suggestions for improvement (Coleman, 2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013). The 
implementation of dashboards led to an increase in awareness and interest in 
quality improvement and had the potential to reduce the spread of misinformation 
and anecdotal reporting.  
On a practical level, nurses used quality dashboards as aide memoires to remind 
them of their wards priorities and areas for improvement. The dashboards also 
provided reassurance that the changes they made to improve patient outcomes 
actually made a difference (Jeffs et al. 2014). Dashboards were also found to raise 
awareness of organisational priorities with the data use to bring focus to safety 
briefings, meetings and handovers between clinical teams. Once quality 
dashboards and their metrics become part of the culture of a ward staff often 
experience peer pressure to make improvements and maintain performance (Jeffs 
et al., 2014).  
To drive change information has to be timely, accurate, and believable with 
consideration given to the unintended consequences of using dashboards linked to 
performance (Daley et al,. 2013, Dixon-Woods et al,. 2013 Jeffs et al,. 2014). This 
is especially important when achievement or compliance with metrics are used to 
determine who should be given rewards or highlights poor performance that could 
lead to reputational damage for an individual or ward. Identifying poor performance 
can lead to ward stigmatisation and associated anxiety for staff working in those 
areas. This can lead to the diversion of resources from genuine quality 
improvement initiatives to superficial steps to address a particular metric and has 
been associated with behaviours such as gaming or measure fixation (Petersen et 
al., 2006, Griffiths, 2008, Van Dishoeck et al., 2009, Okes, 2013).  Where staff 
engage in measure fixation or gaming, although wards metrics may improve there 
will be no real change in practice or care provided (Illingworth, 2014).  
While the majority of papers focus on addressing deficits in performance, several 
highlight the importance of using quality dashboards to recognise success. 





can track improvements in performance over time (Power et al., 2012, Dixon-
Woods et al., 2013, Christiansen et al., 2014, Jeffs et al., 2014, Weiner et al., 
2015). Power et al. (2012) and Dixon Woods et al. (2013) suggest performance 
information appeals to individuals who want to make changes within their wards. 
The motivation for this change is often to improve patient care or to avoid 
managerial scrutiny. Ramsey et al. (2013) and Jeffs et al. (2014) however 
recognised that improving safety is more complex than providing information and 
expecting behaviour change to occur. Jeffs et al (2014) highlighted the importance 
of ward leaders in promoting staff engagement with quality dashboards, and 
identified a lack of leadership can diminish their impact. Staff need to be given the 
capacity and training to interpret and use data in a meaningful way and be given the 
opportunity by ward leaders to make changes in practice (Jeffs et al,. 2014).   
Although there is limit evidence to suggest providing performance data to patients, 
the public and professionals changed behaviour or improve care (Ketelaar et al., 
2011, Shekelle et al., 2016), evidence from the audit and feedback literature is 
more favourable. Audit and effective feedback has been shown to improve 
compliance with standards, with the greatest improvement often seen when a 
significant deficiency in performance is identified. How feedback was given and by 
whom was also shown to influence the impact of feedback on quality of care 
(Flottorp et al., 2010, Ivers et al., 2012, Ivers et al., 2014) Colquhoun et al., (2017), 
suggested using a theoretical perspective or model such as Actionable Feedback to 
identify the causal pathways which lead to behaviour change (Hysong et al., 2006). 
Actionable Feedback suggests the effectiveness of feedback is dependent upon 
how information is given to individuals. Information that was timely, individualised, 
and non-punitive was found to have the greatest impact upon an individual’s 
behaviour. Simply providing performance data was found to rarely lead to change 
(Hysong et al., 2006, Hysong et al., 2012, Hysong et al., 2017).  
The Actionable Feedback model was based upon FIT developed by Kluger and 
DeNisi (1996) to bring understanding to the effect of feedback on performance. FIT  
suggests people regulate their behaviour through comparison, if a discrepancy is 
identified between a standard they are committed too and their behaviour, they will 
try and resolve it by adjusting their effort in a particular direction. The degree of 
increased effort a person makes to reduce a deficit can be influenced by feedback.   
When feedback is aimed at goals of self, this can cause anxiety and therefore lead 





of audit and feedback within an organisation. FIT also acknowledges that people 
often have competing priorities so only deficits that receive attention will result in 
change. This reinforces the notion that simply providing information and expecting 
change to occur is likely to be ineffective. FIT works by providing new information to 
redirect a person’s locus of attention either towards or away from a task. When 
attention is directed towards at task, change is more likely. The ability for feedback 
to influence where attention is focused is dependent upon how feedback is given. 
The frequency of feedback, feedback given in writing and graphically had a positive 
impact on performance. Using comparative performance data, public displaying 
information and verbal information alone were not shown to have an augmented 
effect on the performance of an individual or improve the quality of care.  
3.8 Chapter summary 
While much has been published about why QDs should be developed, what they 
should measure, what should be displayed and where, there was very little 
information on how QD influence change within hospital wards. A scoping review 
was therefore undertaken to gather evidence to support development of the 
programme theories (Appendix B).  
The evidence from the scoping review suggests, information from QD can be used 
to highlight when performance against pre-determined metrics are not achieved. 
Individuals can ignore the information, engage with it and direct attention or 
resource towards improving performance, or seek help and advice. As QD need 
targets and standards to allow performance to be measured, making this 
information explicit may be as important as measurement itself. Once performance 
is measured it becomes possible to compare individuals or ward performance with 
others, this may trigger competition within individuals or challenge an individual’s 
perception of their ward, creating cognitive dissonance which acts as a driver for 
change.  
As QD are mechanisms or tools for audit and feedback, this literature was also 
considered. As several systematic reviews have reported wide variation on the 
effectiveness of audit and feedback on improving performance a best practice 
framework was published. The framework presents recommendations for audit and 
feedback research and suggests its impact can be maximised if information is 
timely, accurate, and believable with consideration given to the unintended 





the reader that people need to engage with feedback if improvement is to happen, 
measurement and presenting information is not sufficient to drive improvements on 
their own. It was also suggested audit and feedback variation may be due to a lack 
of theory to explain how audit and feedback influences behaviour, especially in 
healthcare. Two formal theories identified in the literature that were developed to 
explain audit and feedback was Kluger and DeNisi’s (1996) FIT and Hysong (2006) 
model for actionable feedback. Both offer propositions of how audit and feedback 
influence the volition of individuals and will therefore be considered when 
constructing the programme theories in the subsequent chapters. 
It was clear the WHC-QD is a complex programme, implemented into a complex 
environment. To understand how and why quality dashboards influence care 
delivery within hospital wards, a research approach that uses multiple methods to 
capture complexity will be required. The following chapter will therefore introduce 









Chapter 4: Methodology and Methods 
4.1 Introduction  
This chapter will introduce realism and realist evaluation and explain the rationale 
for using this methodology to explore the aims and objectives of the research. The 
epistemological and theoretical principles of realism will be critiqued and an 
overview of the central tenets of realist evaluation provided. The specific research 
aims of the study will be presented and the three phases of the research set out. 
The methods used to refine and test the theories developed in phase 1 will be 
explained and the influence of the researcher on the study and any ethical 
considerations will be discussed. 
4.2 Research methodology 
As the current literature fails to fully explain how quality dashboards might influence 
staff behaviour and improve the quality and safety of healthcare a methodological 
approach that is capable of exploring complex interventions is needed so it can be 
used to bring new understanding to this area of research. Research methodology 
has been described as the strategy or plan of action which sets out the approach 
used to address the research questions and can be characterised through their 
ontological and epistemological perspectives (Kuhn, 1970, Crotty, 1998). 
Epistemology refers to how we know and learn about reality and ontology is 
concerned with the nature of reality and what there is to know about the world.  
(Ritchie et al., 2014).  
As programmes to improve the quality and safety of care are dependent upon and 
lie within the complex social and institutional contexts of healthcare, capturing this 
reality can be complex and challenging (Davidoff et al., 2015). Pawson (2006 35) 
describes social programmes as “complex systems thrust amidst complex 
systems”. The ontological approach therefore taken to explore these topics is 
realism and the research methodology used to address the research questions is 
Realist Evaluation (RE). Realist evaluation is a methodology that has been applied 
to investigate several healthcare programmes (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2010, Marchal 
et al., 2012b, Jagosh et al., 2015, Ford et al., 2016).  Its flexibility of application is 
considered a methodological strength and therefore an appropriate approach to 





4.3 Realism and realist evaluation 
Realism and RE is a branch of philosophy that sits between positivism and 
constructivism. A positivist view of the world is governed by natural laws and seeks 
to explain human behaviour in terms of cause and effect, in that they expect 
individuals to react to events or their environment. This can be observed and used 
to predict future behaviour. A constructivists view is concerned with the meaning 
and interpretation given to experiences by individuals, therefore knowledge is 
socially and individually constructed (The RAMESES II Project, 2017e). A Realist 
approach uses positivism and constructivism in its search for knowledge of causal 
mechanisms. Mechanisms refer to the structures, powers and relations that explain 
how things work beneath a surface’s appearance. Realism views causation as 
generative rather than the successional view often used when conducting 
experiments under controlled conditions (The RAMESES II Project, 2017f). As it is 
not possible to control conditions in a complex social world a pragmatic approach is 
needed to find mechanisms which are not directly observable and have to be 
identified through their effects (McEvoy and Richards, 2003). 
Realism recognises a social programme or intervention does not generate the 
outcome, they work by offering resources designed to influence a person’s 
reasoning or actions. Interventions and their outcomes are subject to contextual 
influence and as a result may remain latent until they are activated by a change in 
circumstance (Gilmore et al., 2019) . Causal explanation is therefore a matter of 
producing the theories of what the mechanisms are, looking for evidence to support 
or refute the theories, and considering the contextual factors that may influence 
reasoning (McEvoy and Richards, 2003, Pawson, 2006, Bhaskar, 2008, Westhorp, 
2014, The RAMESES II Project, 2017c).  
4.3.1 Realist evaluation.  
RE is a methodological approach which has been used to evaluate a wide range of 
interventions in areas such as social policy, psychology, law, and contemporary 
health service research (Pawson and Tilley, 1997, McEvoy and Richards, 2003, 
Pawson, 2006, Bhaskar, 2008, Rycroft-Malone et al., 2010, Westhorp, 2014, 
Jagosh et al., 2015, Lacouture et al., 2015, Ford et al., 2016, The RAMESES II 
Project, 2017c) 
RE comes under the realism umbrella and was developed by Pawson and Tilley in 





which at that time was dominated by outcome driven research imported from 
clinical trials (Pawson, 2013). Knowing that X leads to Y, is not enough, RE looks to 
uncover how X lead to Y. Pawson and Tilley’s aim was to develop an approach 
which focused on research designs which could extract, test and refine theory 
(Pawson, 2013). The aim of RE is to advance understanding of why complex 
interventions work, how, for whom, in what context, and to explain the many 
situations in which an intervention or programme fails to achieve its anticipated 
benefit (Wong et al., 2017). This is often summarised as; what works for whom, in 
what circumstances and how (Pawson and Tilley, 1997) 
RE begins with asking the researcher to identify initial theories  which explain how 
and why an intervention or programme is expected to achieve its outcomes and the 
conditions which may influence this (Emmel et al., 2018). Constructing programme 
theories involves reviewing the literature, interviewing stakeholders involved in the 
development of the programme and considering how programmes are expected to 
work. RE aims to bring these theories to the surface to allow them to be confirmed, 
refuted or refined (The RAMESES II Project, 2017c). Developing theory in realist 
evaluation should consider what resources and opportunities a programme offers to 
an individual, group or organisation and the circumstances or contextual factors that 
influence the volition of those involved (Pawson and Tilly, 1997, Emmel et al., 
2018).   
Constructing programme theories using RE is retroduction, as it is seeking to identify 
the hidden causal forces that lie behind identified patterns or outcomes (The 
RAMESES II Project, 2017b). Retroduction uses inductive and deductive logic to 
identify the causal powers of a programme and the influence of the circumstances in 
which it is applied. Inductive reasoning generates conclusions from multiple 
observations and deductive reasoning starts with theory and tests propositions. Data 
collection methods in realist evaluation are considered by their potential to contribute 
to theory testing and refinement (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
4.4 Context, Mechanism, Outcomes 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) offer a conceptual framework known as the Context-
Mechanism-Outcome configuration or CMOc’s  (Figure 16) to highlight the 
relationship between the concepts (Astbury and Leeuw, 2010).  The formulation of 





propositions about how a programme is expected to work and is the starting point 
for undertaking realist evaluation.  
Figure 16 Context Mechanism Outcome Configuration 
 
 
The CMO configurations are the fundamental building blocks of realist explanation 
as they are used to facilitate the refinement and generation of middle range theory 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Emmel at al,. 2018). Middle range theories are describe 
as theories that sit between programme theories and grand theories. Grand 
theories are formulated at a level of abstraction which makes it generalizable in 
many differing circumstances (Davidoff et al., 2015). The CMO heuristic is often 
used during data analysis to identify the generative causal processes underlying the 
outcomes. Constructing the CMO and programme theories was can be extremely 
time consuming and complex. Pawson and Manzano-Santaella (2012) found that 
researchers often find themselves conflating mechanism and contexts. Jagosh et 
al. (2015) suggest many researchers struggle with recurring conceptual and 
methodological issues as the boundaries between context and mechanisms are not 
always clear.  Dalkin et al. (2015) also found it difficult to distinguish between 
contexts and mechanisms when presenting programme theories on integrated care 
pathways and therefore proposed an alternative conceptual arrangement of the 











The concept of mechanisms can mean many different things depending upon the 
field of knowledge in which it is used. Mahoney, (2003) identified 24 definitions of 
mechanism from within the literature with them often appearing as unexplained 
causal forces or variables within input-output formula. Although mechanisms are 
used to understand causation between two events (X and Y) to truly understand 
causation you need to understand the underlying generative mechanism (M), the 
influence of context (C) and its relation to the outcomes (O) (Pawson and Tilley, 
2007). Dalkin et al. (2015) model further disaggregates the mechanisms into 
resources and reasoning with context placed in between. Dalkin et al. (2015) 
suggest that the separation of resource and reasoning encourages researchers to 
consider both concepts individually rather than concentrating on one over another 
and makes it easier to differentiate between context and mechanisms.  
Astbury and Leeuw (2010) explains that mechanisms are usually hidden and 
sensitive to variations in context. To highlight this Pawson and Tilley (1997) use the 
example of trying to understand the workings of a clock by only examining the 
movement of the hands or its face. In the case of the WHC-QD, if we only used the 
outcome measures to understand the impact of its introduction it does little to 
explain the variation between wards, how it improves care, and what enables or 





simplification of human behaviour it does remind researchers to look beyond 
outcomes and to think about how the programme influences volition or reasoning. 
Mechanisms are therefore a combination of resources offered by the programme 
under investigation and a person or stakeholder’s reasoning and response (or not) 
to those resources (Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  
4.4.2 Context  
The second important feature of mechanisms is they are sensitive to variations in 
context. Astbury and Leeuw (2010) suggest mechanisms always have potential but 
are dependent upon the context at that particular time. They highlight mechanisms 
should not be seen as universal and therefore can only ever be used to generate 
mid-range theories that sit between universal laws and description (Pawson et al., 
2010). Mechanisms are influenced by context, which has a causal effect upon 
outcomes. As programmes are introduced into pre-existing social contexts, it is not 
possible to have a simple cause and effect relationship, every programme 
implemented will be influenced by contextual constraints and contextual enablers, 
which can occur at an individual and organisational level (The RAMESES II Project, 
2017a). Context refers to the physical and cultural drivers which influence the 
choices made by a person in response to the programme. The influence of context 
explains why the wards with the same policies, bed numbers and staffing levels 
respond differently to the WHC-QD. This point is made to highlight the complexity of 
context which must be considered in regard to its relationship with the mechanisms 
as of part of the CMO configuration rather than a separate entity (The RAMESES II 
Project, 2017a). People always have a choice about whether to participate or 
engage with a programme and their willingness to do so will be influenced by pre-
existing values, beliefs, and experiences (Pawson, 2006).  
Pawson and Tilley (1997) do not expect a programme to have the ability to change 
the culture or social order of an area. As context influences the success and failures 
of programmes, if a programme is implemented into a setting that is considered 
hostile, the programme’s mechanisms are unlikely to be activated and therefore 
change is unlikely to occur. Pawson (2013) believes the success of a programme is 
dependent upon context and they form an integral part of the programme. Contexts 
are however infinitely complicated and dependent upon time, individuals, 
interpersonal relations, institutional settings and infrastructure or the wider, social, 
economic and cultural setting of the programme. Undertaking realist evaluation 





influences the outcome of the programme. Pawson and Tilley describe the 
influence of context on a mechanism by using a gunpowder analogy.  An outcome 
may only trigger if the conditions are favourable in that a flame applied to gun 
powder will only result in an explosion if the powder is dry (Pawson and Tilley, 
1997). Dalkin et al. (2015) recognised that when programmes involve stakeholders, 
volition or reasoning comes into play, this makes the firing metaphor problematic. 
Programmes work by enabling or changing a persons’ reasoning and therefore 
should rarely be considered binary. The impact of an individual’s reasoning on a 
mechanism should be considered as part of a continuum, similar to a light created 
by a dimmer switch, the intensity of the light would change in response to an ever 
evolving context. As an example, while negative WHQ-QD performance on month 
one may not elicit a response or a change in practice, if performance in month two 
is still negative, change is more likely.  
4.4.3 Outcomes  
The third characteristic of mechanisms is they are causal and can generate 
outcomes or outcome patterns. Realist evaluation often uses quantitative data to 
understand outcome patterns. Astbury and Leeuw (2010) suggest that when 
looking for the impact of mechanism on outcomes, we have to go beyond surface 
events and consider the intended and unintended consequences of the programme. 
As programmes have the potential to fire multiple mechanisms resulting in multiple 
outcomes realist evaluators are asked to look for outcome patterns or Context, 
Mechanism Outcome configurations (Pawson and Tilley 1997). 
4.4.4 Realist evaluation to explore the WHC-QD 
Research underpinned by realist philosophy recognises that our understanding of 
the real world is filtered through our senses, culture, and experiences (Westhorp, 
2014). The outcomes observed are generated (generative causality) by causal 
processes and forces or mechanisms that we cannot see, and are influenced by the 
context in which they occur (Bhaskar, 2008, Pawson, 2013). Realist evaluation is 
an approach which is used to bring new understanding to social programmes, 
initiatives and interventions which are designed to solve problems or make 
improvements, rather than explore existing social phenomena. As programmes are 
often implemented into complex social structures, it is recognised that outcome 





The purpose of realist evaluation is not to limit focus to successful programme 
outcome patterns but to explain what works, for whom, in what circumstances (The 
RAMESES II Project, 2017b). The aim of this research is to understand how and 
why quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards.  
As has been shown in previous chapters, quality dashboards have been designed 
and deployed to improve the quality and safety of health care. In response to 
national drivers and safety concerns a large HCP developed a quality dashboard 
(WHC-QD). The aim of the WHC-QD was to develop a programme that could 
measure standards of care, patient outcomes and patient’s experience of care, and 
make this information accessible to staff and patients. To achieve this the WHC-QD 
was required to capture data on structure, process and outcome metrics. This 
information would be used to provide data to the myriad of national audit 
databases, produce composite scores to be displayed for patients and staff to view 
each month, and create a QD that could be accessed by all staff working within the 
HCP. As part of the audit process, a senior nurse would visit the ward each month 
to audit patient records and safety checks. Information from the QD would also be 
used to generate a focus for discussion in management meetings and generate 
data for governance and board reports. The WHC-QD was implemented into 100 
wards across the HCP at considerable cost in terms of financial commitment, time 
required to undertake the WMAP, cost of printing infographics displays for every 
ward, and ongoing data warehousing commitments. As the aim of the programme 
was to improve the quality and safety of patient care, the cost vs benefit 
consideration was justified if improvements were made.  
As previously highlighted hospital wards are not homogenous units but teams of 
professionals working together to provide care to patients. As highlighted in Chapter 
3, simply providing information and expecting change to occur is unlikely to be 
effective, understanding why and how the WHC-QD programme improves the 
quality and safety of healthcare and the circumstances that explain why the 
programme might fail to achieve its anticipated outcomes will bring new knowledge 
to dashboard development and deployment.  
As realist evaluation allows a range of methods to be used to address complex 
research questions in healthcare and looks to explore beyond outcome measures, it 
is therefore an appropriate methodology to address the aims and objectives of this 
study (Rycroft-Malone et al., 2010, Marchal et al., 2012b, Jagosh et al., 2015, Ford 





4.5 Research methods 
The aims of this study is to use RE to understand how and why quality dashboards 
influence care delivery within hospital wards. To achieve this the following 
objectives will need to be considered 
 Critically review the evidence for QD within hospital wards.  
 Explore with those responsible for the development and management of the 
WHC-QD their perceptions of the intended consequences and possible 
unintended consequence of its deployment within wards.  
 Use a range of approaches to explore the impact of QD within hospitals 
wards including staff interviews.  
 Explain how and why QD influences care delivery within hospital wards and 
to understand the influence of contextual factors. 
As every attempt to conduct a realist evaluation is beset with the impossibility of 
covering every angle, and identifying every issue (Pawson 2013), RE allows 
multiple approaches to answer the research question. Some research questions are 
so complex they require quantitative and qualitative answers. A mixed method 
approach involves combining or integrating both quantitative and qualitative 
research in one study. While there has been some academic discourse raising 
concerns about how this integration should take place to prevent one method seen 
as more dominant than the other, combining research methods is common place 
within the literature (Appendix B) (Mason, 2006, Ritchie et al., 2014, Flick, 2014). 
Richie et al. (2014) suggests viewing quantitative and qualitative methods as equal 
but separate and used to answer different questions of the research topic.  
It is also possible to mix methods to support triangulation, with each perspective 
testing and adding to or validating each other. To understand the impact of the 
WHC-QD, outcome data will be required to understand if there has been an 
improvement in outcome measures such as infections, falls or pressure ulcers. 
There has been academic debate regarding the value of triangulation as each 
methodological approach captures their own data and therefore it is unlikely it will 
align. Richie et al. (2014) suggests mixing methods can bring understanding or 





4.5.1. Theory development  
RE begins with asking the researcher to identify potential programme theories 
which explain how and why an intervention or programme is expected to achieve its 
outcomes. When a programme is developed the original idea behind its inception 
should be considered (Emmel et al., 2018). Constructing the initial programme 
theories involves reviewing the literature and bringing these theories to the surface 
to allow them to be confirmed, refuted or refined (The RAMESES II Project, 2017c). 
Consideration must also be given to the resources a programme offers and 
circumstances that may influence the volition of those involved (Pawson and Tilly, 
1997, Emmel et al., 2018). Using evidence presented in Chapters 2 and 3 
(Appendix A and B) and the researchers experience of working as a senior nurse 
within the case study site, the initial programme theories are presented as eight 
Context-Mechanism -Outcome configurations in Chapter 5.  
4.5.2 Phase 1: Theory refinement  
Using the literature presented in the scoping review (Appendix A and B), publicly 
available board papers from the case study site, and the professional experience of 
the researcher, seven initial programme theories were considered. To refine the 
candidate theories, RE asks that the propositions are considered by those who can 
provide a real world perspective (Manzano, 2016). The aim was to explore the 
theories with those who had been responsible for the development of the WHC-QD 
or who were stakeholders in the programme.  
4.5.2.1 Stakeholders Recruitment 
Realist evaluation uses the views of stakeholders or those involved with the design, 
implementation or with responsibility for the programme as a key source of 
information to elicit programme theory and provide data on how a programme 
works (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Stakeholders have different information and 
understanding about how a programme is supposed to work and therefore RE 
should be designed to capture stakeholder views and opinions (Wong et al., 2017). 
The views of stakeholders, while important, need to be considered in the context of 
their investment in the programme and how this shapes their views. Often 
stakeholders are not the ones on the receiving end or affected by the programme 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997).  Pawson and Tilley (1997) therefore asks realist 
evaluators to be aware of, and alert to, stakeholder bias towards a programme and 





tested.  For the purpose of this research, stakeholders are staff who work within the 
macro and meso (Table 1) levels of the HCP and were involved with the design, 
development, implementation, and management of the WHC-QD.  
When considering who to recruit, Manzano (2016) recommends interview 
participants should be selected from a broad range of stakeholders who have 
knowledge of the programme under investigation. Selecting stakeholders, middle 
managers or those involved in the design of the programme allows information 
about the programme’s intention and tacit knowledge of how programmes are 
expected to work to be captured. Sampling for realist interviews are theory based, 
that is respondents are selected because they are in a position to cast light on the 
hypotheses or aspects of the programme (The RAMESES II Project, 2017d). 
Ensuring participants have particular characteristics such as insight into and 
understanding of the area under investigation is known as purposive or judgement 
sampling  (Ritchie et al., 2014, Bryman, 2016). 
No recruitment target was set for Phase one of this research, as the sample size for 
recruitment varies with each realist evaluation (Table 4). It is difficult to establish the 
definitive number of interviews required as it is determined by the need to investigate 
patterns of behaviour, unintended consequences and differing perspectives rather 
than reach a balanced view or consensus.  
Table 4 Sample size in published RE studies 
Randell et al. (2017) interviewed 44 participants in their study into robotic 
surgery. 
Jagosh et al. (2015) interviewed 24 participants exploring participatory 
healthcare research in a community healthcare setting. 
Cheyne et al. (2013) interviewed 12 participants in her study into the impact of 
a government programme to support normal childbirth.  
Harris et al. (2017) interviewed 120 participants in their study on intentional 
rounding. 
 
Although no target was set for the number of participants, 11 stakeholders were 
interviewed in this phase of the study. Staff roles such as ‘ directors of nursing, 
Head of Nursing for Professional Standards, and Lead Nurse for Informatics were 
specifically targeted for recruitment as they were instrumental in the design and 





were also targeted due to their knowledge of the day-to-day operationalisation of 
the WHC-QD, patient safety board (PSB) and ward metric audit (WMAP). 
4.5.2.2 Ethical considerations 
As the focus of Phase 1 did not involve patients as participants, NHS Research 
ethics was not required. Ethical approval was provided by the University of Leeds, 
School of Healthcare Research Committee (SHREC Approval Number RP/499). 
Permission to gain access and interview staff within the case study site was 
obtained from the health care provider’s Research and Innovation (R&I) department 
(R&I Approval number HP15/053). A Participant Information Sheet (PIS) and 
Consent Form were developed and given to the participants (Appendix G,H,I).  
As the researcher was a senior nurse within the case study site and may have the 
potential to influence the willingness of  potential participants to agree to take part 
or change the nature of the discussion during the interview, it was decided that the 
recruitment strategy would not include participants who were directly or indirectly 
line managed by the researcher. Consideration was also given to the professional 
nature of the participants and what should happen in the event that information 
disclosed during the interviews was considered to be criminally or professionally 
incriminating (Ritchie et al., 2014). Information within the PIS made it clear that if 
the participant disclosed information which was considered by the researcher to be 
illegal or posed a risk to patient safety, the interview would be stopped and the 
concerns would be brought to the attention of the researcher’s academic supervisor 
and if appropriate the Head of Nursing for Research and Innovation at the case 
study site. 
4.5.2.3 Participant recruitment  
To recruit stakeholders, an invitation letter and email (Appendix I) was sent to staff 
working in the key roles identified earlier in the chapter.  The researcher also attended 
a monthly staff update meeting attended by Heads of Nursing, Matrons, and senior 
nurses to give an outline of the research and distribute PIS. In total 11 participants 








Figure 18 Recruitment flowchart 
 
4.5.2.4 The realist interview 
Realist interviews are described as theory driven, or structured in a way which uses 
theory to guide the interview process (Manzano, 2016).The aim of the interviews 
was to refine theories in relation to participants experiences and role within the 
organisation (The RAMESES II Project, 2017d). This approach to interviewing 
differs from other research interviews as it is used to seek information about how a 
programme works rather than exploring the participant’s views and experiences of 
the programme under investigation (Manzano, 2016). The realist interview requires 
the researcher to present theories to the participant, rather than trying to capture 
unbiased participant views or perspectives. This style of interview was described by 
Pawson and Tilley (1997) as the teacher-learner cycle. Within this model the roles 
of teacher and learner are not static and become interchangeable throughout the 
interview. Typically the interview begins with the researcher describing the 
programme theories to the participant and the participant gives their real worldview 
of the theory. Data collected from the interviews can be used to make inferences 
about the theories as the participant may reject them, provide insights to allow them 
to be refined or introduce new areas to explore. The theory-testing purpose of 
evaluation is an iterative process that shape and evolve in line with participants 
responses throughout the series of interviews (Manzano 2016, The RAMESES II 
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The initial programme theories and CMO configurations set out in Chapter 5 were 
used to develop a topic guide to highlight the key issues to be explored with the 
research participants (Appendix F). A topic guide should act as an aide memoire to 
help the researcher to achieve a degree of consistency when collecting data but 
providing sufficient flexibility to pursue the detail that is salient to each individual 
participant (Richie, et al 2014). The aim was to achieve a conversational style of 
interview and to use the teacher-learner cycle as a framework to present the initial 
programme theories to the participants and to use their responses to refine the 
theories and look for evidence of new areas to explore (The RAMESES II Project, 
2017d). The topic guide starts with general questions about the participant’s role 
and their views of why the WHC-QD was developed and how it influences quality 
improvement. An iterative process was used to bring the theories to life with the 
participants so they could be refined and developed. 
4.5.2.5 Data collection  
For participants who agreed to take part, interviews were arranged at a time and 
location of their choosing.  All interviews took place in offices within the case study 
site. Verbal and written consent was taken at the time of interview and agreement 
to use a password protected digital recorder was taken. The participants were 
made aware their information would be anonymised and could be removed from the 
study if the researcher was contacted by email or telephone within 14 days of their 
interview. After this time the audio recording was sent for transcription and 
anonymised for inclusion in the study. Information given during the interview was 
stored securely and in line with an agreed data management plan. The audio 
recordings were transferred to a secure University network within one hour of 
completion and removed from the digital recorder to reduce the risk of data being 
lost or stolen.  
4.5.2.6 Data Analysis  
The researcher transcribed the first four audio recordings, however when compared 
with the audio recording, evidence of subconscious auto correction was noted, as 
repeated phrases and dialect had been removed. All of the audio recordings were 
therefore sent to a professional transcription service to ensure consistency.  
4.5.2.7 Framework Analysis 
To allow the abstraction of theories or generate meaning from the vast sums of data 





required to manage the data (Ritchie et al., 2014). An approach used in other realist 
evaluation studies within healthcare and used widely in qualitative healthcare 
research has been the framework approach, also known as the framework method 
or framework analysis (Smith and Firth, 2011, Cheyne et al., 2013, Gale et al., 
2013, Ritchie et al., 2014, Alvarado et al., 2017). The framework method is not 
associated with a particular methodology or theoretical approach but is a tool to 
manage information. It does however use similar processes such as data 
immersion, and comparison between themes that are used in other qualitative 
analysis methods (Gale et al., 2013). Interviews in RE are used to seek information 
about how a programme works, rather than exploring the participant’s experience of 
programmes to the point of thematic saturation (Manzano, 2016). The approach 
allows for theme and case based analysis, rather than building themes up from 
individual participant views. It also provides a step-by-step approach to guide the 
analysis of data which can be helpful to the novice researcher. The steps for 
analysis are, familiarisation; identifying a thematic framework; Indexing; charting; 
mapping and interpretation (Smith and Firth, 2011, Gale et al., 2013, Ritchie et al., 
2014).  
4.5.2.7.1 Familiarisation  
As part of developing an analytical framework, Richie et al (2014) asks the 
researcher to familiarise themselves with the data. This is the process of becoming 
immersed in the information through reading the interview transcripts and re-
reading them to highlight themes identified in the initial programme theories or 
identify possible context, mechanism and outcome not identified from the literature. 
As the process for RE is iterative, familiarisation took place after each interview, 
identifying areas of interest for possible discussion during subsequent interviews 
(Siriwardena, 2009) . Familiarisation in this study included listening to the audio 
recordings, reading a printed copy of the transcribed interview, and re-reading to 
highlight salient points with hand written comments made on the transcripts (Gale et 
al., 2013). Due to participant availability, the scheduling of interviews meant that the 
transcripts were not always reviewed prior to the next interview. Where time did 
allow the notes were added to the topic guide, in addition to using them to form the 





4.5.2.7.2 Developing an analytical framework  
After familiarisation, the aim is to organise data in a meaningful and manageable 
way (Parkinson et al., 2015). The research aims and objectives, initial programme 
theories and CMO configurations, which are set out in Chapter 5, were used to 
construct an initial set of codes. Underlying themes were used to allow grouping of 
ideas under each heading. As a novice researcher, support was given by the 
academic supervision team to develop the initial codes for the analytical framework. 
To support learning for the researcher, two identical transcripts were chosen at 
random and sent un-coded to two academic supervisors. Independently they were 
asked to reviewed the data and identify codes for the analytical framework. The 
codes identified by the academic supervisors were compared to the researcher’s 
codes (Appendix U). While there was general concordance, recognition of success 
and belief in feedback were added as specific codes within the framework. A 
summary of the codes is presented in Table 5.  
Table 5 Initial codes for the analytical framework 
Resources  Contexts 
Consistent QD Data  Organisation legitimises QD  
Focus for improvement Awareness of performance 
Contextualise/educate  Ward manager role 
Performance over time   Need to improve accepted 
Opportunity for change  Knowledge of standards  
 Information is meaningful 
Reasoning  Outcome 
QD is seen as important  Awareness of performance 
Avoidance    Engagement  with QD  
 Disrupts view of ward/self   Opportunity for change 
 Assurance / reassurance  Seek help  
 Recognition change/help is needed Adopt or change practice  
Recognition of Success   Culture change QD routinely discussed  






4.5.2.7.3 Indexing the data 
Using these codes, an analytical framework was developed initially in Excel and 
imported to NVivo (Version 10) which is qualitative data analysis software which 
can be used as an effective way of storing and organising data so it is accessible 
for analysis. Each transcript was once again reviewed and passages of text were 
assigned a code from the analytical framework, this process is known as indexing 
(Richie et al., 2014). Indexing was used to organise the transcripts into framework 
categories and involved systematically applying the framework to each interview 
transcript (Figure 19). 




Once the transcripts were coded, it became possible to organise the data into a 
more manageable format to allow data analysis, this phase is known as charting 
(Gale et al., 2013). The data was imported back to Excel as the researcher found 
this more useful in providing a visual summary of the data. The transcripts were 





a row. In total over two thousand rows were created. Filters were added according 
to, participant, participant job role, questions from the topic guides and codes from 











4.5.2.7.5 Mapping and interpretation 
Once the data was coded, indexed and charted, it was used to move beyond data management 
and towards understanding and interpretation (Gale et al., 2013). The process of coding, 
indexing and charting allowed data to support the CMO configurations to be identified and new 
patterns or programme theories to be uncovered. The information allowed comparison on a 
case-by-case basis, by role or by themes. The CMO configurations were also used as a 
reference point to look for contexts, mechanisms, and outcomes within and across data which 
was used to refine or develop new CMO configurations.  
4.5.3 Reflexivity  
Reflexivity refers to the need for researchers to be reflective about the impact of their methods, 
values and biases, how these may change with time and how they influence the research 
process and analysis (Bryman, 2016). While the aim is for researchers to strive to remain 
neutral, it is recognised that this can never be achieved as all qualitative research is in some 
way influenced by the researcher. It is therefore important that researchers themselves reflect 
upon their bias and this is made explicit within the study (Ritchie et al., 2014). 
Bryman (2016) definition has resonance when considering the researcher’s views on the WHC-
QD at the time of starting this project and how this has changed throughout the thesis. At the 
time of conducting phase one interviews, the researcher did consider  the WHC-QD to be a 
performance management tool or a modern day panopticon, using dashboards and the idea of 
central monitoring to control behaviour  (Foucault, 2003). The researcher had also been present 
at several management meetings where the performance of an initiative was presented via a 
red, amber, green chart and the focus of the discussion always started with staff trying to 
discredit the data rather than making plans to make improvements. At that time there was no 
obvious link between the introduction of dashboards and tangible improvements in the quality of 
care patients would receive, in fact the programme actually demanded time from already busy 
nursing staff rather than providing a solution.  
When conducting the interviews, the researcher was aware that several of the participants had 
invested considerable time and effort in the development of the WHC-QD and their view was 
likely to differ from the researcher. They were also cognisant that several of those interviewed 
worked in a senior role within the organisation and confidentiality could be inadvertently 





2014). The researcher was therefore careful when sharing other participants views of the WHC-
QD and did so anonymously and without revealing the role of the participant as this could 
breach their confidence. 
4.6 Methods Phase 2: Theory testing 
As programme theories rarely exercise direct control over the social conditions they are 
expected to improve, programmes must work by influencing those on the receiving end of the 
programme (Rossi et al., 2004). Change, improvement or success is therefore dependent upon 
the volition of individuals, who are not passive recipients but active agents (Pawson, 2006). A 
programme offers individuals a choice, or an opportunity to change their mind, work harder, 
change practice, look for information or continue as normal. Phase 2 of this study explores how 
the WHC-QD influences the volition of individuals and how this changes practice within hospital 
wards by testing the refined programme theories and CMO configurations from the Phase 1 
participant interviews.  
Data collection methods in realist evaluation are considered by their potential to contribute to 
theory testing and refinement (Pawson and Tilley, 1997). Pawson (2013) argues there is no 
absolute methodological rulebook that researchers must follow; he suggests methodological 
approaches should be adapted to meet the peculiarities and complexity of the phenomenon 
under investigation. 
To explore the complexities of the impact of the WHC-QD and how it influences care delivery 
within the complex social structure of a hospital ward, a case study approach was used. Case 
study design allows multiple data collection methods to be used to capture in-depth and 
contextual information which can be compared and used to highlight contextual influences on 
outcomes (Yin, 2009). Although a criticism of case study design has been the generalisation of 
findings beyond the case study sites, realist evaluation is not looking to build theory from 
observation or participant interviews, it uses retroduction to find evidence from case study sites 
to support or refute programme theories or propositions (Marchal et al., 2012a, The RAMESES 
II Project, 2017e). 
As interviews only provide the researcher with “fragments” of insight, other methods must be 
considered when testing the theories (Rossi et al., 2004, Emmel, 2013, Pawson, 2013, Emmel 
et al., 2018). RE uses a mixed methods design as qualitative and quantitative data is needed to 
understand outcome patterns (Gilmore et al., 2019). Mixed methods research focuses on using 





mixed methods research can be used to illustrate or provide context to quantitative data and 
vice versa. Creswell (2010) describes a mixed methods study as involving the collection or 
analysis of both quantitative and qualitative data in a single study in which the data are 
collected concurrently or sequentially, are given equal priority, and involve the integration of the 
data at one or more stages in the process of research. The information gained from using a 
mixed methods approach can offer a powerful resource to illuminate policy or practice (Ritchie 
et al., 2014). While philosophical assumptions about how to reach the truth in research will 
remain, a mixed methods approach was used in phase two of this study to integrate all the data 
to support or refute the programme theories (Wong et al., 2017). 
4.6.1 Data collection methods  
To test the programme theories and answer the research question, data collection methods 
were selected according to how they could be used to increase the robustness of theory testing 
(Wong et al., 2017). As programmes work by influencing the behaviour of individuals, it was 
important to explore the views of those at the receiving end of the programme. Data collection 
methods were selected to provide evidence or themes to explain intended or unintended 
outcomes (Table 6).  






To understand how staff use the resource provided by 
the WHC-QD, how actions are influenced by context and 
what leads to behaviour change or outcomes 
Visitors to case study 
site 
To understand what visitors perception of the 
information displayed upon the PSB 
Non Participant Observation 
Visitors to the case 
study site 
To see if staff, patients or relatives interact with the PSB 
and if they there presence influences engagement or the 




To understand if WHC-QD information is discussed 





Review of WHC-QD Data and Ward documentation (including electronic) 
WHC-QD data 
To understand current and historical ward performance, 
identify areas for improvement used to inform staff 
interviews 
Patient Safety Board 
Data 
To understand what information is publicly displayed 
within the ward area and how staff receive information 
about their performance. 
Staff communication 
information 
To understand how WHC-QD data is used by staff in 
practice and how key information is communicated 
within wards 
 
4.6.2 Ethical approval and considerations 
As Phase 2 required data collection from within hospital wards, interviews with visitors to ward 
areas and the observation of clinical discussions, NHS ethical approval was required. Following 
completion of the necessary safeguards and assurances Phase 2 of this study was sponsored 
by the University of Leeds, with NHS ethical approval given by the East of England- Cambridge 
East, NHS REC number 17/EE/0006 on the 13th January 2017. The case study site gave 
permission in February 2017 for the study to be conducted within their hospitals, reference 
number NU17/91059. The letter of approval is available in Appendix J.  
Once again, as the researcher was a senior nurse, any case study sites linked to their role was 
excluded from selection. As with the Phase 1 study, a participant information sheet and 
information on the consent form made it clear that if any information was disclosed which was 
considered by the researcher to be illegal or posed a risk to patient safety, the interview would 
be stopped and the concerns would be brought to the attention of the researcher’s academic 
supervisor and if appropriate the Head of Nursing for Research and Innovation at the case 
study site. Thankfully no concerns were identified during any of the interviews. 
4.6.3 Case study site selection 
To gather evidence from a range of staff with differing experiences of using the WHC-QD, 
evidence from three case study sites were used to test the programme theories. Each case 
study site would be selected according to their WHC-QD performance.  
Case study site A: A ward which had been ‘green’ according to WHC-QD metric data for 2 





performance was recognised, if it was seen as important and if recognising success was a 
factor in maintaining performance.  
Case study site B: A ward that had been red/amber for 2 months or longer within the last 12 
months. The rationale for this was to see if the negative performance data translated into 
actions within the department to address the performance deficit. 
Case study site C: A ward where the metrics had changed from green to red within the last 12 
months, to see if the negative performance data or a change in status triggered a response or 
change in behaviour.  
Using these criteria, potential case study sites were selected by the Head of Nursing for 
Professional Standards who had oversight of all wards performance data within the HCP. The 
Head of nursing, Matron and Ward manager for the potential case study sites were contacted 
via email and letter to ask for permission to undertake the research within their ward areas. 
Maternity, paediatric, and wards with restricted access due to security and infection reasons 
were excluded due to reduced visitor access and additional security measures in place.  Three 
case study sites were identified and the necessary permissions obtained.  
4.6.4 Description of the case study sites 
All three case study sites were hospital wards within the HCP 
 Case study site A, was a ward with 24 beds specialising in caring for patients with 
medical conditions.  
 Case study site B was a ward with 20 beds, specialising in caring for patients with 
extremely complex medical conditions and a tertiary referral centre providing highly 
specialist care.  
 Case study site C was the largest ward with 32 beds providing support to patients 
recovering from complex cancer surgery.  
The PSB were located in similar locations within the case study sites and all three wards had 
been receiving WHC-QD data for over 18 months. The wards were located on one hospital site, 
and were managed by different Matrons and Heads of Nursing.  
The staffing levels and organisational structure within each case study site were similar in that 
each ward had one ward manager known as senior sister or charge nurse and three sisters or 
deputy ward managers. Although ward managers also get referred to as sister, for the purpose 





managers/sisters referred to as sisters. The number of staff nurses and clinical support workers 
varied between 13-18 per ward with each area supported by one or two ward clerks.  
4.6.5 Review of the case study site WHC-QD data 
To inform and guide the participant interviews and the non-participant observation of ward 
handovers and updates, WHC-QD data from April 2016 to December 2018 for each of the case 
study site was provided by the HCP.  
While pre-existing documentary data by its nature is ordered and structured around key topics 
or subject matters, consideration must be given to its purpose, intention, and target audience for 
the data as this must be considered in any analysis (Flick, 2014, Ritchie et al., 2014). For this 
phase of the study WHC-QD data was exported into an excel format and used to develop a 
descriptive profile of the case study sites. Areas for improvement were highlighted and 
descriptive notes made of trends and progress made against each metric commented upon. 
The data used were copies of the type of information available to all staff working in the case 
study site. As it was suggested in the phase 1 interviews, it was unlikely staff accessed the 
WHC-QD via a computer, so photographs of the PSB were taken from each of the case study 
sites for the purpose of using the information to inform the staff interviews. The information was 
redacted to maintain site location confidentiality.  
Realist analysis is not a staged approach, it is an on-going iterative process, with information 
needed before data collection to allow insights to be pursued with participants (The RAMESES 
II Project, 2017e, The RAMESES II Project, 2017d). The purpose of reviewing data prior to staff 
interviews was to inform the discussion and test if the participants had an awareness of how 
their ward was performing and if their view matched performance. The data was also used to 
ascertain to what extent participants had an awareness of current priorities for improvement and 
how this influenced practice or care delivery.  The information from the WHC-QD also informed 
the non-participant observation of ward handovers and updates to see if areas for improvement 
were discussed during key communication opportunities (handover) within the ward.  
4.6.6 Non-participant observations 
Observation is a central method used in qualitative research and realist evaluations (Rycroft-
Malone et al., 2010, Harris et al., 2017, Randell et al., 2017, Ritchie et al., 2018). The 
involvement of a researcher during a period of observation varies from complete participant, 
where the researcher attempts to become a member of the group; to complete observer where 





observe as a participant, which involved engaging in the case study sites but only for short 
period of time, being open about the purpose of the study, observing the participants and visibly 
making notes during the period of observation (Ritchie et al., 2014). The purpose of undertaking 
this element of the research was to use the information to test programme theories, rather than 
gathering descriptive information of the case study sites. The aim was to gain data on visitor 
interaction with the PSB and to observe nursing handover and safety huddles to see if 
information from the WHC-QD was discussed when planning patient care. Handover is the 
process of passing the responsibility of care from one team to another (Smeulers et al., 2014). 
Responsibility deals with the transfer of accountability for the quality, safety and care of the 
patient from one healthcare professional to another. This process typically happens two or three 
times per 24 hour period in hospital wards (Smeulers et al., 2014).  
The primary function of handovers is to ensure continuity of patient care via a process which 
involves using verbal, written and electronic information about the care patients have received 
or need. The patient’s medical history, care needs and areas of potential risk such as drug 
allergies, risk of falls, risk from infection or concerns over skin integrity are highlighted to the 
individual or team taking over responsibility for the patient’s care (Messam and Pettifer, 2009). 
Although the location of handovers can vary between office setting, nurses station or the 
patient’s bedside, the approach used within the case study sites utilised an office setting for 
handovers (Messam and Pettifer, 2009).  
Safety huddles are short often multidisciplinary briefing focused on the patients most at risk. 
Effective huddles involve agreed actions and are informed with visual feedback of data. They 
are believed to improve safety through an opportunity for teams to agree focus and priorities for 
the shift and to raise awareness of safety concerns (Cracknell, 2017). The location of the safety 
huddles took place at the nurses’ station which is an open space in the middle of the hospital 
ward.   
The data collection method used for observing handovers and huddles involved the researcher 
being present during the process and making field notes via a data collection form (Appendix 0). 
The use of field notes is a common method during observation and prevents confidential patient 
information being inadvertently captured by audio or video recording devices (Ritchie et al., 
2014). The researcher used handwritten notes to capture data while observing handover. Staff 
were made aware of the presence of the researcher by an introduction by the nurse in charge 
and a participant information sheet was available for staff to review. Participants were made 





observation and information could be removed if required to protect patient or staff 
confidentiality.  
The non-participant observation approach used to gain data on visitor interaction with the PSB 
involved the researcher observing visitors to the ward area. The periods of observation were 
limited to 1 hour and took place during ward visiting hours to maximise visitor numbers to the 
case study sites. Data was collected via field notes with the number of visitors recorded, their 
designation (if known) and if they were seen to interact or view the information on the PSB. A 
poster was displayed at the entrance to the case study site at the beginning of the period of 
observation to alert visitors to the presence of the researcher and the study (Appendix K).  A 
participant information sheet was available if required (Appendix Q). No visitors or patients 
approached the researcher during the period of observation to ask about the study.  
4.7 Participant recruitment 
In phase 1, stakeholders or those involved with the design, implementation or responsible for 
the programme were targeted for recruitment to the study. The participant recruitment strategy 
for phase 2 was designed to target those on the receiving end of the programme (Pawson, 
2013). As change is dependent upon the volition of individuals, understanding how a 
programme influences decisions and choices made by individuals allows programme theories to 
be tested. A key source of data in realist evaluation are participants who can provide 
information about how mechanisms are influenced by context to produce outcomes, any sample 
should therefore be sufficiently diverse to provide evidence across different contexts (Pawson 
and Tilley, 1997, Wong et al., 2017). The aim was to recruit a number of participants who 
worked within the micro level (Table 1) of the organisation. 
Within every hospital ward there is a hierarchy of pay grades, responsibilities and roles. A 
typical hospital ward in the NHS is staffed by registered nurses, clinical support workers and 
ward clerks. The precise numbers of staff vary between HCP and wards but a typical structure 
would be 
 1 ward manager  
 2 or 3 sisters/deputy ward managers 
 0.5 nurse per bed,  
 0.25 clinical support workers per bed.  





This establishment would be used to provide care to patients over a 24 hour period (National 
Institute of Health and Care Excellence, 2014).The sampling strategy for the staff interviews 
was developed to include all grades of staff responsible for providing care, including clinical 
support workers and ward clerks. Since the unit of analysis in RE is not the person but the 
events and processes around them, every participant has the potential to uncover a collection 
of micro events that can be used to explore the theories. Emmel (2013) reminds the reader that 
it is not how many people we talk to, but who, why and how. Although no recruitment target was 
set for phase 2, consideration was given to purposively recruiting staff working in different roles 
within each of case study sites rather than focus on numbers of participants. The purpose of the 
interviews was to build knowledge of variation of what happens in the ward setting and to 
ensure all staff roles were included for interview. Data from the interviews were used to test how 
different participants were influenced by the programme. 
To build explanation, Manzano (2016) recommends an iterative process of data collection 
involving the re-interviewing of participants as new theories emerge, no participants were re-
interviewed as part of this study. Once data was entered for analysis, it was anonymised. New 
theories or areas to explore were however put to participants as the study progressed rather 
than return to the particular individuals for clarification or further testing.  While it was not 
possible to re-approach participants, as new evidence emerged during the interviews, the topic 
guides were revised to explore the potential mechanism with the next participant, therefore 
ensuring a progressive iterative approach to data collection and analysis. 
To recruit participants an invitation letter and email (Appendix Q) was sent to ward managers and 
participant information was given to staff during the periods of non-participant observation. In total 
30 participants agreed to be interviewed across the 3 case study sites and their information used 





Figure 21 Phase 2 participant recruitment flowchart 
 
4.7.1 Visitor Recruitment 
As one of programme theories was focused upon the influence of publicly displaying 
performance data via the PSB, the research was designed to interview visitors to case study 
sites. Participants were asked to take part in the study if they were seen to be interacting or 
looking at the PSB. The interviews would be undertaken during the planned periods of non-
participant observation. The aim was to use the information to explore to what extent PSB 
information was used by visitors. It became apparent however during the periods of 
observation, that as very few people were seen to be observing the PSB, recruitment into this 
part of the study would be low. In total only six visitors were interviewed for this aspect of the 
study.  
4.7.2 The realist interview 
As previously discussed, as realist interviews use theory to guide the process, a new a topic guide 
was developed based upon the revised theories (Appendix S). This was used as an aide-memoire 
to help guide the interview and draw out the participant’s view of the programme theories. A 
teacher-learner cycle was used to describe the programme theories to the participants and their 
response captured with an audio recording device with field notes written on the topic guide 
(Pawson and Tilley, 1997, Manzano, 2016, The RAMESES II Project, 2017d). 
The time between participant interviews in most cases did not allow data to be transcribed, 
analysed and available to inform the next participant interview, therefore field notes taken during 
the interview were used to refine or highlight particular areas to focus question for the next 
participant where appropriate. 






Date of first 
interview 15 March 
2017
Date of last 
interview 07 July 
2017. 








4.7.3 Data collection  
The researcher made themselves available within the case study sites and the participant 
interviews took place within an office on the ward. A participant information sheet was available 
and written consent was taken at the time of the interviews (Appendix P, Q, and R). Interviews 
were audio recorded and stored securely according to a data management plan. The 
participants were aware their information could be removed from the study within 14 days of the 
interview.  
The visitor interviews took place, next to the PSB within the hospital ward corridor, so the PSB 
could be referred to during the interview. No visitor information was collected during the consent 
process, but the participant information sheet set out how to contact the researcher if they 
wanted their data to be removed from the study.  No participants or visitor contacted the 
researcher after the interview to have their data removed.  All audio recordings were sent to a 
professional transcription service to ensure consistency. As no participants withdrew their 
consent for their information to be included in the research, 30 staff and 6 visitor interviews 
were available for analysis (Table 7).   
Table 7 Participants roles 
Role Case study site A Case study site B Case study site C 
Ward manager 1 1 1 
Sister 2 1 3 
Staff nurse 5 4 3 
Clinical support worker 1 1 3 
Ward clerk 2 2 0 









4.7.4 Framework Analysis 
To allow the abstraction and generate meaning from the vast sums of data from the participant 
interviews, framework analysis was once again used to manage data. The process is outlined 
earlier in this chapter (Gale et al., 2013, Ritchie et al., 2014). A thematic framework was 
developed using the CMO configurations and theories refined in phase one.  
4.7.5 Familiarisation  
The researcher familiarised themselves with the data by reading the transcripts and re-reading 
them to highlight themes and areas of interest. The data was also read by job roles to see if any 
common themes within staff groups. Familiarisation for this phase of the study involved reading 
a printed copy of the transcribed interview, and re-reading to highlight salient points with hand 
written comments made on the transcripts (Gale et al., 2013).  
4.7.6 Developing an analytical framework  
After familiarisation, the aim was to organise data in a meaningful and manageable way (Gale 
et al., 2013). Themes were drawn from the refined programme theory, WHC-QD data and the 






















Table 8 Phase 2 analytical framework 
Resources  Contexts 
Consistent QD Data  Organisation legitimises QD  
Focus for improvement Awareness of performance 
Contextualise/educate  Leadership 
Performance over time   Knowledge of standards 
Opportunity for change  Meaningful information  
 Credible auditor  
Reasoning  Outcome 
QD is seen as important  Awareness of performance 
Avoidance  Engagement  with QD  
Disrupts view of ward/self  Opportunity for change 
Assurance / reassurance  Seek help  
Competition Adopt or change practice  
  Culture change  
  QD routinely discussed 
 Increased effort 
 
4.7.7 Indexing the data 
Data from the transcripts were exported into Excel, to allow an analytical framework to be 
developed. Columns were added to allow the data to be filtered according to participant, role, 
case study site, interview question and response. Each transcript was once again reviewed and 
passages of text were assigned a code from the analytical framework, this process is known as 
indexing (Ritchie et al., 2014). Indexing was used to organise the transcripts into framework 
categories and involved systematically applying the framework to each interview transcript.   
4.7.8 Charting 
Once the transcripts were coded, the data was organise to allow analysis, this phase is known 
as charting (Ward et al., 2013). The transcripts were combined and added to EXCEL with each 
sentence or groups of sentences added to a row. In total over two thousand seven hundred 






Recognition of researcher biases is a key principle when undertaking research and reflexivity is 
how qualitative researchers strive for reliability and validity (Seale, 2011). As previously outlined 
in phase one interviews remaining neutral, can never be achieved as all qualitative research is 
in some way influenced by the researcher (Ritchie et al., 2014).The researchers previous bias 
was outlined earlier in this chapter, but there was recognition that time and considerable 
reading had taken place since the phase one interviews and therefore my enthusiasm for the 
WHC-QD and its potential was a consideration. I was also mindful that all three case study sites 
were busy wards with staffing vacancies and I was nervous that spending several hours 
observing, handovers, visitors to the ward, rather than supporting the nurses to deliver care to 
the patients would be seen as an luxury that could be ill afforded in such a time precious 
environment. It was noted that the length of the interview with the staff members were shorter 
than the phase 1 interviews. This may have been a consequence of theory consolidation rather 
than gleaning  (Manzano, 2016) or may have been due to an awareness that staff were 
extremely busy and were giving up time to participate in the interviews. Upon reflection, follow 
up participant interviews could have been included in the research design to reduce the time 
pressure on the first interview and allow a second opportunity to present the programme 
theories to the participants.      
4.9 Chapter summary 
This chapter introduced realism and realist evaluation and the rationale for the use of this 
approach to answer the research questions. The central principles of Context, Mechanism and 
Outcomes and the need to generate initial programme theories about how a programme is 
expected to work are explained. An alternative to the CMO heuristic is presented to remind the 
researcher to separate resources and reasoning to aid the identification of contexts from 
mechanisms.  
The research aims and objectives were reintroduced and three phases were identified to 
support programme theory development, refinement and testing. The process begins with 
theory development, which involves using the evidence set out in previous chapters and the 
researcher’s experience of healthcare to develop candidate theories about how QD influence 
care delivery within hospital wards.  
Theory refinement or phase one, sets out the steps taken to recruit stakeholders to participate 





interviewing requires theories to be presented to the participant, the teacher-learner cycle is 
explained. Data collection and analysis techniques are outlined for Phase one and Phase two of 
the study. The rationale for using a mixed methodological approach to capture information from 
three case study sites is set out with reference to ethical approval and how the case study sites 
were selected. Case study site data, non-participant observation and participant and visitor 
interviews were used to capture data for analysis. Consideration is given to how the researcher 
may influence the study. As the first step in RE is to develop initial theories about how QD 
influence care, the next chapter, using evidence from Chapter 2 and 3 will present the initial 





Chapter 5: Developing the initial programme theories 
5.1 Introduction  
Pawson (2006) describes programmes as theories incarnate, and believes every programme or 
intervention has a theoretical underpinning. Realist evaluation aims to bring these theories to 
the surface, to explain what works for who, in what circumstances and how (The RAMESES II 
Project, 2017b). The first phase of RE is to develop initial theories or propositions which explain 
how and why a programme is expected to achieve its outcomes and the conditions that allow or 
prevent this from happening. This chapter will initially set out considerations regarding theory 
development using RE, and will identify the range of sources used to develop the initial CMO 
configurations and programme theories to explain how quality dashboards influence care 
delivery within hospital wards. 
5.2 Constructing the programme theories 
RE begins with identifying initial programme theories which hypothesize how, why and for 
whom a programme may work (Figure 22). The realist evaluation cycle highlights that RE 
process and the research journey needed to understand how mechanisms, respond to contexts 
to produce outcomes. 
Figure 22 The realist evaluation cycle 
 





The first phase of RE is to develop initial theories or propositions which explain how and why a 
programme is expected to achieve its outcomes and the conditions that allow or prevent this 
from happening. Where possible the theories should be developed using literature, document 
reviews, and interviews with programme architects or implementers (Gilmore et al., 2019). The 
RAMESES II Project (2017b) group also suggest multiple sources should be used to develop 
the theories (Table 9). 
Table 9 Information used to develop the initial programme theories 
Potential sources 
available to develop RE 
theories 
Sources used to develop RE  
(Appendix A-D) 
Published journal  
Scoping review, 
Published systematic reviews 
Published reports  Quality and Safety Reports (Appendix A) 
Grey literature  Descriptive articles, Patient information leaflets 
Expert and consensus 
papers  
Audit and Feedback Framework  
Metric development 
Government reports  
Existing or linked theories  
Actionable Feedback 
Feedback intervention theory  
Documentation used to 
develop and support the 
programme 
Published Board papers with reference to the 
WHC-QD and the purpose of its development  
Interviews with people 
involved in the  
development of the 
programme 
Stakeholder interviews, (Chapter 6)  
Experience of the 
researcher 
Experience as a nurse working within the case 
study site,  knowledge of the WHC-QD and its use 
in management meetings 
(The RAMESES II Project, 2017b) 
The programme theories in realist evaluation should reflect the realist view of causation, and 
should not be limited to evaluating if a programme achieves its outcomes. The theories should 
consider what resources and opportunities the programme offers to an individual, group or 
organisation and the circumstances or contextual factors that influence the volition of those 





With reference to this thesis and research project, the first step was to consider why the HCP 
decided to develop the WHC-QD and consider how the programme would be used to change 
practice. Using publicly available board papers from the HCP the following was identified 
[The WHC-QD brings together] “a range of measures that provide a strategic overview 
and focus on the fundamentals of care, together with patient outcomes and feedback on 
their experience of care by ward. It was developed to provide rich data to help ward & 
CSU (a collection of wards) teams focus their attention on actions that will improve patient 
outcomes and experience. The information is used to identify wards that have positive 
patient outcomes and identifies wards which need to focus on developments to improve 
performance and patient outcomes” (Case study site Trust Board Paper 2014). 
The use of board papers as evidence to develop the initial theories clearly shows the intended 
consequences of implementing the WHC-QD, it also specifies how the WHC-QD was expected 
to be used and by whom. The statement provides rich information regarding the intention of the 
programme (The RAMESES II Project, 2017b). Board papers have also been used in other 
studies to assess the maturity of HCP digital response to improving the quality and safety of 
healthcare (Keen et al., 2018a).  
If the statement from the board paper is considered in the context of realist evaluation, it 
provides important insight, to explain how and why a programme is expected to achieve its 
outcomes but offers limited insight into the conditions that allow or prevent this from happening. 
From the board statement the WHC-QD was developed to provide a strategic overview of care 
and improve patient outcomes and experience.  
It was expected to achieve this by  
 Providing feedback  to all levels of staff within the organisation (strategic, ward, 
management) (Table 1)  
 Providing rich data with focused actions 
 Identifying  wards with positive feedback and performance data 
 Identifying wards who need to focus on developments to improve performance  
This resource was expected to be used by management and ward teams to focus their attention 
on making improvements. Although consideration is not given to the unintended consequences 
of the introduction of WHC-QD or contextual factors which may limit its potential, it did provide a 





Unfortunately as outlined in Chapter 3, the literature is littered with evidence to suggest 
programmes designed to improve performance, actually have limited impact making healthcare 
safer (Kluger and DeNisi 1996, Flottrop 2010, Iver’s et al., 2014). The first step to understanding 
how QD influence care delivery within hospital wards was to understand the link between 
measurement and improvement  (Berwick et al., 2003).  Where the introduction of programmes 
have led to improvements in the safety or quality of care, the evidence suggests it is 
multifactorial and dependent upon what information is given, how the information it is given and 
by whom. To support the develop of initial theories a synthesis of evidence from HCP board 
papers, the scoping review and the researchers experience of working with the WHC-QD was 
used to identify salient points from the literature outlined in Chapter 3.  
To organise the information three key questions were considered, a summary of this is available 
in Appendix C and D.  
 What are the unintended consequences of QD? 
 What are the key features of QD feedback needed to improve performance or change 
practice? 
 How does information from QD influence practice? 
The key themes for successful feedback from QD, suggested that information needs to be 
trustworthy, timely, meaningful, useful, and discussed. It was also important for staff to engage 
with, and understand QD information and be given an opportunity to use it to change and improve 
care (Appendix C).  
It is suggested from the literature, QD provide focus and can act as an aide memoire to remind 
staff of the areas for improvement. QD also raise awareness of performance against pre-
determine standards, this creates an opportunity to be recognised for success, avoid managerial 
scrutiny or ask for help (Appendix B).  
Unintended consequences of QD are discussed in greater detail in Section 2.5, (Appendix V) 
however there is a concern that as QD identify poor performance, this can lead to ward 
stigmatisation and associated anxiety for staff working within those areas. QD may also lead to 
resources diverted from genuine quality improvement initiatives to superficial steps to address a 
particular metric. Behaviours such as gaming or measure fixation are more likely when the 
consequence of poor performance is linked to financial incentives or the avoidance of personal 





patients will receive no real benefit (Lilford et al., 2004, Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012, 
Illingworth, 2014). 
To develop initial theories or propositions to explain how QD influence care within hospitals wards 
the evidence was used to identify, Context, Mechanisms, and Outcomes and how these could be 
brought together as CMO configurations.  
5.3 Initial programme theories 
Using Dalkin et al. (2015) model, mechanisms are disaggregated into resources and reasoning 
to avoid conflating contexts and mechanisms  The evidence summarised in Appendix B,C and D, 
was used to develop initial theories to suggest what resources are offered by QD (Table 10). 




Consistent QD data 
For QD to influence behaviour, the data needs to be considered 
trustworthy, accessible, accurate, and given in a timely manner. 
Consideration should be given to the content and how data are 





Change was more likely when QD information or feedback highlighted 
specific areas for improvement, given with an educational component 
and specifically discussed with individuals or teams 
Performance over 
time  
As one of the benefits of collecting performance data is the ability to 
track performance over time, this allows progress to be assessed, 
improvement to be recognised and allows audit cycles and goal driven 
targets to be used. It also reassured managers and staff that changes 
made to improve patient outcomes actually made a difference. 
Opportunity for 
change 
Within a structure or hierarchy of a hospital ward governed by process 
and procedures, change can be difficult to enact and is dependent 
upon a person’s roles and responsibilities.  
QD makes performance visible and therefore provides an opportunity 







5.3.1 Initial contextual considerations  
As providing information does not inevitably lead to improvement in performance, consideration 
was given to the pre-existing social contexts which influence how the resources offered by the 
QD programme are viewed and used. The initial contexts are presented in Table 11. 
Table 11 Initial contexts considered 
Context Title Context 
Organisation 
legitimises QD 
When QD was used by senior managers to engage in quality 
improvement initiatives and the information was used in governance, root 
cause analysis meeting, it reassured staff that there was a collective 
responsibility to improve care. This was also emphasised  when QD 
metrics are aligned to organisational priorities 
Awareness of 
performance 
An awareness of performance was seen as a fundamental step in making 
improvement, if staff are not aware of how they or their ward is 
performing, it is unlikely any increase in effort or change in practice will 
be actioned. For change to occur there has to be recognition change or 
help is needed  
Ward manager 
role 
Ward managers play a vital role in promoting engagement with QD 
programmes and giving staff an opportunity to make changes in practice, 
change is more likely if information comes from a trusted source. The 
opinion of local leaders has been found to be more effective than audit 




As with any system developed to provide performance information, if 
improvement is needed those receiving the information have to accept 
the message. Acceptance may happen over time or with repeated 
performance information, change is unlikely if staff are resistant or reject 






Change is unlikely if staff are unaware of the targets or standards which 
they are being measured against. The information has to be meaningful 
for the individual and provides them with information to inform actions, 
decisions or behaviours. Change is more likely when data are about 
individual or team behaviours and based upon recent performance and 






5.3.2 Initial mechanisms  
As outlined earlier, mechanisms are the participant’s response to the resources offered by the 
programme. Mechanisms suggest why participants decide (or not) to change behaviour or 
participate in a course of action. As hospital wards are extremely busy places, staff are faced with 
multiple competing priorities. Staff work within a system governed by routines, customs and 
practice developed to provide structure to how care is delivered (Jagosh et al., 2015).  
The initial mechanisms are presented in Table 12. 
Table 12 Initial reasoning mechanisms 
Mechanism Title Mechanisms (Reasoning) 
QD is seen as 
important 
For information from QD to lead to change, it has to be considered to 
be important. Importance may be dependent upon which layer of the 
organisation you work and the rationale for why it is important  
Avoidance 
Disrupts view of 
ward/self   
As QD also brings poor performance to the attention of all levels of 
the organisation, staff are motivated to make improvements to avoid 
managerial scrutiny and publicly displaying negative performance 
information which can worry patients and disrupt their own world view 
of their own or team performance 
Reassurance 
Assurance 
For those working in the Macro, and Meso levels of an organisation, 
QD information provides assurance care is delivered in line with 
agreed standards. For those working at a micro level, QD information 












5.3.3 Initial outcomes  
With the right resources and in the right context staff will respond to the QD and this will lead to 
improvement in the quality and safety of care within hospital wards. The affect may however not 
be immediate, while an awareness of performance may not lead to improvements in care; it 
may start a ripple effect, what starts as an initial outcome becomes a resource and context over 
time (Jagosh et al., 2015). The outcomes presented reflect sustained improvement in patient 
safety and care (Table 13). It has been shown that QD can lead to short term improvement, 
which ends when the initiative or incentive is removed. 
Table 13 Initial outcomes 












Once teams are aware of performance and engage with  
QD information, this may lead them to look for opportunities for 
change or seek help to improve performance depending upon the 
specific areas for improvement 




Some tasks may need a simple increase in effort to improve 
performance, others require a change in practice or a new 
approach to be taken  




For sustained improvement be made QD can lead to change in 
culture where opportunity to change practice becomes routine, 
peer pressure to maintain standards is evident and QD information 







5.4 Initial Context Mechanism Outcome configurations 
As Context-Mechanism-Outcome configurations are central to analysis, theory 
building and refinement, the resource, context, reasoning, and outcome theories 
were brought together as context, mechanism, outcome configurations (CMOC’s)  
(Wong et al., 2016, Gilmore et al., 2019) (Table 14).  







Information generated by the QD needs to be 
considered important 
When information from QD is generated consistently and 
systematically (Resource) and legitimised through 
management engagement (Context), its key message will 
be seen as important (Reasoning) and less likely to be 
rejected. This will lead to staff engagement with the 




Information generated by the QD needs to convey a 
story 
When QD information is contextualised or given with an 
educational component (Resource), and there is a need to 
improve performance (Context) the message is seen as 
important (Reasoning) and the information used to adopt 




Disruption may lead to change. 
When a ward has previously performed well (Context) and 
QD information reports negative information (Resource), 
this disrupts (Reasoning) the positive perception of the 
individual/ward. Staff will choose to reject the message or 
increase effort (Outcome) to improve performance.  
Disruption 2 
 
Consistent disruption will lead to change 
When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to address the 
deficit when performance is tracked over time and staff 
are aware (Resource + Context) to avoid scrutiny 
(Reasoning) and disrupting how the ward is viewed by 
patients and managers (Reasoning), a change in practice 















Informative feedback will lead to improvement 
If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) and 
a specific focus for improvement is given (Resource) if the 
metric is considered important (Reasoning) and there is 
recognition (Reasoning) change is needed, staff will 





Awareness of QD over time can positively influence 
ward culture 
When information from the QD (Resource) tracks 
performance over time, and staff are aware of their wards 
performance (Context) they become reassured 
(Reasoning) the care on their ward is safe. If QD 
information is used to recognise success, and staff engage 
with the information, this can lead to a change in culture as 
QD information becomes embedded in practice, discussed 
daily and used to plan care (Outcome) 
Avoidance  
 
QD offers an opportunity for change 
When QD information (Resource) tracks performance over 
time (Resource) and identifies a need to improve standards 
(Context), (Ward) managers who wish to avoid managerial 
scrutiny or publicly displaying negative performance 
information (Reasoning) ask staff to increase effort 
(Outcome), seek help (Outcome) and  create opportunities 











5.5 Discussion  
The initial programme theories, of importance, disruption, focus, reassurance and 
avoidance, are based upon evidence that suggests how and why quality 
dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards and presented earlier in 
this thesis. This information was used to identify potential mechanism and theories 
to be refined and tested later in the study. The initial theories presented in this 
chapter are based upon several key findings from the literature, which suggest how 
QD improve care within hospital wards.  
5.5.1 The initial theory of importance  
Information generated by the QD needs to be considered important.  
CMO Configuration 1: When information from QD is generated consistently 
and systematically (Resource) and legitimised through management 
engagement (Context) its key message will be seen as important 
(Reasoning) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff engagement 
with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness of the wards 
performance (Outcome).  
As QD have been shown to generate information about performance (Maben et al., 
2012, Strome, 2014). The quality of the information and how it is used have been 
identified as key mechanisms for change (Table 10 and Table 12). To drive 
change, information from QD needs to be timely, accurate, and believable. 
Believability is enhanced when the information comes from a trusted source and is 
based upon recent performance. Engagement with information was more likely 
when ward leaders considered it important. In one study (Flottorp et al., 2010) the 
opinion of local leaders was found to be more effective than audit and feedback 
(Flottorp et al., 2010, Coleman, 2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs et al., 2014a, 
Ivers et al., 2014). 
 
The initial theory of importance:  
Information generated by QD needs to convey a story 
CMO Configuration 2: When QD information is contextualised or given with 
an educational component (Resource), and there is a need to improve 
performance (Context) the message is seen as important (Reasoning) and 
the information used to adopt or change practice and increase effort to 





The greatest improvement in quality and safety were seen when performance data 
were discussed in person with individual staff members (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014). 
Contextualising or providing information that illuminates an area for improvement is 
one of the key features of QD and one of the intended consequences for the 
development of the WHC-QD. Feedback given with an educational component, 
used text or graphics or discussion was found to be more effective than information 
alone. Evidence from Actionable Feedback theory also suggests the effectiveness 
of feedback is dependent upon how information is given to individuals. Information 
that was found to be timely, individualised, and non-punitive was found to have the 
greatest impact upon an individual’s behaviour.  Simply providing performance data 
was found to rarely lead to change (Hysong et al., 2006, Hysong et al., 2012, Ivers 
et al., 2012, Hysong et al., 2017).  
5.5.2 The initial theory of disruption 
QD information can cause disruption which leads to change.  
CMO Configuration 3: When a ward has previously performed well 
(Context) and QD information reports negative information (Resource), this 
disrupts (Reasoning) the positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will 
choose to reject the message or increase effort (Outcome) to improve 
performance.  
FIT which suggests people regulate their behaviour through comparison, if a 
discrepancy is identified between a standard they have committed too and their 
behaviour they will try and resolve this by adjusting their effort in a particular 
direction. When wards have received positive metrics scores and then performance 
dips, this has the potential to cause disruption. FIT suggests new information, such 
as negative performance data can redirect a person’s locus of attention either 
towards or away from a task. When attention is directed towards at task, change is 
more likely. FIT acknowledges that people often have competing priorities so only 
deficits that receive attention will result in change. When feedback is aimed at goals 
of self, this can cause anxiety and has greater potential to lead to behaviour 
change. As self is subjective, this could explain variation in the impact of audit and 
feedback within an organisation and why ward managers more than any other role 







Initial theory of Disruption:  
Consistent disruption caused by QD data will lead to change.  
CMO Configuration 4: When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to 
address the deficit when performance is tracked over time and staff are 
aware (Resource + Context) to avoid scrutiny (Reasoning) and disrupting 
how the ward is viewed by patients and managers (Reasoning) a change in 
practice will be initiated or the ward manager will seek help (Outcome) 
As staff working within hospital wards have many competing priorities it is possible 
performance data that shows a drop in performance does not initially result in 
change (National Institute of Health and Care Excellence, 2014). However if this 
deficit is tracked over time and remains an issue change will be initiated. This may 
be because the feedback message is harder to reject the longer it is in place. It is 
also possible that ongoing deficits in performance are more likely to receive 
managerial scrutiny and are interlinked with the theory of avoidance.  
 
5.5.3 The initial theory of focus 
Informative feedback will lead to improvement 
CMO Configuration 5: If a ward has a performance deficit identified 
(Context) and a specific focus for improvement is given (Resource) if the 
metric is considered important (Reasoning) and there is recognition 
(Reasoning) change is needed staff will engage with the information and 
increase effort to improve performance (Outcome) 
This theory describes the need for staff to understand what is being measured and 
the standards that underpin the metric. Audit and effective feedback have been 
shown to improve compliance with standards, with the greatest improvement often 
seen when a significant deficiency in performance is identified. Knowing what you 
are being measured against is an important factor in this. Improvement can be 
made if objectives are specific, measurable, achievable, relevant, time-bound, and 
a clear action plan is provided (Ivers et al., 2014). On a practical level, nurses used 
quality dashboards as daily aide memoires to remind them of their wards priorities 
and areas for improvement. For focus to be maintained reminders of the deficit 
need to be made explicit and often. Unlike CMO2 this information does not need to 







5.5.4 The initial theory of reassurance  
Awareness of QD over time can positively influence ward culture 
CMO Configuration 6: When information from the QD (Resource) tracks 
performance over time, and staff are aware of their wards performance 
(Context) they become reassured (Reasoning) the care on their ward is 
safe. If QD information is used to recognise success, and staff engage with 
the information, this can lead to a change in culture as QD information 
becomes embedded in practice, discussed daily and used to plan care 
(Outcome). 
While the majority of papers focus on addressing deficits in performance, several 
highlight the importance of using quality dashboards to recognise success (Dixon-
Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs et al., 2014a, Ivers et al., 2014). Dashboards have the 
ability to provide reassurance about the care provided and can track improvements 
in performance over time. Staff can feel reassured that the efforts taken to improve 
care have been worthwhile when performance improves. 
Although FIT fails to identify the feelings involved in receiving performance 
feedback information. They recognised feedback can produce feelings of 
pleasantness and this in itself can influence behaviour (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). 
Dashboards were also found to raise awareness of organisational priorities with the 
data use to bring focus to safety briefings, meetings and handovers between clinical 
teams. Once quality dashboards and their metrics become part of the culture of a 
ward staff often experience peer pressure to make improvements and maintain 
performance (Power et al., 2012, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs et al., 2014, 
Christiansen et al., 2014, Jeffs et al., 2014, Weiner et al., 2015).  
5.5.5 The initial theory of avoidance:  
QD offers an opportunity 
CMO Configuration 7 When QD information (Resource) tracks 
performance over time (Resource) and identifies a need to improve 
standards (Context) (ward) managers who wish to avoid managerial scrutiny 
or publicly displaying negative performance information (Reasoning) ask 





opportunities for staff to suggest changes in practice (Outcome) to improve 
performance. 
 
Although there is limited evidence to suggest making performance information 
available to the public influence the behaviour of healthcare professionals, 
displaying performance data for patient and visitors to review needs to be explored.  
Power et al. (2012) and Dixon Woods et al. (2013) have shown the greatest 
improvement in care delivery was noted when performance data were discussed in 
person with individual staff members or became visible to senior managers via root 
cause analysis or performance meetings. The motivation for this change may be 
linked to staff trying to avoid managerial scrutiny. This has been described by goal 
theory and suggests when a discrepancy in performance is identified people are 
motivated to reduce it. This differs from goal setting theory that suggests people are 
motivated to achieve a goal rather than reduce a discrepancy. The aim is to avoid 
the cognitive dissonance caused by the deficit, or address the feedback deficit by 
attempting to achieve the standard. (Carver and Scheier, 1981, Latham and Locke, 
1991) 
Using dashboards to raise awareness of the challenges within wards reassured 
staff that senior managers would support and were engaged in efforts to improve 
the quality of care. The engagement of senior management signalled collective 
responsibility for improvement and gave permission for all staff members to make 
suggestions for improvement. The implementation of dashboards can also lead to 
an increase in awareness and interest in quality improvement and had the potential 
to reduce the spread of misinformation and anecdotal reporting. Performance 
information may appeal to individuals who want to make changes within their 
wards. Staff will need to be given the capacity and training to interpret and use data 
in a meaningful way and be given the opportunity by ward leaders to make changes 
in practice (Coleman, 2013, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs et al., 2014b). 
5.5.6 Unintended consequences 
Although not specified in the programme theories, consideration was given to the 
unintended consequences of QD implementation and the circumstances that may 
result in their activation. Evidence suggests there are a range of unintended 
consequences or dysfunctional consequences of health performance measurement 





achievement or compliance with metrics are used to determine who should be 
given rewards or highlights poor performance which could lead to reputational 
damage for an individual. Identifying poor performance can lead to ward 
stigmatisation and associated anxiety for staff working in those areas. This has 
been associated with behaviours such as gaming or measure fixation (Petersen et 
al., 2006, Griffiths, 2008, Van Dishoeck et al., 2009, Okes, 2013).  Where staff 
engage in measure fixation or gaming, although wards metrics may improve there 
will be no real change in practice or benefit for staff or the patient (Illingworth, 
2014).  
5.6 Chapter summary 
This chapter described how evidence from a scoping review, board papers, audit 
and feedback literature, and unintended consequences concerns, were brought 
together to develop the initial programme theories to explain how QD influence care 
delivery within hospital wards.  
Mechanisms were separated into resource and reasoning to aid identification and 
potential contextual factors identified. A number of outcomes were presented and 
seven CMO configurations put forward as initial programme theories under the 
headings of, Importance, Disruption, Focus, Reassurance and Avoidance. These 








Chapter 6: Phase one: Theory refinement  
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter sets out the steps taken to refine the initial programme theories set out 
in chapter 5.  It reports on the stakeholder recruitment phase of the study and 
outlines the process used to refine and develop the programme theories. The 
methodology and methods used to undertake this phase of the research is set out 
in Chapter 4. This chapter will present the findings and explain how this information 
will be been used to develop and refine the programme theory.  
6.2 Stakeholder interviews 
Realist evaluation considers stakeholders as a key source of information to elicit 
programme theory and bring insight, their tacit knowledge and understanding about 
how a programme is supposed to work. When considering who to recruit, Manzano 
(2016) recommends interviewing participants selected from a broad range of 
stakeholders with knowledge of the programme under investigation. As developing 
a WHC-QD is a significant strategic and financial undertaking, it was no surprise 
that the majority of stakeholders were staff working in the macro and meso level of 
the organisation and therefore the number of potential participants was limited 
(Keen et al., 2018b). 
6.3 Findings 
Using the recruitment strategy set out in Chapter 4, 11 participants were recruited 
to this phase of the study. The first interview performed on the 29th May 2015 and 
the last on 11th August 2015. Interviews lasted between 30 and 60 minutes. 
Participants were recruited from a wide range of senior management roles within 
the organisation, including four that were identified as key to the development of the 
WHC-QD. An outline of the roles and responsibilities of the participants in relation 
to the WHC-QD and their role within the HCP is presented in Table 15. None of the 






Table 15 Phase 1 participants  
Job Title  
 
Role in WHC-QD  Participant 
Chief Nurse Executive sponsor of WHC-QD.    A 
Nurse Director  Has hospital wide oversight and responsibility for WHC-QD data. Generates Board papers using 
WHC-QD summaries.  
B 
Nurse Director   Has hospital wide oversight and responsibility of WHC-QD data. C 
Head of 
Nursing  
Had responsibility for leading the development and design of the WHC-QD including leading 




Senior Manager, part of the management team of the clinical Service Unit (CSU), responsible 
several hundred nursing posts including several wards or departments. Reports to Director of 




Senior Manager, part of the management team of the clinical Service Unit, responsible for several 
hundred nursing posts including several wards or departments. Receives WHC-QD reports for the 




Senior Manager, part of the management team of the clinical Service Unit, responsible for several 
hundred nursing posts including several wards or departments. Receives WHC-QD reports for the 




Senior nurse with responsibility for supporting Informatics projects within the Trust. Had 
responsibility for development of the WHC-QD. Reports to the Head of Nursing corporate.  
H 
Matron Senior manager, responsible for overseeing standards of care, operational delivery of care. 
Oversees a number of hospital wards or departments. Receives WCH data for their 
ward/departments and reports to a Head of Nursing.  
I 
Senior Nurse  Senior nurse working within a team of staff with responsibility for delivering education and training 




Senior nurse working with a Matron with responsibility for education and training across a number 








6.3.1 Intended outcomes of the WHC-QD. 
As outlined in earlier chapters, the WHC-QD was a programme developed to 
provide a strategic overview and rich data to allow ward team to focus their 
attention on actions that will improve patient outcomes and experience and identify 
wards who provide safe care and those in need of support. As explained in Chapter 
4, realism recognises a social programme or intervention does not generate the 
outcome, they work by offering resources designed to influence a person’s 
reasoning. RE looks to explain causation, or what triggers something to happen or 
change to occur. This stage of the research begins by trying to understand why the 
WHC-QD was developed and the intention behind the programme.  
Throughout the participant interviews, it became clear that the WHC-QD was 
developed principally as a tool to gather and collect data that could be used to 
provide assurance regarding the standard of care within the organisation.  
Previous attempts to provide assurance regarding the quality and safety of care had 
been difficult with information held in various different healthcare systems. The 
participants shared their frustrations at previous attempts to generate reports about 
the performance of wards.  
“I had about a day a week to go into the numerous different spreadsheets to 
obtain data, and then I’d have to cut and paste it in the format, paste it into 
another format, and then take bits of information, from all over the place really, 
and pull it together to allow it to tell me a story” (Participant H).   
It was also difficult to acquire comparable data prior to the WHC-QD, so there was 
no benchmark with which to judge how a ward was performing.  
“I had various bits of information, that were collated on different IT systems, 
but no generic overview of what the quality metrics were for nursing. There 
was nothing to say either celebrate success or where wards were in difficulty 
or need support, there was no comparison data” (Participant B).  
Several participants also highlighted the difficulty with organising a comprehensive 
overview of quality and safety within a large multi-site healthcare organisation. 
“when I asked the question how many falls were a consequence of the 
patient’s comorbidities, or drug related, or what have you, no one could tell 
me. I wasn’t confident that I could stand up in an annual public meeting and 





pressure ulcers; or losing weight when they were coming into hospital” 
(Participant A).   
The need for strategic oversight of the quality care was evident from the participants. 
As set out in Chapters 1 and 2, the move towards transparency and the need to 
supply regulators with vast sums of performance data was a mandatory requirement. 
Senior healthcare managers appeared worried about how a large HCP organisation 
could provide assurance the care within their organisation was considered to be safe, 
one participant recalled being asked by a healthcare care regulator how did she know 
care on her wards was safe and she was not confident she could provide them with 
a comprehensive answer.  
 “When the CQC came they went to a collection of wards and were not happy 
with the care, I was asked how assured are you in relation to the safety and 
quality of care within the wards that all under your remit in division. I remember 
thinking what evidence have I got? I hadn’t got any evidence” (Participant D) 
There was also a sense that safety of healthcare in the NHS was under more scrutiny 
than ever before in light of the public concerns regard care (Appendix A).  
“Since Francis was published, since the Daily Mail and the Stafford (Mid-
Staffordshire Public Inquiry) and everything that goes with it, so the learning 
disabilities element, I think there is much more scrutiny on the wards than 
there has absolutely ever been” (Participant I) . 
It was however clear from the participants that the WHC-QD was the start of the 
journey towards ward to board assurance and oversight (Machell et al., 2009) 
“So if you're an individual ward sister you can use that data to help you get 
support via your matron and upwards, but if you're in a director position or 
chief nurse or whatever position, you can see the temperature of your 
wards” (Participant A).   
The WHC-QD had fulfilled part of its commitment, as it was seen as programme 
that could provide a strategic overview and capture rich data. It also seemed 
reasonable to classify the WHC-QD as  a quality dashboards as it was capable of 
consolidating and arranging information across a large organisation and allowing 
summary views of multiple metrics to allow a quick assessment of overall 
performance (Few, 2004). What was less clear was how the WHC-QD was 
expected to improve the quality of care or persuade those working with directly with 





6.3.2 Importance 1 
Information generated by the QD needs to be considered important 
CMO Configuration 1: When information from QD is generated consistently 
and systematically (Resource) and legitimised through management 
engagement (Context) its key message will be seen as important 
(Reasoning) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff engagement 
with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness of the wards 
performance (Outcome).  
 
Hospital wards are busy, complex social structures where staff face competing 
priorities on a daily basis. The theory of importance suggests information from the 
WHC-QD would only lead to change if it was seen as important. For it be seen as 
important, it needed to be generated consistently. The literature also suggests 
information from QD needed to be consistent and timely. Several participants 
confirmed the timeliness of the WHC-QD data was important, as delays in receiving 
information detracted from the information’s value.  
“You know, we've got some of the March's data still up and we're going into 
June.  April's only came, you know, like a week ago and I think that's what 
they struggle with (ward managers) from an actual operational element the 
lag creates some challenges in itself” (Participant E). 
Participants working operationally, had a clear view that as the information was 
retrospective, it did not contribute to their day-to-day routine.  
So it tells you how it was two months ago, but actually, as an operational 
manager, you know, I’m managing today and the future, so I have to get that 
from other sources” (Participant J).  
The systematic generation of data seemed to be an area of particular interest; 
participants felt information that was automatically generated was more robust. 
There was a sense that information reported to external agencies or displayed 
publicly would be accurate and trustworthy, especially if it was used to prepare 
reports for regulators, commissioners and displayed on PSB’s. The accuracy of the 






 “So I think we’ve got a higher degree of confidence in terms of where data 
is harvested automatically from within Trust systems, that it’s robust” 
(Participant B) .  
The believability of WHC-QD was deemed important, as the researcher and several 
of the participants had been involved in several meetings where the focus of 
discussion was centred on what the information was telling us and trying to discredit 
the data rather than identify how to improve the care.  
What we used to do if, you know, I went to an hours meeting, we spent 50 
minutes debating whether the data was right or not, and then at the end of it 
we’d say, well are we going to do anything?  Whereas now we go and we 
say, this is the data.  If you think it is inconsistent, it’s consistently 
inconsistent. It gives us a much stronger footing to have much more honest 
and transparent discussions with them” (Participant E). 
The accuracy of the data was considered more robust when automatically 
generated and less credible when an obvious error was present.  
“When you see that (WHC-QD) coming through, so that’s when I then start 
to say, well it’s not right, how can it be? And when she sends… 107%, so 
yes, where I spot inaccuracy I immediate start to disregard that as a credible 
indicator” (Participant H). 
During the interviews, several participants also identified that the validity of data 
could be negatively affected by the behaviour of the auditor during the ward metrics 
audit programme (WMAP).  
6.3.2.1 Role of the Auditor  
The participants suggested staff would devalue or discredit data in the context of 
negative performance results. The participants suggested if information can be 
discredited or devalued, it loses its importance and becomes less likely to change 
behaviour. The credibility of staff undertaking the WMAP and their behaviour during 








There was a perception that auditors from the corporate nursing team were more 
likely to find problems with the standards of care and give a negative performance 
score.  
 “So if a senior nurse from corporate land comes to do your audit they (Ward 
staff) feel that they will get a worse score than if a head of nursing from 
operational land comes to do your audit as you never achieve their 
standards (Participant K) 
Interestingly a negative score given by an auditor from an operational role was 
thought to be more believable and more important as they considered them a peer.   
“If the real nurse from operational world gave you a bad score I think they'd 
be inclined to believe it, and be disappointed” (Participant J). 
The credibility of the WHC-QD data was also questioned when the robustness of 
the WMAP was in doubt.  
 “I had one of my wards, there was a lot of challenge that went back 
because the auditor came on, she did it in 20 minutes; if they don't believe in 
the auditor they will lose faith in the results if it's not positive. (Participant I) 
Participant were also concerned when auditors visited the ward, completed the 
audit and left before giving any advice or feedback to staff.  
“So their expectation is the auditor feeds back because what they were 
doing was leaving the ward and then they were amber or red and they were 
like, hang on a minute, if you're telling my care is not up to the standard that 
we expect, my expectations of you is that you feedback” (Participant C).  
This was seen as a missed opportunity to influence change and reduced the 
credibility of the auditor and the WMAP results.  Credibility was enhanced when the 
auditor engaged with staff during the audit, discussed the results and identified 
areas for improvement.  
 “We want the auditors to be, we want them to go and help that ward get 
better, not to go and put a policeman's hat on at the door, you know, metrics 
police, and walk in and be all hard and harsh, and it's about saying, you 
know, you've done a really good job of this, but we need to focus on this 





The participants considered a credible auditor to be a senior member of staff, 
working in an operational role, and someone who could explain the audit standards 
and discuss their findings at the time of the visit.  
6.3.2.2 Organisation legitimises QD  
What was clear from the interviews was the importance of the WHC-QD in 
providing a focal point for discussion in meetings and performance reviews. As 
previously outlined, participants were unable to have an overview of performance 
prior to the WHC-QD. Several mentioned they could not imagine life without the 
WHC-QD now. It appeared its functionality had become part of the senior 
management landscape 
“I hear heads of nursing and matrons describe how they use that information 
in one to one meetings with their ward sisters, I think there are parts of the 
organisation where it is used, it is embedded into day to day practice” 
(Participant F).  
Although participant F, suggested it was embedded in every day practice, several 
participants found it of limited value in supporting day-to-day operational issues. 
Where the WHC-QD could add day-to-day operational value was identifying wards 
in need of additional help and support.  
“So for instance one of my wards was red, so it was about me, the lead 
clinician, business manager, doing weekly formal visit to say, how are you, 
what do you need, what do you need the help for.” (Participant G) 
The organisation also used the WHC-QD to check compliance with patient safety 
alerts and patient safety risks. If a specific concern was raised, the WMAP would be 
adapted and a trust wide position of compliance could be generated.  
I know some of the medicine questions completely changed in March and 
that was reflected from some of the lessons learnt and SUI (serious 
incidence) information to see if we have learnt our lessons (Participant H). 
6.3.2.3 Public display of performance information 
Publicly displaying performance information via the PSB was one of the key 
features of the WHC-QD. As information was displayed for visitors to the ward, 
there was an assumption it must be important. Participants were however unsure 





No one's every rung us to feedback anything, could you come and speak to 
a relative or can you come and explain this and I've never witnessed 
anything. Therefore, as a visitor to a ward, I am not sure how useful it is, but 
I still think it is probably one of the most useful ways to display that 
information (Participant B). 
 
The PSB were located at the entrance in each ward and updated monthly with 
visual displays of performance data. Participant K was also unsure how information 
displayed on the PSB was used to influence practice.  
 
“I think I am unconvinced of there being a direct relationship between staff 
thinking that, goodness, this information is visible to the public, and that 
linking through in terms of influencing practice” (Participant K).   
Or if relatives engaged with the PSB  
“So when I ask staff in clinical areas, I don’t think staff believe that relatives 
spend a lot, or families spend a long time, looking at the boards, so the 
public display of information.  I’ve had feedback that they are not often 
asked questions about the information that is displayed” (Participant F). 
While it was suggested that publicly displaying performance data might enhance 
credibility, none of the participants could identify a situation where it had been 
referenced in a complaint or discussion with patients or relatives.  
6.3.2.4 Revised theory  
The interviews supported the idea information generated from the WHC-QD had to 
be timely, accurate and valid. Initially this was identified as a resource offered by 
the programme but could also be seen as a context, as consistent, believable data, 
enhanced the credibility and importance of the WHC-QD information and was more 
likely to trigger an outcome. The interviews revealed the perception that, in the 
context of negative performance information, staff would take an opportunity to 
discredit the importance or validity of WHC-QD data.  
 
Automatically generated data was seen as more robust than the WMAP data due to 
the subjectivity of the auditor. Subjectivity gave staff an opportunity to question the 
validity of the WMAP data and diminish its importance. As the information from the 





each ward area, it was seen as important, and overtime the credibility of the 
information was accepted. Although it was unclear from the interviews how the 
information displayed on the PSB was used by patients and visitors, it was 
considered an important source of information for staff and used to remind them of 
the organisations priorities and recent performance. Based on these findings, 
CMOC1 was revised as follows 
  
Information generated by the QD needs to be considered important 
Revised CMOC1 Importance: When QD information is generated 
consistently (Resource+ Context) with credible audit processes (Context) 
and legitimised through management engagement (Context) it is seen as 
important (Reasoning) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff 
engagement with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness 
performance (Outcome). 
6.3.3 Importance 2  
Information from the WHC-QD was seen as important when it was contextualised or 
given with an educational component. To contextualise is to give meaning in a real 
context or situation, this adds value to the information and enhances its importance. 
 
Information generated by QD needs to convey a story 
CMO Configuration 2: When QD information is contextualised or given with 
an educational component (Resource), and there is a need to improve 
performance (Context) the message is seen as important (Reasoning) and 
the information used to adopt or change practice and increase effort to 
reduce deficit (Outcome). 
The greatest improvement in quality and safety were seen when performance data 
were discussed in person with individual staff members (Dixon-Woods et al., 2014). 
Contextualising or providing information that illuminates an area for improvement is 
one of the key features of QD and one of the intended consequences for the 









Feedback given with an educational component, using text or graphics or 
discussion was found to be more effective than information alone. Evidence from 
Actionable Feedback theory also suggests the effectiveness of feedback is 
dependent upon how information is given to individuals. Information that was found 
to be timely, individualised, and non-punitive was found to have the greatest impact 
upon an individual’s behaviour (Hysong et al., 2006, Hysong et al., 2012, Ivers et 
al., 2012, Hysong et al., 2017).  
The CMOC suggests contextualised information from the WHC-QD is considered 
more important and therefore more likely to lead to an outcome, in the context of a 
performance deficit. Participants supported this view 
“I think when (the WHC data) it's real and about real people, it's more 
meaningful than if it's about a name or a number. You know, I don’t know, 
human nature I guess to kind of if you personalise it and make it about a 
person then it means more and it bothers you more”  (Participant K). 
Contextualisation was also about raising awareness of why the standards were 
important and using examples to emphasise their importance.  
“It's about awareness isn't it, it's about driving that understanding to say why 
that's important. You know, resus trolley [emergency equipment] check, 
might seem an insignificant thing, but you know, well what's one day missing 
a resus trolley check, but if you get them to understand that actually on that 
day there's a piece of kit missing and if it's not check what was going to 
happen to that patient, then they can see… it's the understanding isn't it that 
underpins what it is” (Participant H).   
It was also important to understand any personal attachment given to the data, this 
participant and supported a nurse who had experienced a very traumatic 
resuscitation and felt very personal about this particular standard.  
“I personally checked those resus trolleys [emergency equipment] to see 
when they were last checked, of those 56 only 5 of them had been checked 
in the last month, and some hadn’t been checked for longer than two 
months and when I approached staff about that they, there seemed to be a 
lack a sense of  importance. I just felt that was a big risk, and having gone 
through and learnt the trauma that you put nurses through that end up in 





Several participants suggested it was the role of the ward manager to interpret the 
WHC-QD data and contextualise it or bring it to life for staff working within ward 
“Most people can feel good at that because a year ago you had a patient fall 
every seven days, now a patient only falls every 30.  Well that doesn’t take 
much to understand, you don’t need a picture, and you don’t need numbers, 
a simple statement” (Participant A). 
 
Ward managers were also expected to use the information to develop action plans 
to improve care and present the information in a way which made it more 
meaningful for staff.  
 
“I think other wards just display them and not a lot of interest is paid to them.  
So I think it does vary on how the ward is using that to the leader of the 
ward, even perhaps to the matron sometimes and how much they use that 
information” (Participant D). 
 
Although no specific guidance or training on how to contextualise WHC-QD 
information was available, ward managers had developed their own strategies to 
present information to staff.  
“Some ward leaders hand them over, so as they get their new board they will 
have a theme of the week and a theme of the month, and the ten key steps 
that goes on the ward board they will change them appropriately” (Participant 
D)  
Evidence from participants suggests contextualising WHC-QD information adds to 
its importance and is often the responsibility of the ward manager. Although WHC-
QD information is displayed on the PSB, there was no guidance to suggest how 
ward managers should communicate key messages to staff. Contextualisation was 
therefore dependent upon the ability and experience of ward managers. The CMO 
configuration was revised to include the role of the ward manager 
Revised CMOC 2 Importance. When there is an need to improve 
performance (Context) and the WHC-QD information is contextualised by a 
Ward manager (Context)  (Resource), the information will be seen as 
important (Reasoning) and used to adopt or change practice and increase 







The programme theory of disruption was developed to include two CMO 
configurations 
CMOC 3 Disruption: When a ward has previously performed well (Context) 
and QD information reports negative information (Resource) this disrupts 
(Reasoning) the positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will choose 
to reject the message or increase effort (Outcome) to improve performance.  
CMOC 4 Ongoing disruption: When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails 
to address the deficit when performance is tracked over time and staff are 
aware (Resource Context) to avoid scrutiny (Reasoning) and disrupting how 
the ward is viewed by patients and managers (Reasoning) a change in 
practice will be initiated or the ward manager will seek help (Outcome). 
 
While both CMOC’s are based on disruption, they represent different reactions to 
disruptive performance data over time. Disruption is the interruption in the usual 
way a system or process works. Information from the WHC-QD can disrupt staff 
views or perceptions of how a ward is performing. Negative WHC-QD data has the 
potential to disrupt a person’s view of how care is delivered or how their ward is 
performing.  
“At one point it was literally just a RAG rated, you are bad. You are bad 
because this is red.  I didn't think that was a good thing” (Participant F).  
Participants felt disruptive performance information could lead to a change in 
practice or an increase in effort to reduce the deficit.  
“We use the information to discuss I’m looking at doing this change or trying 
to implement this. So for example, it may reflect that your care is good and 
you've got greens and a 100% or whatever the mark is, and it might 
encourage you to then work harder to get a better, maintain or get a better 
score” (Participant E). 
It was suggested that staff may choose to initially reject the WHC-QD data if it was 
the first time an issue with performance was identified. 
“I think when the Health Check first came out, because they were red, the 





wards were either good or that they had been given that message 
previously. So they didn't value it really, and they didn't value the metrics 
and measures initially when it first came out” (Participant B).  
 
However, when the WHC-QD information repeatedly showed care was below the 
agreed standard, despite an initial increase in performance, staff may use WHC-QD 
data to seek help and support from managers to avoid the ongoing disruption 
caused by the negative WHC-QD information.   
“Where you think you're struggling and you did in fact get a lower score, that's 
your key to say to your manager, I need help with, because we're not doing 
very well on. So if you're an individual ward sister you can use that data to 
help you get support via your matron and upwards. I think especially in light 
of Mid Staffs, it goes back to the how do you demonstrate to people other 
than your own rhetoric, when you are trying to explain that you need help, 
support, I think they're really useful”  (Participant E). 
Several participants used the WHC-QD as a programme to support staff and provide 
a focus for improvement rather than using it as a performance management tool. 
“I do think that as a visual tool to help them to work towards process 
improvement is a good thing, but a dashboard in itself can't do that, it has to 
be part of a process of improvement where it's used as a tool to document 
and visualise where the pinch points are I guess, or where the problems might 
be” (Participant F). 
The participants confirmed that disruption remains an important CMOC to explore in 
phase two of the study as it has the potential to motivate staff to change practice, 
behaviour and effort. It is also important to consider how the influence of negative 
performance information changes with time. While no change may initially be seen, 
the mechanism may not trigger until consistent negative performance information 
changes the context for staff working within the ward. The CMOC’s for disruption 







6.3.5 Focus  
The purpose of dashboards are to summarise complex data and provide summary 
views of multiple metrics to allow a quick assessment of overall performance. They 
bring focus to positive and negative performance, therefore the focus CMOC was 
based upon these principles.  
CMOC 5 Focus /Aide memoire 
CMOC 5: If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) and a 
specific focus for improvement is given (Resource ) if the metric is 
considered important (Reasoning) and there is recognition (Reasoning) 
change is needed staff will engage with the information and increase effort 
to improve performance (Outcome).   
Much of the evidence for QD is centred on their ability to bring attention to a 
problem or deficit and the subsequent plan of action or change that occurs. There 
was evidence to suggest the WHC-QD data was used to highlight areas for 
improvement that resulted in the development of specific actions plans within ward 
areas. 
“We developed the ten-point plans, so that actually the really important 
aspects of that policy were clearly on a very visual chart, available to them 
that they could use and use and that’s supposed to be a visible thing on the 
board, and everyone’s supposed to have a copy, and this is what we’re 
working on this week ” (Participant A).   
However, it was possible the aide memoires or action plans were a focus for senior 
managers, matron, and ward managers rather than staff working within the ward 
areas. Participants did confirm the WHC-QD was used to improve communication 
within the ward and raise awareness of the organisational priorities to reduce 
infection and harm from pressure ulcers, falls and medication errors. 
“So the ward rounds are better, the safety briefings and the MDT, rather it 
just being about discharge it's about high risk patients, it's about pressure 
ulcers, it's about falls, it's about incidents that go with that [WHC-QD] they 
integrate it into their daily work, they don't just see it as a performance 
management or a support” (Participant B). 
 
Participant C also confirmed successful change was more likely when the information 





“They need to be all singing from the same hymn sheet, you know, they need 
to know what it is that we want from them, getting things into their practice, 
you know, rather than it just being a Monday, Wednesday, Friday thing, 
getting it into their routine and making it a daily practice for them to, you know, 
having an influence on their practice so that it's improving their practice” 
(Participant C).  
Participant G was concerned focusing on specific WHC-QD metrics may divert 
attention from other issues within a ward or department.  
“I do think it can sometimes make us focus in a specific direction at risk of 
other things”. 
These unintended consequences are recognised risks of QD and have been shown 
to diverted attention from genuine quality improvement initiatives to improve a deficit 
in a particular metric.  
6.3.5.1 Knowledge of standards  
Using WHC-QD to focus efforts to improve care is only possible if staff know what 
they are being measured against and the changes needed to improve. The 
participants suggested staff would have knowledge of the results displayed upon 
the PSB but may not be aware of the measures or audit standards that create the 
dashboard.  
“I think, in all honesty, if you said to me, am I confident that the Band 2 on a 
ward, if you went and said, tell me what your metrics are for nutrition, the 
five categories, they’d glaze over. I think there is still a hierarchy of need to 
understand the detail, and I would expect the ward sister to be that person 
who would be going onto the dashboard quite regularly”.   (Participant H). 
As change was more likely when staff understood what was being measured 
strategies to improve performance were developed which focused attention on a 
particular area of practice. 
“So if there's something on the dashboard for that month where we've failed 
on, we will use that as a message of the week or whatever, and that 
message gets given and what we're going to do to action it at every 
handover period. We've tried on one of the units, we're trying to give out a 





Other participants shared the audit standards with staff to remind them of where to 
focus their attention and action plans for improvement.  
“So I think by making the standards clear by virtue of saying these are the 
questions that we are ticking yes and no for, crystallises your thinking, okay, 
can’t do that anymore” (Participant J). 
 In light of the importance of having an awareness of the standards performance 
was measured against, the CMOC was refined to include knowledge of standards 
as a contextual factor that may increase the likelihood of change occurring.  
CMOC 5-Focus: If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) if 
staff are aware of the standards (Context) and a focus for improvement is 
given (Resource 2) if the metric is considered important (Reasoning) staff 
will engage with the information and increase effort to improve performance 
(Outcome).   
6.3.6 Reassurance 
As identified earlier in this chapter, one of the reasons the WHC-QD was developed 
was to provide assurance to senior managers that the care within the HCP was 
safe. WHC-QD also have the potential to reassure staff, care within their ward is 
safe. While previous CMOC’s have been based upon information from the WHC-
QD identifying deficits in performance, this CMOC is based upon its ability to 
highlight success and improvements in performance.  
CMOC 6: Reassurance  
CMOC 6: When information from the QD (Resource) tracks performance over 
time, and staff are aware of their wards performance (Context) they become 
reassured (Reasoning) the care on their ward is safe. If QD information is 
used to recognise success, and staff engage with the information, this can 
lead to a change in culture  as QD information becomes embedded in 
practice, discussed daily and used to plan care (Outcome). 
An awareness of performance over time was identified as an important resource 
provided by the WHC-QD.  
“I thought that dashboards, if we were measured in our performance then 
everybody should know about it, right down to the housekeeping staff really. 





have a chance to improve on their practice and things would get better from 
thereon in” (Participant C).  
Being aware of performance and changes over a time allowed staff to see if their 
increase in effort or strategies for improvement made a difference to the metric. 
This was seen as an opportunity to use the WHC-QD information to recognise 
achievements and celebrate success.   
“So I think it focuses the team of what's going well and actually… they 
celebrate success, so they celebrate what they've done well, but not only 
that, where they're not they'll integrate together and they will pull together as 
a unit rather than just a ward or the Band 7” (Participant B).  
Some participants were concerned the information would be used as a performance 
management tool. 
“For performance management, absolutely. And I think our culture would tell 
us that’s what we use the dashboard for. You know, you were red or you’re 
green, and if you’re red, it’s not good” (Participant H).  
“You could use it supportively or you could use it as a stick to beat people” 
(Participant E). 
As the WHC-QD allowed comparison of wards and was the first objective 
measurement by which to quantify success and reassure staff the care provided 
had met or was above the standards expected by the HCP. Reassurance and 
recognition of success were identified by participants as important factors in 
encouraging staff to increase or maintain performance. 
“I think having seen it running in Salford where it is absolutely part of their 
culture and they're proud of being… they get a little badge and they get an 
award and all the rest of it, and the senior nurses become matrons.  And that 
feels something really to be proud of.  So when you see it working in another 
organisation you can think, well actually yeah that really drives… will really, 
really drive practice, because people want to be in one of those wards, people 
want to achieve to be something (Participant F). 
Following the participant interviews, the CMOC was revised to recognise the 
importance of using the WHC-QD as a tool for highlighting both positive and 





Revised CMOC 6- Reassurance: When information from the WHC-QD 
(Resource) tracks performance over time (Resource) and recognises 
success or improvement, (Resource) staff can see if improvement strategies 
have worked and are reassured (Reasoning) care on their ward is safe. This 
is likely to lead to greater staff engagement with WHC-QD programme 
(Outcome).  
6.3.7 Avoidance 
As the WHC-QD has the ability to highlight positive and negative performance, the 
theory of avoidance was developed to understand how and why negative 
performance information leads to change.  
CMOC 7: Avoidance: When QD information (Resource) tracks 
performance over time (Resource) and identifies a need to improve 
standards (Context) (ward) managers who wish to avoid managerial scrutiny 
or publicly displaying negative performance information (Reasoning) ask 
staff to increase effort (Outcome), seek help (Outcome) and create 
opportunities for staff to suggest changes in practice (Outcome) to improve 
performance.  
Participants confirmed negative performance data was a driver for change, as  
“Nobody wants to be in red, I mean, you know, nobody likes it when they're 
in red” (Participant F) 
 
When asked if other members of the ward team feel responsible for the metric 
results, the participants suggested that when the WHC-QD results were seen as 
‘good’ or ‘green’ then staff were collectively proud of their ward, but when it was 
red, individuals were less likely to feel personally responsible.  
“I think if was good they'll be proud of it, if it was red it was nothing to do with 
them” (Participant E)  
The concern was the WHC-QD performance was an indicator of the quality of care 
provided by the ward. The participant identified that poor metric scores often 
accompanied other safety or leadership concerns.  
“The wards in escalation, there’s an absolute triangulation of ward metrics 





maybe, I have rarely been surprised of any area that’s gone into escalation 
(Participant A). 
6.3.7.1 The role of the ward manager 
The participants also suggested ward managers experience a sense of 
responsibility for the WHC-QD results as they feel they reflect their leadership or 
management abilities.  
“I think there’s something for ward sisters and charge nurses that is 
probably very personal about this” (Participant C).   
The role of the ward manager was identified as a context and resource when WHC-
QD data was contextualised. However as improvement requires staff engagement 
with plans to improve performance, participants overwhelmingly identified the role 
of the ward manager and their leadership abilities as key to effecting change.  
“My experience is that it’s been about the ward leadership and what those 
ward leaders are able to do” (Participant J).  
It recognised that time to support the ward managers was an issue 
“Resources is the biggest barrier to change. Leadership is the second 
biggest barrier to change” (Participant D).   
In particular participants suggested it was how the ward manager engaged with 
staff to highlight the need for improvement. 
“I think it's about getting all your members of staff on-board as a team, and I 
think that that obviously boils down to how successful that ward manager is 
and the junior sisters and the clinical educator I suppose. But I think you've 
got to have all the team on-board as well” (Participant E).  
“I think that all comes from leadership.  So I would say, if you've not got a 
leader in there that believes in it and is driving it, you won't get the rest of the 
staff on-board” (Participant F).  
As the CMOC for avoidance identified the role of the ward manager as crucial in 
enabling or disabling change. Rather than the using the ‘role of the ward manager’ 
the participants suggested it was there leadership style and ability to engage staff 
with performance improvement strategies, therefore the CMOC was refined to 





Revised CMOC 7: Avoidance: Ward managers who wish to avoid 
(Reasoning) the managerial scrutiny that comes with repeated negative 
performance information, (Resource + Context) will show leadership 
(Context) and seek help and develop strategies (Outcome) to improve 
performance within their ward.  
One participant believed once staff were engaged with the WHC-QD data it 
encouraged leadership from all staff members and was a focus to bring teams 
together to meet the standards. The information was also used to share ideas of 
how to improve processes to achieve the targets.  
“So there's a leadership at the Band 5 level that wasn't there before. I think 
they work much better, the senior teams, and the ward team MDT because 
it's very much about you all have to get it right to get your Dashboard right” 
(Participant B). 
Success was thought to be more likely when the ward managers understood the 
standards within the WHC-QD; they believed in the data and used the information 
to develop action plans and strategies for improvement.  
“I think that all comes from leadership.  So I would say, if you've not got a 
leader in there that believes in it and is driving it, you won't get the rest of 
the staff on-board. Because what the staff see is the dial, they don't see 
everything underneath that do they, so generally I suspect they will see the 
board, and depending on whatever the senior nurse feeds back to them, 
would depend on how much they've bought into it.  But I think it is absolutely 
about the individual who is responsible for that area to, as a leader to feed 
that information back” (Participant F).  
Participants identified competition as a factor in making improvements with 
participant E, citing the case of a ward manager who started with low metric scores, 
identified what needed to improve, and developed an action plan. Over time, the 
scores improved, driven by the competitive nature of the ward manager.  
“So that ward leader, maybe she had a slightly competitive nature, so was 
driven by those targets to make her ward improve, but nevertheless it worked 
because she then got to that sustained position, because, you know, on the 
reduced assessments but didn't just hang her coat up and put her feet back 





improvements which weren't necessarily monitored on the dashboard” 
(Participant E).  
Several other participants also identified competition as a possible mechanism that 
needed to be considered.  
6.3.8 Competition  
All of the participants interviewed identified competition as a mechanism for change. 
The suggestion was the nature of healthcare was competitive but prior to the WHC-
QD there had not been an objective system to measure the performance of wards.  
“I think there is that competitive nature of we work in…I heard a lecture 
recently about we're tribes, so in healthcare you have tribes, and I guess it's 
the same thing as that kind of sibling rivalry” (Participant G). 
Once performance could be measured, it allowed wards to be ranked according to 
performance and league tables to be developed. This visibility of performance 
allowed competition to flourish which became a potential mechanism for change.  
“It’s really simple, [the WHC-QD] it's like the star system at primary school 
isn't it, it's really simple and you can't imagine that it works, but it does.  People 
are… competitive people are just driven by just that, whatever it is, a piece of 
paper, it's just that… it's like playing a card game isn't it, it's the need to better, 
it overrides all rationality” (Participant E). 
Competition seemed to be limited to associated or comparable wards within specialist 
areas such as the ward next door rather than across the whole organisation.  
“From my position as a ward manager and not in my role now, I'm competitive, 
so I wanted to be the best. I had a healthy competition with my peer ward next 
door, and we had constant banter each day, oh what are you doing, and that 
definitely helped. If one ward scored more than the other, you know, the next 
month you had to do better” (Participant D). 
It was also seen as an opportunity for ward managers to come together to share 
ideas for improvement.  
“So we had at least one cup of coffee a month and a sit down and we'd go 
through what we did to make it better.  And we shared that in our bigger 
meetings because we all shared that because we all got on really well as the 
ward sisters, So we would, after our sisters meetings we would talk about 





To explore competition as a mechanism for change, a new CMO configuration was 
developed. 
CMOC 8: Competition: As QD information has the ability to identify 
performance over time (Resource) the performance of wards can be ranked 
and viewed by senior managers within the organisation (Context). This will 
engage ward managers (Context) to compete (Reasoning) with other wards 
which will lead to improvements in performance (Outcome). 
6.3.9 Unintended consequences 
Although not specified in the programme theories, consideration was given to the 
unintended consequences of QD implementation and the circumstances that may 
result in their activation. Evidence suggests there are a range of unintended 
consequences or dysfunctional consequences of health performance measurement 
systems (Appendix V) and these are more likely to come into play when 
achievement or compliance with metrics are used to determine who should be 
given rewards or highlights poor performance which could lead to reputational 
damage for an individual. Identifying poor performance can lead to ward 
stigmatisation and associated anxiety for staff working in those areas. This has 
been associated with behaviours such as gaming or measure fixation (Petersen et 
al., 2006, Griffiths, 2008, Van Dishoeck et al., 2009, Okes, 2013).  Where staff 
engage in measure fixation or gaming, although wards metrics may improve there 
will be no real change in practice or benefit for staff or the patient (Illingworth, 
2014).  
When asked about concerns regarding gaming, participants considered the use of 
senior nurse from outside the ward area or management team to reduce bias. 
However as outlined in earlier in the chapter concerns regarding the auditor was 
found to have an impact on the believability of the WHC-QD data 
6.4. Refined programme theory and CMO configurations  
The initial programme theories of importance, disruption, focus, reassurance, and 
avoidance were refined using the phase 1 participant interviews. The role of the 
auditor when undertaking the MAP was identified as a specific contextual factor as 
it was suggested by participants that their behaviour at the time of the audit had an 
impact on the believability and therefore the importance of the WHC-QD results. 





the message from the WHC-QD was likely to be rejected and change was therefore 
unlikely to occur.   
The initial theories identified the role of the ward manager as a significant 
contextual factor in leading to improvement. This has been changed to ‘leadership’ 
to emphasise importance of behaviour that effects change rather than a designed 
job role or title. The issue of leadership is also linked to competition that has been 
added as a new CMO configuration to explore in Phase 2. Although the literature 
identified competition as a potential mechanism for change, this was often linked to 
a commercial model of increased patient choice or patient numbers (Shekelle et al, 
2008, Ketelaar et al, 2011). The potential mechanism identified by the stakeholders 
was not linked to a desire to be the best, but better than peers or to simply to avoid 
being ‘last’ rather than a need to be ‘first’. It is possible this was linked to the 
avoidance mechanism and was highlighted by participants as an area for further 
investigation. The revised programme theory summary are presented followed by 
updated CMO configurations to be tested in phase 2.  
Theory: Importance 
Revised CMOC1: Importance: When QD information is generated consistently 
(Resource + Context) with credible audit processes (Context) and legitimised 
through management engagement (Context) it is seen as important (Reasoning) and 
less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff engagement with the programme 
(Outcome) and raise awareness performance (Outcome). 
Revised CMOC2: Contextualisation: When there is an need to improve 
performance (Context 4) and the WHC-QD information is contextualised by a Ward 
manager (Context + Resource), the information will be seen as important 
(Reasoning) and used to adopt or change practice and increase effort to reduce 
deficit (Outcome). 
Theory: Disruption CMOC 3: Disruption: When a ward has previously performed 
well (Context) and QD information reports negative information (Resource), this 
disrupts (Reasoning) the positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will choose 
to reject the message or increase effort (Outcome) to improve performance.  
CMOC 4: Ongoing disruption: When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to 
address the deficit when performance is tracked over time and staff are aware 





viewed by patients and managers (Reasoning) a change in practice will be initiated 
or the ward manager will seek help (Outcome) 
Theory: Importance: Revised CMO 5:  
Focus: If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) if staff are aware of 
the standards (Context) and a focus for improvement is given (Resource) if the metric 
is considered important (Reasoning) staff will engage with the information and 
increase effort to improve performance (Outcome).   
Theory: Reassurance: Revised CMOC 6:  
Reassurance: When information from the WHC-QD (Resource) tracks performance 
over time (Resource) and recognises success or improvement, (Resource) staff can 
see if improvement strategies have worked and are reassured (Reasoning) care on 
their ward is safe. This is likely to lead to greater staff engagement with WHC-QD 
programme (Outcome).  
Theory: Avoidance: CMOC 7:  
Avoidance:  Ward managers who wish to avoid (Reasoning) the managerial scrutiny 
that comes with repeated negative performance information, (Resource +Context) 
will show leadership (Context) and seek help and develop strategies (Outcome) to 
improve performance within their ward 
Theory: Competition: New CMOC 8:  
Competition: As QD information has the ability to identify performance over time 
(Resource) the performance of wards can be ranked and viewed by senior managers 
within the organisation (Context). This will engage ward managers (Context) to 
compete (Reasoning) with other wards which will lead to improvements in 
performance (Outcome). 
6.5 Chapter summary 
This chapter has reported on the results of the stakeholder recruitment phase of the 
study. In total 11 participant were recruited from the case study site. The chapter 
described how the initial 7 programme theories set out in Chapter 5 were refined 
using evidence from participant interviews. New Contexts, Mechanisms and 
Outcomes were identified and the new theory of competition introduced. All eight 





Chapter 7 Phase 2: Results and theory testing  
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings from Phase 2, and outlines the steps taken to 
test, confirm and reject the refined programme theories. The data collected in 
phase two is diverse and includes quantitative and observational data, information 
from key informants who are directly affected by the programme under investigation 
and visitors to the case study sites (Wong et al., 2016). The data gathered 
throughout phase two will be used to interrogate the programme theories and CMO 
configurations and used to explain theory. The aim is to identify potential 
mechanisms and use evidence to support or refute the theories, while considering 
the contextual factors that may influence a person’s volition (Westhorp, 2014, ODE, 
2015, Wong et al., 2016, Porter et al., 2017).  
7.1.1 Results: Observation of interactions with the PSB. 
A total of 9 observations across the 3 case study sites took place. Their purpose 
was to observe visitor interaction with the PSB. Each observation was one hour in 
length and timed to coincide with hospital visiting hours, a summary of the 
observations are presented in Table 16. In total 195 visitors were recorded as 
entering the ward during the periods of observation. No staff were observed 
interacting with the PSB and only nine visitors. Three of the nine visitors were 
visiting relatives in the rooms next to the PSB (Figure 23).  
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Of the nine visitors seen to be observing the PSB, six agreed to be interviewed for 
the study.  
Figure 23 Visitors to case study sites 
 
 
7.1.2 Visitor to the case study site interviews. 
The researcher anticipated more people would be seen engaging with the PSB and 
a sample size of thirty was estimated. The fact that so few people were seen to be 
looking at the board, is in itself an important finding, In total only 6 of the 9 visitors 
agreed to participate, 4 from case study site C and 2 from case study site A. Five of 
the six participants expressed a view that displaying WHC-QD information was 
important.   
“I think it's important.  In my job in my career I was head of a university, the 
same sort of argument.  We had people say to us, well your budget's 90 
million tell us, is it value for money?  So I'm very much in favour evaluation 
and monitoring so long as it doesn't become too excessive because that 
distorts from your behaviour.  So I agree with what you're trying to do, and 
it's important that we as… well I suppose we're not customers, we’re 
patients, we as patients have a good knowledge of what you're achieving 
and how well you're achieving and what you're seeking to achieve” (Visitor 
5). 






















 “Well that tells you how they're doing, obviously.  That's the key standards 
of care, that's like you say, it's been seen they had this infection or that 
infection or a fall or sores, pressure sores.  And I think… and that's the 
staffing levels, I mean I can understand all that, so yeah” (visitor 3).   
They also expressed a view that transparency and the accuracy of the data was 
important. 
 “Well I'd still want to know because I think it's honest, that's honesty rather 
than somebody telling you a lot of lies saying, oh no that doesn't happen in 
this hospital” (Visitor 4). 
When asked about the impact of displaying negative performance information, the 
visitors, confirmed that it may prompt them to ask staff about the data. 
‘Well I wouldn't be happy, put it that way, I wouldn't be over the moon, I'd 
have a word, yeah.  I'd want to know why it isn't up to standard” (Visitor 3). 
When asked if the PSB could be made better, two visitors suggested a simpler 
display in the form of star ratings and one suggested an electronic version with 
audio. 
Although based upon six interviews, there was agreement that displaying 
performance information was an expectation and part of being open and 
transparent. Although visitors would be concerned about seeing negative 
performance information displayed, there was agreement the information should be 
displayed and it may prompt visitors to discuss their concerns with staff. Although 
the information was considered self-explanatory, staff had not explained the 
information to relatives, with visitor suggesting star ratings or an electronic display 
may have made the information easier to understand.  
7.1.3 Results: Observation of the Ward Handovers and Safety Huddles 
Handover and safety huddles were observed on 9 occasions. As handover and 
safety huddles take place at a pre-determined time, the researcher observed one 
morning and one evening handover and one safety huddles in each case study site. 
Each observation lasted approximately 30 minutes. The field notes taken were used 
to assess if any information or key messages from the WHC-QD was specifically 
mentioned within the handover.   
As the primary function of handovers is to ensure continuity of patient care, it 





highlighting salient points from a pre-printed sheet. The pre-printed sheets had 
headings used as aide-memoire to guide each patient report. Key topics such as 
resuscitation status, social care needs, medical history, risk of falls, pressure ulcer 
care and allergy status were discussed with a rhythmic sense of purpose as large 
volumes of information passed between staff members. Staff members were seen 
to write on pre-printed handover sheet, underlying key facts and creating little boxes 
that would at some point during the shift receive a tick to confirm a task had been 
completed.  
The initial hand written notes of the researcher were awash with endless 
abbreviations, as the researcher was initially worried that key points would be 
missed. On reflection and review of the information captured during the handovers, 
it became apparent the information discussed was for passing on information about 
individual patients. Although information about key metrics within the WHC-QD was 
discussed, this was associated with specific patient needs rather than to highlight a 
ward performance issue, or to suggest changes in practice. Handovers were 
focused upon ensuring key aspects of patient care was communicated to the 
incoming staff members, with limited time for discussion or opportunity to discuss 
performance information. In case study site B, specific areas for improvement were 
discussed in each handover and staff were reminded to focus on a particular area 
for improvement. Certain tasks such as checking the status of the resuscitation 
trolley was also discussed. Case study site B had developed their own checklist to 
remind the nurse responsible for coordinating the shift to undertake specific tasks 





Figure 24 Ward checklist 
 
(Reproduced with permission from the case study site, IRAS Reference Number: 
196077)  
The three safety huddles observed were used as an opportunity to update team 
members and identify patients who were unwell or those at risk of falls or 
developing pressure ulcers. Within the safety huddle, staff were reminded of 
specific tasks that needed to be completed, and aspects of patient care that needed 
attention. The huddles were also an opportunity to include positive information 
about recent performance and reminders of changes in practice or new 







7.1.4 Results: Review of WHC-QD data and ward documentation  
To inform and guide the participant interviews and non-participant observations, 
access to WHC-QD data for each case study site was provided by the HCP. The 
data was exported from the WHC-QD into an Excel document, examples of the 
information is available in Figure 27. The case study sites performance over time is 
shown in  
 
Figure 25 and Figure 26 with specific areas for improvement identified by the wards 
metric audit programme results also shown in Figure 27.  
Case study Site A’s WHC-QD data showed their performance to be rated as 
‘Green’ with composite scores consistently above 90%. Case study site B, had 
several months were the score was less than 90%, and case study site C had two 
periods where their performance dipped below the expected standard, but had 
been consistently green in the months immediately prior to the staff interviews. 
Case study site B’s performance was due to multiple issues identified from the 
metric audit data. These included, checking of fridge temperatures, undertaking 
controlled drug safety checks, ensuring patients have their observations and 
oxygen prescribed, and completing patient risk assessment documentation. 
These findings were used to inform the participant interviews and provide an overall 
assessment of the case study sites performance over time. Participants were asked 
about specific areas for improvement highlighted by the WHC-QD data to establish 
if the performance data influenced practice. The information was also used to check 
the participants perception of their wards performance and understanding of what 
was being measured. All three case study sites did show an improvement in their 
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7.1.5 Results: Participant interviews  
In total 30 staff members were recruited to participate in Phase 2 of this study between March 
2017 and July 2017 (Table 17). The participants were staff recruited from a range of roles within 
each of the case study sites. The aim was to explore the programme theories and CMO 
configurations with different staff groups to understand how the WHC-QD influenced their 
behaviour or approach to organising patient care. None of the participants asked for their data 
to be removed from the study.  
Table 17 Staff interviews in Phase 2 
Role 
 
Case Study Sites 
Total A B C 
Senior Sister/Ward Manager  1 1 1 3 
Sister 2 1 3 6 
Staff Nurse 5 4 3 12 
Clinical support worker 1 1 3 5 
Ward Clerk 2 2 0 4 
Total 11 9 10 30 
7.2 Refined Programme Theory and CMO configurations 
The WHC-QD was a tool for assurance, and a programme used to provide data to ward teams. 
The aim was for the information to be used to develop or trigger actions that would improve 
patient outcomes and experience. To improve patient outcomes and experience the WHC-QD 
has to influence the behaviour and actions of staff working within wards. The interaction 
between the resources offered by the WHC-QD and how staff responded to the programme 
mechanisms are central to realist evaluation. As mechanisms can be constrained or supported 






7.3 Theory: Importance 
The CMO configurations under the heading of importance were based upon 
evidence that suggests information from QD’s are likely to be acted upon if the 
information is considered believable, generated consistently, and legitimised by the 
organisation or those in a position of authority. The credibility of data can be 
influenced negatively by inconsistency, lack of face validity, and its usefulness to 
staff in their day-to-day activities.  
Theory: Importance: CMOC :Importance: When QD information is 
generated consistently (Resource + Context) with credible audit processes 
(Context) and legitimised through management engagement (Context) it is 
seen as important (Reasoning ) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead 
to staff engagement with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness 
performance (Outcome).  
7.3.1 Consistent QD information.  
The theory identified consistent information, as a resource and a contextual factor 
that influenced the credibility and importance of the WHC-QD information. Staff 
within all three case study sites, confirmed they received data from the WHC-QD 
via their ward manager and from the information displayed on the PSB. Only one 
staff member confirmed she had accessed the WHC-QD but this was for specific 
information needed for root cause analysis meetings. The other 26 participants 
confirmed they had not seen or were not aware of how to access the computer 
based WHC-QD.  
 “Not as much as [Ward Manager] does, she tends to get more involved with 
that than I do.  I know where to find it, if I’m doing an RCA or something like 
that. The information displayed on the ward, I check that every day, because 
I make sure it’s updated.  That sounds really weird but yes, we tend to 
check that every day” (Site a, Sister 11). 
All three managers confirmed they only accessed the WHC-QD on a monthly basis, 
usually around the time the WMAP had been completed.  
 “If I’m completely honest I will probably look at it when I know that they’ve 
done my metrics.  And usually, probably I look at it once a month, when I’ve 
had my metrics done.  If I’ve got more time in the office, it’s all dependent on 





One ward manager used the WHC-QD to track their progress and used it to gather 
contextual information about their wards performance compared to other areas.  
 “Quite a lot really, because I think, well I personally tend to look at it in 
advance, to see where we are, where we are in the ratings, and if anybody’s 
in escalation, or how we’re doing.  So quite often, I’m often checking on 
there to see what’s happening.  Because I like to be in green all the time, 
and be up there” (Site A, Ward Manager 20). 
 
The phase two interviews confirmed the wealth of information available within the 
WHC-QD was only every accessed by ward managers and those working within the 
macro and meso (Table 1) level of the organisation. Those working within the 
micro level of the organisation (ward) relied upon the information displayed upon 
the PSB and updates from their ward managers. When asked if staff were aware of 
management engagement with the WHC-QD results, there was a belief that the 
corporate nursing team would be monitoring results as well as matrons but the ward 
manager was responsible for reviewing the information and sharing it with their 
teams.   
“I feel like probably corporate would look at it, the matrons would look at it.  
How in depth, I don’t know.  I think they probably look at a lot of the ward 
health check, and look at whether you’re in escalation or not” (Site C, Ward 
manager 4). 
Ticking of boxes could be considered as an unintended consequence of attempting 
to diminish the value of the WHC-QD. 
“I think the ward managers are under lots of pressure, but ultimately if we're 
not ticking all the boxes then they can't force us to do it” (Site B, Staff Nurse 
29). 
When staff were asked if they believed the WHC-QD information, several confirmed 
they thought the information was accurate, but were unsure if it reflected the care 
on the ward.  
Yeah I believe it.  I believe that gaps are there.  I think it's very harshly 
marked.  .  So I believe the number as data, but I don't think that they show 





Other factors that influenced the importance of the WHC-QD information was when 
the credibility of the WMAP results were questioned by obvious breaches in 
standards of care which auditors missed.  
“And I thought we don’t deserve 98%.  Thank you for giving us 98%, but you 
know, you just think hmmm.  But I think you get an idea when you’re talking 
to your patients” (Site C, Ward Manager 4).  
Credibility of the auditor continued to appear as a theme throughout the interviews. 
“But if you’re looking after six patients out of a whole ward, and not a single 
one’s got one in [audited care plan], but they’re still in the green, how does 
that work?” (Site A, Staff Nurse 15)  
It was also reinforced when staff were aware of examples of incomplete or poor 
documentation in other wards that had positive QD results.  
“Like when I see their documentations are probably 100%, and they come 
on here and half of it missing, I’m like something… they’re either lying or 
something is seriously, yeah” (Site C, CSW 3). 
7.3.2 Credible audit process 
The credibility of the auditor and the audit process was identified as an important 
context that affected the importance of the WHC-QD information. When asked how 
the behaviour of the auditor influenced the credibility of the WHC-QD data, staff 
were concerned about the time taken to do the audit. 
“You hear of other people going to wards and doing it in 20 minutes, half an 
hour.  Now to me, that is not a thorough evaluation of the documentation” 
(Site A, Ward Manager 20). 
While others had a negative perception of the audit visit and considered auditors to 
be detached from the realities and challenges of working within a busy ward.  
 “They always tend to come on the busiest day at the busiest time when I 
think sometimes they expect things to have been done by maybe the time 
they arrive, but actually you know, they haven't seen the full 13 hours day” 
(Site B, Staff nurse 27).     
The majority of staff nurses and clinical support workers interviewed had never 





“No, I’ve never spoke to them, because they always like, take themselves 
off and not introduced themselves or said who they were, looking at the 
notes” (Site A, Staff Nurse 18). 
The ward managers recognised the importance of engaging with the auditors during 
their WMAP visit.    
 “Because when they’d initially come on, when we were in a very, you know, 
negative place for a while, they’d come on and it was negative on the ward 
in general, and so nobody would talk to them. We weren’t doing well in the 
metrics, and everyone was just annoyed, and so they’d come on and you’d 
be like oh god, they’re going to find something that I’ve not done, and 
people would hide.  And they wouldn’t talk to them” (Site C, Ward Manager 
4).    
There was also agreement that it was important for auditors to engage with staff 
during the audit and feedback any results or recommendations. 
A good auditor is one that will feed things through, and if she’s struggling 
with something just sort of say, I don’t know about this It’s an absolute 
nightmare when they just come on, do the audit and then go, and don’t give 
you any feedback (Site A, Ward Manager 20). 
One staff member suggested knowing there was an audit pending resulted in an 
increased effort to improve documentation.  
“When it gets to that time when they come on, when you know sort of 
they’re due, we maybe up you game a little bit, they’ve not been to check us 
now and make sure everything’s in place and go through the paperwork and 
things like that” (Site, A Sister 11). 
7.3.3 Box-ticking  
When considering importance as a theory, several staff referred to the WHC-QD as 
a “box ticking” exercise or suggested the WHC-QD was a tool to improve 
documentation. Initially the researcher considered the perception of the WHC-QD 
as a ‘tick box exercise’ to be limited to Site B, which was the ward with the lowest 
metric scores. Referring to the WHC-QD as a tick box devalued is importance, and 
therefore the feedback message could be rejected. Further data analysis however 
identified participants from within all three case study sites referred to the WHC-QD 





 “So if you’re scoring poorly on pain, that can be, it’s sometimes reflected 
just that it’s not ticked on your obs [observation] chart” (Site C, Sister 7). 
This was also identified as a potential unintended consequence suggesting the 
organisation may be focused upon measure fixation 
 “I don’t know whether ticking a box necessarily means that someone’s had 
the right care, it means that someone’s ticked the box.  And I don’t know 
whether the two always correlate” (Site A Staff nurse 15).   
It was also considered a programme to improve paperwork rather than drive 
improvements in safety. 
 “It’s a way of measuring, it’s got to be done.  It doesn’t always show a true 
reflection of what’s going on, because quite often the things that we get 
pulled up on are things like not having [ward number] written on a sticker, or 
not having the bed magnets on the end of the bed, which I personally, and I 
know this isn’t the corporate opinion. Something’s got to give.  And the 
paperwork is what gives” (Site C, Staff nurse 2).   
Staff had also been involved in audits and initiatives such as the ST and had 
questioned their purpose and value.   
Where does it go? [The information]  Frequently every month, on nights, you 
have to fill out this paper thing, which basically tells you bugger all, which 
then, the sisters have to put online, before 11 o’clock in the morning 
otherwise they get told off for having it not online by 11 o’clock in the 
morning.  Where does it go, nobody knows what happens to it, who looks at 
it, what it proves, what’s it supposed to do, what’s its purpose?  Why are we 
doing it?  How does it help anybody? (Site A, Staff nurse 15).  
It was also clear some staff were not aware of what was being measured and how 
the information was used. This was confirmed by the Ward Manager on Site B who 
had only recently been given access to the full WHC-QD. 
“I've only recently got access to the electronic one, so I look at it now but I'm 
just starting to get used to how it works and getting the ward in and to like 
find it useful. So when I got access to it we were in escalation as a ward, 
which I didn't realise until I got access to it.  You can see very clearly why 
you're in escalation and what you need to do to get out of escalation” (Site 





To revisit importance as a theory, the interviews with staff suggests the nurses, 
clinical support workers and ward clerks within all three case study sites received 
information from the WHC-QD via their ward manager and from the information 
displayed on the PSB. Staff were aware senior management such as Heads of 
Nursing, matrons and their ward managers, reviewed the information. There was an 
assumption the accuracy of the data was validated through the ward manager. 
Rather than question the reliability of the WHC-QD, staff were concerned the 
information did not always represent the care provided. Staff were more likely to 
question the reliability of the information or specifically the results of the WMAP 
when they reviewed documentation from other ward areas and found it to be lower 
than the standards expected and audited. Several staff gave examples of patients 
transferring from ward areas with positive metric results but found incomplete 
documentation that resulted in them questioning the audit process or the auditor.   
All three ward managers felt staff should engage with auditors during the WMAP 
and emphasised the importance of receiving feedback during or on completion of 
the audit. Several staff and clinical support workers across all three case study sites 
had never seen or spoken to an auditor at the time of the WMAP.  
Interestingly the importance of the WHC-QD seemed to be undermined or 
questioned by a suggestion that it was a “tick-box exercise” or a programme to 
improve documentation. Looking at the complexity of the WHC-QD and the 
performance information available, staff seemed to focus on aspects of the WMAP 
rather than the structure, process and outcome measures used to provide the 
WHC-QD composite summary. The theory of importance was therefore update to 
include lack of awareness of structure, process and outcome measures  
Theory: Importance: CMOC Importance 
When QD information is generated consistently (Resource + Context) with 
credible audit processes (Context), legitimised through management 
engagement (Context) and staff have an awareness of the standards 
being measured (Context) the information will be seen as important 
(Reasoning) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff 
engagement with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness 
performance (Outcome).  
Staff are likely to question the importance of the programme if there is a 






An awareness of what was measured and why, emphasised the important role 
contextualisation may have in how the WHC-QD data is used by managers to 
engage staff in making improvements.  
 7.3.4 Contextualisation  
To contextualise or to consider something in context is to make information 
meaningful. As identified earlier, staff relied upon their ward managers to engage 
with the WHC-QD, check the credibility of the information and share it with their 
team. For the WHC-QD to influence care delivery, ward managers had to make the 
information meaningful for staff and important enough for it to lead to a change in 
practice or increase in effort. Several staff had expressed their doubts about the 
usefulness of the WHC-QD and considered it a programme for improving 
documentation or a ‘box-ticking’ exercise rather than improving the quality and 
safety of care.  The CMOC identified the role of the ward manager as key to 
contextualising or making information meaningful and had identified it as a context 
and a resource when considering the mechanism of importance.  
CMOC: Contextualisation: When there is a need to improve performance 
(Context) and the WHC-QD information is contextualised by a Ward 
manager (Context+ Resource), the information will be seen as important 
(Reasoning) and used to adopt or change practice and increase effort to 
reduce deficit (Outcome). 
Throughout the interviews, it was clear the majority of staff in all three case study 
sites were not aware of how the overall metric score was generated or see 
relevance of measuring process and outcome measures. One way of 
contextualising WHC-QD information is to emphasise the link between process 
measure compliance and improvement in outcome measures. For example, 
improvements in completion of pressure ulcer risk documentation, (process 
measure) may reduce the number of patients who acquire a pressure ulcer while in 
hospital (outcome measure). As an example, staff were concerned about complying 
with the agreed standard of checking the emergency equipment every day. 
 “No, I don’t feel the metric’s always reflects the care because, sometimes 
you can be in red for things that don’t involve care.  Not directly, like you 
checking your crash trolley or how many times you’ve checked your CD 
checks and things like that I know it’s an important part, but it’s just, that bit I 





Several staff were also concerned about how relatives might perceive a negative 
result displayed on the PSB.  
“You know like, if you’ve missed one crash signature, you fail for the whole 
month. Just think how does that look to relatives, when they’re walking past 
and it says you’ve gained 0% for resuscitation” (Site C, Ward manager 4).   
In the interviews staff discussed the WHC-QD information in the context of 
achieving the standard, rather than explaining why the standard was important. 
Interestingly having interviewed the chief Nurse in phase 1 of this study, the 100% 
compliance threshold was set in response to their experience of supporting nursing 
staff who had to attend a coroner’s court to explain why the emergency equipment 
had failed to work during resuscitation of a patient. They had also undertaken her 
own snapshot audit of 56 wards and identified only 5 wards were compliant with the 
emergency equipment guidelines. It is unclear if knowing this information would 
have made a difference to how staff viewed the importance of achieving compliance 
with this standard, as their concerns were based upon undertaking more work in the 
time-pressured environment of a clinical ward. 
   
 “When they pull us up on something and it's like, yeah well this is a really 
minor thing, we've been really busy this morning, we haven't had time to just 
prescribe these obs” (Site B, Staff Nurse 27).  
Again there was a suggestion that they missed ticking a box rather than what the 
metric actually represented.  
“Yesterday was probably one of the worst shifts I've worked, we were all 
really busy, had quite a lot of poorly patients.  And then like your paperwork 
kind of is your last priority and then if I miss a box then the whole ward gets 
marked down so it's stressful” (Site B, Staff Nurse 28).   
Some staff did recognise the importance of completing risk assessments as they 
prompted staff to take action to improve patient safety.  
“Well, the falls, because we’ve got the care plans, and the pressure ulcers, 
we’ve got care plans, so there’s more prompts to look into it. So you’re 
constantly having to evaluate their safety and stuff.  So when you do your 
nursing assessment, it sometimes flags up that they are at risk, then you’ve 
got extra care plans then to do on a daily basis to make sure that everything’ 





bits and bats that you’d do for someone that was at risk” (Site A, Staff nurse 
15). 
 
When staff were asked if they were given information about outcomes measures 
such as pressure ulcers, medication errors, or patient falls, they referred to the 
metrics displayed on the PSB. Overall staff thought performance had improved 
since the introduction of the WHC-QD.   
“Well if you notice that there is an issue with falls and you've got a target you 
know you can sort of address it as a ward, you know, identifying people that 
are a falls risk and then putting in place things to prevent falls.  And if people 
are a bit more aware of the problem” (Site B, CSW 23).  
There was however no evidence from the case study sites WHC-QD performance 
data or interviews to suggest the WHC-QD programme was associated with a 
reduction in patient harms such a falls, pressure ulcers or a link had been made 
through contextualisation to emphasise its importance.  
Establishing causation within a large HCP is extremely complex. While outcome 
data from the ST (Figure 32) might suggest the number of falls in hospital has 
reduced since the introduction of the WHC, data must be considered in the context 
of changes in guidelines, risk assessments, and the introduction of specific 
initiatives to reduce harm from pressure ulcers, falls, and medication errors. It must 
be recognised that RE is an approach that is used to bring new understanding to 
social programmes, initiatives and interventions that are designed to solve 
problems or make improvements. As programmes are often implemented into 
complex social structures, it is recognised that outcome patterns will vary 
dependent upon the context.  The purpose of realist evaluation is not to limit focus 
to successful programme outcome patterns but to explain what works, for whom, in 
what circumstances (The RAMESES II Project, 2017b). The aim of this research is 
to understand how and why quality dashboards influence care delivery within 
hospital wards and it not limited to the measuring outcome measures.  
Considering the differences in bed numbers and patient admissions between case 
study sites, when outcome data was calculated over a 22-month period, there was 
little difference in the overall number of patients who developed pressure ulcers, 
experienced medication administration errors or fallen while in hospital. The friends 
and family test also showed little variation between sites (Figure 28). However, 





presented using a time matched sample for each site, a different perspective 
emerged (Figures 29, 30, 31). Case study site A was the only ward that had seen a 
year on year reduction in incidences. This emphasised the challenges ward 
managers faced when trying to use WHC-QD information to highlight areas for 
improvement, identify potential risks, or demonstrate the difference the WHC-QD 
has made to the quality and safety of healthcare. There was no evidence to support 
the assumption associating WHC-QD with a reduction in patient harm motivated 
staff to maintain or improve performance. Ward managers were found to be 
contextualising the WHC-QD information through their actions and reactions to the 
monthly summary of performance. When ward managers shared information about 
the WHC-QD results, thanked staff for positive performance scores, or implemented 
strategies and a focus for improvement in response to negative performance 
information the importance of the WHC-QD was reinforced. 
 








% of patient who
recommend the
ward
Site A 13 27 60 98
Site B 16 40 42 97.5
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Figure 30 Study site B outcome data 
 


























































Ward managers’ response to monthly performance information.  
 “Our [Ward Manager] tells us what’s going on, everything that’s gone on.  Like I say, 
when we get the metric figures, she tells us straight away what we’ve got.  If there's any 
problems on the ward, we get it on the huddle, every morning we have a huddle, and if 
anything’s one on she tells us.  It’s all about communication, it’s communication, 
communication, communication” (Site C Staff Nurse 10). 
Other staff wanted to ensure performance was maintained out of professional respect for their 
ward manager.  
 
 “Oh, you can tell she’s proud.  You see on pay slips, team work makes the dream work, 
that type of thing.  So she is happy that it’s gone up” (Site C CSW 3). 
 
The role of the ward manager and their leadership in response to the WHC-QD performance 
data was therefore identified as an importance context in the CMO configuration.  
7.3.5 Leadership  
As previously highlighted in Phase one the leadership of the ward manager and their response 
to the WHC-QD was found to be central to empowering, encouraging and leading change.  
“I think people respond to that, and they respond to how their manager is working on the 
ward.  So if they don’t see their manager doing what they’re asking them to do, they 
think well why should I bother.  If they don’t have confidence in the skills or the advice 
that the manager’s giving them, then I think they, you know, they won’t follow, they won’t 
listen to what they’re doing” (Site C, Ward Manager 4) 
It was very clear from the staff interviews that improvement in each of the case study sites was 
attributed to the leadership of the ward manager.  
Case study Site A  
 “We’ve got a brilliant manager, she came onto this ward as a Band 6 and was promoted 
up to a 7.  She’s very hands on, and that makes a massive difference because she’s not 
prepared to ask people, or pull people up for stuff, that she doesn’t know how to do 
herself.  And I do think that makes a big difference” (Site C, Staff Nurse 2).  
Case Study Site B  
 “She never like, names and shames. She wouldn’t say like, you didn’t fill this in in this 





we need to be doing this.  And I think it’s a little nudge to say because half the time 
you’re like, oh yeah, I don’t do that” (Site A, Staff Nurse 18). 
  
Case study site C  
 “So [Ward Manager] will give our latest metrics score, what we've done well on, what 
we need to improve on, and then when we were doing really badly. The [Ward manager] 
would physically go through every patient's paperwork and picking up the missing bits 
and saying, this person hasn't got this completed, this person hasn't had that done. 
Actually that got people filling in paperwork more than the strangers that show up” (Site 
B, Staff Nurse 22). 
 
Staff also felt a sense of responsibility to maintain standards and ‘not let the ward manager 
down’.   
 “we’re a great as a team, we work as a team.  And it’s respect for [Ward Manager] as 
well, because she helps you, you know, she will, you know of you need anything. She’s 
approachable, she’s not like you know, oh she’s the big boss, you know, she’s 
approachable you can go to her.  So you want to do well for her as well” (Site A, Staff 
Nurse 13). 
In summary, some staff were unable to see the connection between the WHC-QD and 
improvements in patient safety. Using outcome data to demonstrate the impact of the WHC-QD 
on the quality and safety of care within the case study sites was difficult as although there was a 
reduction of the overall number of falls or pressure ulcers within the HCP as reported by the ST, 
the three case study sites showed limited change or improvement over a 22 month period. As it 
can be difficult to show WHC-QD was responsible for improving safety within the wards the 
outcome data from the case study sites were presented in a different formats to emphasis the 
challenges ward managers face when deciding how to use WHC-QD data. Only case study site 
A showed a reduction in incidences. As the ward managers confirmed that they had not 
received any formal training, guidance or advice about how to contextualise WHC-QD 
information, this was added as context, however as there was no evidence to support this 
notion, this is an area for future consideration. The interviews revealed that staff were more 
likely to respond to their ward manager’s reaction to performance information rather than the 
information itself. When ward managers engaged with WHC-QD data and made it meaningful to 





reinforced the importance of the WHC-QD and was more likely to lead to outcomes. The CMO 
configuration was updated to emphasise the important role leaders’ play in engaging and 
responding to performance information and how staff perceive this.  
 
Theory: Importance CMOC:  Contextualisation 
When there is a need to improve performance (Context) and ward managers, show 
leadership, engage with, and contextualise WHC-QD information and share this with 
staff (Context + Resource), the information will be seen as important (Reasoning) and 
used to adopt or change practice and increase effort to reduce deficit (Outcome). 
Future consideration: Ward managers who undergo training on how to review, interpret 
and communicate salient points from the WHC-QD are more likely to develop 
communication strategies that lead to greater staff engagement with the WHC-QD 
information.   
 
7.3.6 Focus  
As discussed, a ward manager’s response to negative performance information was often to 
highlight areas for improvement and provide a focus for change or an increase in effort. To aid 
the flow of the results, it was appropriate to discuss the focus CMOC next. The focus theory 
was based upon evidence from the literature that suggests the main purpose of QD are to 
identify deficits in performance and areas for improvement against pre-determined standards.  
CMOC: Focus: If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) if staff are aware 
of the standards (Context) and a focus for improvement is given (Resource) if the metric 
is considered important (Reasoning) staff will engage with the information and increase 
effort to improve performance (Outcome).   
The evidence suggests displaying QD information would act as an aide memoire reminding staff 
of aspects of patient care that needed to improve. Although staff interviewed were aware of 
information displayed on the PSB, there was no evidence to suggest this was used as an aide 
memoir.  All of the discussion around improvement were initiated by the ward manager, often in 
response to accessing the WHC-QD or updated results on the PSB. This was highlighted by a 
ward manager who had only recently gained access to the WHC-QD and found the detail 






Within all three case study sites, ward managers had developed their own aide memoirs to 
remind staff to undertake certain tasks or improve performance in certain areas. Key messages 
and reminders were discussed in daily handovers and safety huddles. One ward had developed 
a checklist to remind staff to complete specific process measures (Figure 24) while another 
area used a staff notice board. One ward manager had developed a system of updating staff 
through attaching a written update to payslips that staff appreciated. 
 “Now we're using the handover from the dashboard, so that's maybe helping us fill the 
information out a bit more than we were before.  Because we're printing that off every 
day and using it as our handover. it just prompts us to update it” (Site B Sister 24) 
Safety huddles were used to move the WHC-QD into every use and information from the WHC-
QD was displayed in staff rooms and communication folders. 
 “So at the end of handover whoever is in charge, either one of the sisters or whoever is 
in charge goes through a folder which has got notes and messages in.  So will give our 
latest metrics score, what we've done well on, what we need to improve on, and then 
when we were doing really badly” (Case B Staff Nurse 29). 
 
Using the summary from the WHC-QD rather than the PSB allowed a more detailed discussion 
on what needed to improve. As an example staff in case study site B, were aware they needed 
to improve compliance with prescribing patient observations (Figure 24). This approach did lead 
to improvements in performance for prescribing observations. 
 
I suppose it's about recognising what we can improve in; so it helps us to identify the 
areas that we're maybe lacking in and can develop.  There is something that we can 
bring to the team, like the safety huddle or whatever and say this is where we're 
slipping, this is what we need to do to be able to get there, and then knowing what we 
need to do and working towards that point. Like for instance like prescribing of 
obs,(bloods pressure, pulse, temperature) that was one thing that we was lacking on 
before” (Site B Sister 24). 
 
All three wards used safety huddles as an opportunity to discuss patient safety, ward 






“Our Band 7 [ward manager] passed it on in, what we do is we do a board round on a 
morning, it’s like a safety huddle.  She does tell us anything that’s gone on, you know, 
that we need to know.  Like metrics, she’ll tell us what the metrics are when we’ve got 
the metrics, the cleaning, she tells us what she’s put in place to get things improved”  
(Site C Staff Nurse 10). 
Observations of the safety huddles confirmed patient safety concerns were discussed, including 
key safety checks such as checking fridge temperatures and emergency equipment. All three 
case study sites had developed their own communication cascade to raise awareness of 
performance. These included verbal updates given in handovers and safety huddles and written 
information via notice boards and individual staff updates. Ward handovers and safety huddles 
were the key moments for WHC-QD data to be discussed. Although the focus of handovers was 
to communicate patient specific information rather than discuss the performance of the ward, 
case study site B which had several months with WHC-QD scores less than 90%, had 
developed a checklist or an aide memoire to remind staff of specific metrics to focus upon. 
Extracts from the WHC-QD was used in handover as a reminder and to raise awareness of 
what was being measured. There was evidence from observations of handovers, safety 
huddles, and staff  interviews to show ward managers would use information from the WHC-QD 
to develop strategies to share information with their teams, highlight areas for improvement and 
remind staff to focus upon specific aspects of care and safety checks.  
 
Theory: Importance CMOC: Focus 
If a ward has a performance deficit identified (Context) if staff are aware of the 
standards (Context) and a focus for improvement is given (Resource) if the metric is 
considered important (Reasoning) staff will engage with the information and increase 
effort to improve performance (Outcome)?   
 
No change to this CMOC 
 
7.4 Theory: Disruption 
What motivated ward managers to develop strategies to improve performance and staff to 
respond to them was also due to how negative WHC-QD performance data has the potential to 





negative views. This created cognitive dissonance as the new information challenged or 
reinforced their existing beliefs.  
CMOC: Disruption: When a ward has previously performed well (Context) and QD 
information reports negative information (Resource), this disrupts (Reasoning) the 
positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will choose to reject the message or 
increase effort (Outcome) to improve performance.  
As outlined by Jagosh et al. (2015), resources can have a ripple effect. Ward managers did not 
always respond to unexpected negative performance information especially if they had 
concerns about the performance of the auditor or suspected aberrations in the data. If however 
subsequent performance information was still negative, this was more likely to trigger a 
response or action.   
CMOC: Ongoing Disruption: When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to address the 
deficit when performance is tracked over time and staff are aware (Resource + Context) 
to avoid scrutiny (Reasoning) and disrupting how the ward is viewed by patients and 
managers (Reasoning) a change in practice will be initiated or the ward manager will 
seek help (Outcome). 
One staff member when asked if they believed the WHC-QD information, they suggested only 
when the results were positive and dismissed it when the results were negative.  
“When it's bad I don’t think it reflects the care the patients are receiving” (Site B, Ward 
Manager 30). 
Staff found negative WHC-QD performance information disruptive, causing frustration and 
anger for staff, who dismissed the data as unrepresentative.  
“Oh no, no, it's just numbers for a ward, it's got nothing do with actually care. We had a 
metrics the other month and we dipped, but it was a horrendous… it was a horrendous 
week I think the whole week had been awful.  I think we're a pretty strong ward, I think 
we are a good team and we were really cross about it, we were trying every way 
possible not to put that on that board [PSB].  But it's not a true reflection of the nursing 
care that you get at all” (Site B, Staff Nurse 22). 
Some staff felt strong emotions in response to a negative score. 
“I felt really frustrated because I think it make it look as though we weren't giving the 
same care, good care, and I knew how hard people were working. I just felt that it wasn't 





weren't in the amber because we hadn't done this piece of documentation or that piece 
of documentation.  It didn't reflect that the patients still got all the care they needed and 
all the drugs they needed.  Their experience was still really good.  So I found it really 
frustrating” (Site B, Ward Manager).  
Other staff when aware of negative performance information referred to the friends and family 
test as a better indicator of care provided by the ward.  The friends and family test data is based 
upon patient feedback about their experiences on the ward. Case site B at the time of the 
interviews was positive with 97.5% of patients recommending the care they provided (Figure 
28).  
Staff also found it disappointing when the focus was on the WHC-QD results but failed to 
recognise staffing shortages and the day-to-day challenges and pressure staff were working 
under 
“I can kind of see why metrics are important but I don't always feel like they give a very 
true reflection of the day-to-day care provided on the ward.  It feels very critical;  it felt 
like we were being constantly told we weren't doing well enough, even though you're 
working with three less staff nurses than you should do and you have kept all of your 
patients safe and well and alive that day, to then be told we're in the red, you're not 
doing well enough, you all need to do better is quite difficult to hear” (Site B, Staff Nurse 
29).   
An awareness of negative WHC performance was also found to have an impact upon staff 
morale. Especially when the WHC-QD did not improve over time.  
“By the time you get to third stage [escalation]  we were a bit like, well they're not going 
to shut us down because where are they going to put the patients.  Everybody got a bit 
like defeated, and instead of being like, let's try it was a bit like, well if we're crap, we're 
crap, let's just be crap “ (Site B, Staff Nurse 29). 
The impact of negative performance information was challenging as staff within all three case 
study sites had referred to a sense of pride in the care patients received within their wards.  
 
 “Because it makes you want to… it gives you pride in your work and you want to be 
better, and do better.  And you want… you don’t want to let the rest of the ward down. I 





When asked how important it was for the WHC-QD to show ‘green’ metrics, pride once again 
was identified as an important potential context to consider.  
“People started to take a bit more pride when our metrics started to go up.  They were 
asking you, what’s our metrics this month, and so it was just, yeah, I think it was more 
team working.  We just needed a bit of a fresh start, and it did kind of lift the mood, it 
started to lift a little bit, and people trying to help each other out a bit more” (Site C, 
Ward manager).  
7.4.1 Pride 
Although not originally identified as theory, during the thematic analysis several participants 
identified feeling proud of their ward and the patient care provided. Pride is “a feeling of 
pleasure and satisfaction that a person experiences because a person or people connected has 
done or got something good” (ODE, 2015). In the interviews pride was linked to teamwork and 
leadership and providing the best patient care.  
“Yeah, very proud of, because as you know we’re really short on nurses, and I feel like 
we all, me as a healthcare as well I feel like – what was I saying… I feel like we’ve really 
all come together and really got on with it as a team.  And we have like a get on with it 
attitude and the main thing is the patients isn’t it, so yeah.  But I really enjoy it on here” 
(Site C, CSW 1). 
In response to disruption caused by the negative performance information staff working within 
case sites A and C (wards with the best WHC-QD performance) both identified teamwork as an 
important outcome, when areas for improvement were identified.    
“We’ve always had quite a good sense of teamwork on here to be honest with you.  And 
I don’t know whether it’s made any difference on other wards, but we’ve always worked 
quite well as a team on here.  And that’s something that’s been quite nice.  And when 
you do go to other wards, you notice that they really don’t. So if you’ve got a proactive 
team and a proactive management team, then the whole ward and the whole 
productivity of the ward is better (Site A, Staff Nurse 15).  






“They weren't really doing the family and friends tests and then when I started I pushed 
them to do it and it's like, well not to like take credit but it has started going up because I 
just sort of prompt them (Site B, Ward Clerk).  
Staff also worked collectively to improve care and were prepared to challenge colleagues to 
ensure standards of care were maintained.   
Yeah, I think we do challenge each other.  I think even the staff amongst themselves will 
challenge the others, they want to do well.  And when we do well it encourages them to 
do better.  And I think from that respect they are a team that want to get the best metrics 
and they want to be the best team” (Site B, Sister 24). 
There was evidence to suggest negative WHC-QD did disrupt staff’s perception of care 
provided and caused dissonance. Initially staff decided to reject the feedback message, or refer 
to other more positive metrics that challenged the WHC-QD data. Negative performance 
information also caused anger and frustration for some staff members as the WHC-QD 
information became a focal point rather than the addressing staffing level, patient numbers or 
the increase in patient acuity or complexity of care needs. Staff discussed the pride they had in 
their ward, and the disruption caused by negative performance information. While staff 
dismissed the importance of the WHC-QD, they did want their ‘metrics to be green’ and 
therefore did respond to negative performance information. The responses included working 
together as a team to make improvement and to challenge colleagues practice to ensure 
standards were maintained.  
The CMO configuration was therefore updated to include pride as a contextual factor for 
consideration and to emphasise teamwork and challenge as an outcome in response to 
negative performance information and the disruption or challenge this causes the staff sense of 
pride in their ward.  
CMOC: Disruption.  
When a ward has previously performed well (Context) and staff are proud of their team 
and ward (Context) and WHC-QD information reports negative information (Resource) 
this disrupts (Reasoning) the positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will choose 
to reject the message or increase effort (Outcome) to improve performance.   
CMOC: Ongoing Disruption: 
When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to address the deficit when performance is 





ward is viewed by patients and managers (Reasoning) a change in practice will be 
initiated, managers will seek help and staff will work together as a team and challenge 
colleagues to improve performance (Outcome). 
 
7.5 Theory: Reassurance.  
As the WHC-QD also had the potential to show when improvements had been made, recognise 
success and reassure managers, patients, visitors and staff care within the ward was safe or 
had achieved the pre-determined standard the mechanism of reassurance was developed.  
Theory: Reassurance When information from the WHC-QD (Resource) tracks 
performance over time (Resource) and recognises success or improvement, (Resource) 
staff can see if improvement strategies have worked and are reassured (Reasoning) care 
on their ward is safe. This is likely to lead to greater staff engagement with WHC-QD 
programme (Outcome).  
As has already been identified, staff express concerns that the WHC-QD did not always reflect 
the care given but were ‘pleased’ to have their metrics in ‘green’ and receive the recognition 
that came with consistent good performance.  
 “I think it’s making people more aware.  It’s making people more empowered, if they 
see your falls are going up and up and up, and you get a certificate after so many, 
people do like that.  They like to have a certificate and they like a photograph in the 
Trust Bulletin.  And you think yay, we got to 30 days, and that’s nice, to hear other 
people say about that (Site A, Ward Manager).   
 “Too many people have told us that we’re really good, so we’ve got standards to keep 
up to” (Site A, Staff Nurse 17).   
Staff were also pleased to see their work to improve performance reflected in the performance 
data.  
“When we got out of escalation it proved what we're now doing is better, I think it just 
proves that we are capable of doing it, of being”(Site B, Staff Nurse 26). 
In case study site A, then an amber metric score was updated to green in the following months 







Table 18 Social media comments 
Social media comments in response to returning to green metrics 
Well done you guys top effort. 
Right back where you belong in the 
green zone. 
Well done team. 
Amazing, fantastic team effort.  
Fantastic work well done. 
 
Unlike avoidance and disruption, there was no evidence to suggest reassurance was a 
mechanism which would lead to change. It was seen as an outcome of ward staff receiving 
consistent WCH performance data. Change occurred as a consequence of negative 
performance information, rather than wards seeking ongoing reassurance that the care 
provided was safe and effective. In view of this, reassurance was added as an outcome rather 
than a mechanism.  
CMOC: Reassurance 
When information from the WHC-QD (Resource) tracks performance over 
time (Resource) and recognises success or improvement, (Resource) 
staff can see if improvement strategies have worked and are reassured 
(Outcome) care on their ward is safe. This is likely to lead to greater staff 
engagement with WHC-QD programme (Outcome).  
 
7.6 Theory: Avoidance 
To aid with the flow of results chapter the theory of avoidance is presented. The theory of 
disruption was based upon a response to negative performance information; the theory of 
avoidance is based upon staff wanting to avoid negative performance information and its 
associated scrutiny.  
Theory: Avoidance: CMOC: Ward managers who wish to avoid (Reasoning) the 
managerial scrutiny that comes with repeated negative performance information,              
(Resource + Context) will show leadership (Context) and seek help and develop 
strategies (Outcome) to improve performance within their ward 
As the WHC-QD has the ability to make performance visible to patients via the PSB and senior 





because of staff wanting to avoid negative performance information and the potential 
consequences of triggering the escalation process. Ward managers were most concerned with 
avoiding negative performance information and escalation. The ward managers though they 
should be able to manage their own ward and negative performance information may be seen 
as a judgement on their leadership ability. 
“To me, that’s how it must feel if your metrics drop.  And there’s nothing worse than 
people coming on to your ward and telling you how you should be running your ward, 
because that’s me, that’s my ward, and if I’m not doing it right then I will pick it back up “I 
don’t want people coming in and telling me how to pick it back up I’d be mortified, if it 
was my ward” (Site A, Ward Manager 20). 
There was also a sense of judgement,  
“I felt like that’s how I was judged, and that’s how we as a ward were judged. I found it, if 
I’m honest, I had a difficult time.  As a manager, yes you lead, and you ask people to do 
something, but you can’t make them do it.  You just hope that they will so that it makes 
your life easier” (Site C, Ward Manager 4).   
With experience ward managers became more confident in responding to the performance 
information.  
“So it’s important to me, but it doesn’t define me like it did maybe six months ago. I’m a 
bit more laid back about it now, in the sense of if I feel like the care that we’re giving is 
good, I think if it’s above a certain point, if it starts dropping and you get into like red, or 
low amber, I start thinking why are we like that, what are we not doing” (Case site C, 
Ward Manager 4).  
For staff working in case site B their experience of the escalation process was considered 
negative rather than supportive and had an effect on team morale.  
“It felt pretty rubbish to be honest because like when you're here every day you see how 
hard the nurses work, you see that they're putting everything into make patient care their 
number one thing.  So when they're put into escalation it sort of brings like an awful 
mood upon people, you know, when people bring it up and it's like, oh we're 
escalation”(Site B, Staff Nurse 26). 
Some staff suggested when facing negative performance data the team would come together; 





 “We’d get really disappointed and we’d look at why, we’d look at what areas we’ve 
slipped on and we’d just make sure that we improve in that area and we’re consistent 
with it throughout the… we wouldn’t just look at that particular area, but we would want 
to be back up to green, and we work hard as a team and we cascade information back 
to each other and say the reasons why we’re in amber, and just make sure that we all 
just work really hard to get it back up to where we were” (Site A, Sister 16). 
From the interviews staff also suggested displaying performance information for patients and 
visitors was something staff wanted to avoid as this may worry patients and suggest care on the 
ward was unsafe. Ward managers were particularly concerned. 
I remember thinking crikey, imagine if you’re red and relatives are coming.  They’re not 
going to want to come into that ward. I’d be mortified if I was red outside the door” (Site 
A, Ward Manager 20). 
Other staff members were also concerned that displaying negative metrics could worry patients 
or portray a negative perspective of the ward. 
 “Like we said before, it can be a bit humiliating when we’re really bad, you know when 
we’re in the ambers, and it showed what we were failing on.  It kind of, it makes a bad 
light on you, to say, are they really crap at their jobs or not (Site C, CSW 3). 
Staff did recognise that displaying information about their wards performance was part of 
encouraging an open and transparent culture within healthcare.  
 “I think it’s fine being audited, because I just think it’s the way of the world isn’t it and 
that’s what we’ve got to do.  And I think the public and everybody wants to see that don’t 
they?” (Site A, Sister 16). 
When asked if patients or visitors engaged with the information displayed on the PSB, the 
majority of staff across all three case study sites confirmed that they had seen patients and 
visitors looking at the PSB. However no staff members had been asked about the information 
displayed on the PSB. These findings supported the observational data presented earlier in the 
chapter. 
 “I have seen relatives looking, I have seen relatives when they’ve been waiting for 
certain things, they’ve actually stood and looked at them all.  Not whatever they take in, 





One ward manager initially thought patients or relatives would be more challenging when they 
reviewed negative performance information but she had never been approached to discuss the 
data.   
 “I thought we'd be challenged a bit more by relatives and patients, there's only this 
many staff on shift today or, you've had a fall recently and was that my relative, and 
what have you” (Site B, Ward Manager 30).  
In summary ward managers were concerned about receiving and displaying negative 
performance information via the PSB. Negative performance information could influence the 
reputation of ward manager, the ward and cause patients and relatives to worry. Those who 
had experienced the escalation process found the experience to have a negative impact upon 
morale. Managers and staff were therefore keen to avoid this so standards would be maintained 
or strategies developed by ward managers to improve performance. Although staff were 
concerned about displaying negative performance information, there was agreement that 
measuring and monitoring the safety of healthcare was now part of everyday practice and that it 
may lead to greater transparency and trust in the care provided even if the performance 
information was “red”. As identified earlier in the chapter through observation, although the 
PSB’s were displayed in prominent locations within the case study sites, very few visitors 
stopped to review the information displayed or asked staff about the information. The driver for 
change was therefore intrinsic within staff than through challenges by relatives. As displaying 
negative performance information was a contextual factor that influenced the mechanism of 
avoidance, the CMOC was updated to reflect this.  
CMOC: Avoidance 
Ward managers who wish to avoid (Reasoning) displaying negative 
performance information (Context) and the managerial scrutiny that 
comes with repeated negative performance information, (Resource + 
Context)  will show leadership (Context) and seek help and develop 
strategies (Outcome) to improve performance within their ward 
 
7.7 Theory: Competition 
Competition was identified by the stakeholders in phase one as an important driver for change. 





ranked and rated. An objective tool for recognising success also has the potential for 
comparison and league tables to develop. Competition would lead to improvement in 
performance and care as wards would compete with each other to achieve better results.  
CMOC: Competition: As QD information has the ability to identify performance over 
time (Resource) the performance of wards can be ranked and viewed by senior 
managers within the organisation (Context). This will engage ward managers (Context) 
to compete (Reasoning) with other wards which will lead to improvements in 
performance (Outcome). 
Several staff however did not see competition as a mechanism for change and there was no 
reference to competing with other wards or departments during the observation of the ward 
hand overs or safety huddles. One staff member was unsure if competition should be 
encouraged within healthcare. 
That could make it more competitive, which I don’t know if it's healthy in kind of the 
NHS, or I'd say on a ward to be like competing with each other.  I don’t know.  Obviously 
competition can be healthy sometimes, but on here it's more working as a team and 
having that team kind of drive rather than individual drives.  But I guess it might make 
some people not want to be red all the time and they might try harder” (Site B, Staff 
Nurse 28). 
However some staff were interested in the performance of their nearest or “rival” ward, 
suggesting that competition with a peer or contextualised competition was important.  
 “Next door.  I think they just maybe got slightly better than us last month” (Site B, Staff 
Nurse 22). 
However the potential for competition to lead to change was limited due to the availability of 
performance data.  
 “Every ward’s going to want to be better than their rival ward.  Like [ward name] we're 
going to want to be better than them and stuff so.  I don’t actually know what their 
ratings are, I wouldn’t know how to find out, apart from going onto the ward and looking” 
(Site A, CSW 14).  
Interestingly several staff working in case study site A, did feel competition was important, but it 
was based upon wanting to be the “best” for their patients rather than being first, winning a prize 






It was also recognised that it needed all staff to be involved if they were to be successful 
“On this ward we’re quite competitive, so we want to be up there and be good at 
everything.  And we work as a team, so if we just help each other to meet our targets 
really (Site A, Sister 11).   
Others found the WHC-QD created competition within the ward itself between teams. This 
resulted in staff reminding colleagues of specific tasks to complete. It also allowed positive 
performance to be recognised which may have motivate staff to continue to improve or maintain 
the standards.    
“I want to obviously do better but I never look at see what like [ward next doors] metrics 
are or whatever, you know.  And some of the nurses like do want to do better than last 
month and they're always like, we're going to beat it, we're going to get better, we're 
going to be 100%, you know, so there is a bit of that camaraderie isn't there I guess and 
want to do better” (Site B, Ward Manager 30). 
The mechanism of competition or the activity of striving to gain or win something by defeating or 
establishing superiority over others (ODE, 2015) was less about trying to establish superiority 
and more about creating uncertainty when the performance data are generated. This 
uncertainty was used for individual reflexivity that may drive changes in behaviour. The 
mechanism of competition is actually a resource, as the results allow wards to be ranked or 
judged. The actual mechanism of competition or judgement was based in the mechanisms of  
avoidance, and disruption as staff change behaviour to avoid being judged as a poorly 
performing ward, are reassured the care they provide is safe or have their perception of their 
performance disrupted by the results. Interestingly the ‘best performing’ ward of the three case 
study sites, were driven by a collective sense of responsibility and teamwork to maintain 
performance. It was an expectation that the ward would maintain their performance with staff 
experiencing a sense of disappointment or disruption when the WHC-QD identified areas for 
improvement and relief when performance improved 
CMOC: Competition 
As QD information has the ability to identify performance over time (Resource) the 
performance of wards can be ranked and viewed by senior managers within the 





(Mechanism) their wards performance being rated lower than neighbouring 
ward,  this will lead to improvements in performance (Outcome). 
 
7.8 Discussion 
The phase 2 findings were used to test the programme theory and CMO configurations. Across 
all three case study sites, only the ward managers accessed the WHC-QD, all other staff 
members received their WHC-QD data from the information displayed on the PSB or via their 
ward manager. The information displayed upon the PSB was updated monthly and only 
displayed process outcomes from the WMAP and an overall composite performance score. The 
vast majority of data within the WHC-QD was left unseen by staff. Although there was no 
evidence to suggest the PSB itself was used as an aide memoir, one ward downloaded 
performance information from the WHC-QD to target specific areas for improvement and raise 
awareness of the standards the ward were being measured against. In addition a checklist was 
developed to remind staff to undertake specific tasks known to be included in the WMAP.  
Although staff used the PSB for information, its design and location was developed to publicly 
display performance information for patients and visitors. All three ward managers were 
concerned about displaying negative performance information and how this may concern 
patients and their relatives. Other staff members recognised that displaying performance 
information, is part of encouraging an open and transparent culture within healthcare and while 
some expressed concerns, overall those who commented suggested it may reassure patients.  
For WHC-QD data to drive change, the information has to be considered important and 
believable. Phase 1 participants expressed concerns about the credibility of auditors and how 
their behaviour can detract or influence the believability of the performance data. While several 
staff had never spoken to an auditor, ward managers and sisters made a point of engaging with 
the auditors during the audit visit and expected feedback to be given at the time of the 
inspection. Ward managers were frustrated when negative performance data was published 
without discussion. Staff did question the validity of the audit, when patients from well 
performing wards transferred to the case study site with incomplete documentation and missing 
information.   
The main forum for raising awareness about performance was via ward handovers and safety 





discuss patient safety. The ward managers in all three case study sites each had developed 
their own way of disseminating information to their teams. Using outcome data to highlight the 
link between process and outcome measures was shown to be difficult and no guidance or 
standard approach was available from the HCP. The key factor in raising awareness of 
performance and enabling or prohibiting change was the behaviours of the ward manager. 
Many staff were inspired by the leadership skills of the ward manager and a sense of teamwork 
and commitment to their ward, with several staff highlighting pride as potential context.  
One surprising finding from staff was their perception of the WHC as a system for checking 
documentation and a ‘tick box assurance’ process. Staff were concerned minor documentation 
failures during the WMAP would result in the ward failing to achieve compliance with the 
expected standards. This raised two issues, staff knowledge of standards and the importance of 
linking process measures and outcome measures. A review of the outcome data for the three 
case study sites could find no evidence to suggest outcomes such as number of pressure 
ulcers had reduced, although across all wards within the HCP there had been a reduction in 
incidences. Contextualising information is an important way of attaching meaning to a metric. 
An example from the Phase one interviews which highlighted the need for 100% compliance 
with checking emergency equipment. Contextualisation has the potential to raise awareness of 
the expected standards, why they are important, and challenge the tick box perception.  
As WHC brings performance into the spotlight and staff expressed concerns about how the 
PSB information would be viewed by visitors and patients. In reality very few patients or 
relatives were seen to be looking at the PSB and few staff had been asked to explain the data 
displayed. Of those visitors who agreed to be interviewed, all suggested displaying open and 
honest performance data was an expectation and it provided reassurance wards were 
monitoring safety.  
Avoidance as a mechanism also suggests change occurs as ward managers look to avoid 
potential reputational consequences of a ward being in ‘escalation’ and develop strategies to 
improve performance. When WHC-QD data disrupts a person’s perception of the care they 
provide, this is a potential mechanism for change. There was evidence staff sought additional 
information to reaffirm and dismiss the WHC-QD data as non-representative however negative 
performance data, over time led to strategies to improve performance.  
The mechanisms described as reassurance, on reflection became an outcome as the result of 
consistent performance data over time. Finally although competition was identified by the 





competition as a mechanism and there was no reference of competing with other wards. While 
some staff may be motivated by competition, most staff agreed that it was more important to 
provide safe and effective care rather than try to out-perform a neighbouring ward.   
In view of these findings the programme theory has been refined with reassurance, competition, 
teamwork, and challenging colleagues identified as an outcome. The greatest influence on staff 
was the leadership and commitment shown by ward managers and their ability to contextualise 
information and create a sense of pride and collective responsibility to provide safe care. The 
programme theory summary has been updated to reflect the changes to the CMO 
configurations. A summary of all 5 CMO configurations are outlined in the next section.  
7.8.1 Summary of programme theories  
 
Theory: Importance 
Importance Information generated by the QD needs to be considered 
When QD information is generated consistently (Resource + Context) with credible audit 
processes (Context), legitimised through management engagement (Context) and staff 
have an awareness of the standards being measured (Context) the information will be 
seen as important (Reasoning) and less likely to be rejected. This will lead to staff 
engagement with the programme (Outcome) and raise awareness performance 
(Outcome).  
Staff are likely to question the importance of the programme if there is a lack of awareness 
of what is being measured and why.  
 
Theory: Importance 
Information generated by QD needs to convey a story 
When there is an need to improve performance (Context) and ward managers, show 
leadership, engage with, and contextualise WHC-QD information and share this with staff 
(Context + Resource), the information will be seen as important (Reasoning) and used to 
adopt or change practice and increase effort to reduce deficit (Outcome). 
Future consideration: Ward managers who undergo training on how to review, interpret 
and communicate salient points from the WHC-QD are more likely to develop 
communication strategies which lead to greater staff engagement with the WHC-QD 








 QD information can cause disruption which leads to change.  
When a ward has previously performed well (Context) and staff are proud of their team and 
ward (Context) and WHC-QD information reports negative information (Resource) this 
disrupts (Reasoning) the positive perception of the individual/ward. Staff will choose to 




Consistent disruption caused by QD data will lead to change. 
 
When an increase in effort (Outcome) fails to address the deficit when performance is tracked 
over time and staff are aware (Resource + Context) to avoid disrupting how the ward is 
viewed by patients and managers (Reasoning) a change in practice will be initiated, 
managers will seek help and staff will work together as a team and challenge colleagues to 
improve performance (Outcome). 
 
 
Theory  Avoidance  
QD offers an opportunity 
Ward managers who wish to avoid (Reasoning) displaying negative performance information 
(Context) and the managerial scrutiny that comes with repeated negative performance 
information, (Resource + Context)  will show leadership (Context) and seek help and develop 
strategies (Outcome) to improve performance within their ward 
 
7.9 Chapter summary  
This chapter presents the findings from Phase 2 and the steps taken to confirm and reject the 
refined programme theories. Quantitative and observational data, information from participants 
directly affected by the programme under investigation and visitors to the case study sites were 
used to interrogate the programme theories and CMO configurations and used to explain 





change to occur. In view of these findings the programme theory was refined with reassurance, 
competition, teamwork, and challenging colleagues identified as an outcome. The greatest 
influence on staff was the leadership and commitment shown by ward managers and their 
ability to contextualise information and create a sense of pride and collective responsibility to 
provide safe care. The evidence from this research suggests three interrelated key theories of 
Importance, Disruption and Avoidance can be used to explain how and why QD influence care 
delivery within hospitals wards and the contextual factors that enable or inhibit their impact. This 





Chapter 8 Discussion  
8.1 Introduction 
As the structure of this thesis was guided by the Quality and Reporting Standards for Realist 
Evaluation, this chapter sets out the main findings in relation to the research question and aims 
and objectives of the study with reference to the programme theory (Wong et al., 2017). The 
chapter begins by presenting the original research question and a summary of the key findings. 
The three interrelated key theories of Importance, Disruption and Avoidance supported by the 
key CMO configurations are presented and consideration is given to the unintended 
consequences. A summary of the discussion sets out main areas of consideration of the 
research. Strengths and limitations of the study outlined and implications for practice will be 
presented. Consideration is given to future questions and the thesis presents a short conclusion 
for consideration.  
8.2 The aims of the study 
Throughout history, patients have experienced care that has caused distress and harm. While 
the root cause of the published healthcare failings have differed, all have called for HCP to 
create a culture of transparency and candour. Over the last decade, there has been 
considerable interest in the development of QD within healthcare. QD are created at 
considerable time and expense however, the benefit of deployment has the potential to 
outweigh any cost. The benefit will however only be realised if their potential can be unleashed 
and used to make healthcare safe. Assessing the quality and safety of care is complex, 
however we find ourselves surrounded by performance data, most of which is never used. As 
has been shown throughout this thesis, simply providing performance information has limited 
impact on quality and safety in healthcare (Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs et al., 2014a, Ivers 
and Barrett, 2018, Keen et al., 2018a). Consideration must also be given to the potential 
unintended consequences associated with measuring healthcare practice. QD are complex 
programmes deployed into complex organisations, it is therefore unsurprising that their impact 
varies from ward to ward. This study brings new information to the field of QD development and 
deployment and may have the potential to allow QD data to be brought to life, contextualised 






The aim of this research was to understand how and why quality dashboards influence care 
delivery within hospital wards.  
The specific objectives of the study were to   
1. Critically review the evidence for QD within hospital wards.  
2. Explore with those responsible for the development and management of the WHC-QD 
their perceptions of the intended consequences and possible unintended consequence 
of its deployment within wards.  
3. Use a range of approaches to explore the impact of QD within hospitals wards including 
staff interviews.  
4. Explain how and why QD influences care delivery within hospital wards and to 
understand the influence of contextual factors. 
Objective one was addressed using a literature review of the history of patient safety within 
healthcare, quality dashboards, audit and feedback theory, and a scoping review of 27 papers 
focused upon the use of quality dashboards within hospital wards. The evidence for this was 
presented in Chapters 1, 2 and 3.  
As RE is theory driven, evidence from the case study site, literature review, researcher, and 
scoping review were used to develop the initial programme theories and CMO configurations to 
explain how QD influence care delivery. Five initial programme theories; Importance, Disruption, 
Focus, Reassurance, and Avoidance supported by seven CMO configurations were developed. 
The programme theories were refined with staff responsible for the development of the WHC-
QD. As the study site had introduced a QD known as the WHC-QD, phase one of the study 
interviewed stakeholders responsible for its development and implementation. The initial 
programme theories were presented to the participants to ascertain their views and insight into 
how quality dashboards influence care. The seven interrelated CMO configurations constructed 
were refined through analysis of the phase one interviews. Eight interrelated CMO 
configurations were taken forward for testing in phase two. Phase 2 used a mixed methods 
approach and a range of data collection methods to increase the robustness of theory testing, 
including outcome data, non-participant observational, HCP documentation, outcome data and 
visitor and staff interviews (Wong et al 2017). Three case study sites were selected according to 
WHC-QD performance scores to allow differing experiences to be explored. Evidence from 






8.3 How do quality dashboard influence care delivery within hospital 
wards? 
As identified at the beginning of this research, while hospital wards may have the same policies, 
procedures, and staffing structures they are not homogenous units delivering homogenised 
care. Each ward is a complex micro system with complex interplay between staff members, 
hierarchies, and teams who work together to provide care. The impact of a new initiatives or 
interventions when introduced can therefore vary. The WHC-QD was a complex programme 
introduced into the complex social structure of a hospital ward. Using RE allowed a range of 
theories to be explored with staff within the case study sites to advance understanding of why 
complex interventions work, how, for whom and in what context and to what extent, and explain 
why the programme might fail to achieve its anticipated outcomes. 
The evidence from this research suggests three interrelated key theories of Importance, 
Disruption and Avoidance supported by six key CMO configurations set out in Chapter 7 section 
7.8.1 can be used to explain how and why QD influence care delivery within hospitals wards 
and the contextual factors that enable or inhibit their impact.  Each theory will be discussed in 
turn.  
Figure 33 Interrelated programme theories 
 
8.3.1 Importance 
The response to international and national concerns regarding the safety of healthcare and 
subsequent investigations, reports, and recommendations outlined in Chapter 1 was for 
governments, regulators and HCP to improve safety and become more transparent about 







that provide a strategic overview and focus on the fundamentals of care, together with patient 
outcomes and feedback on their experience of care by ward. The QD would “provide rich data 
to help ward & CSU (a collection of wards or Clinical Service Unit) teams focus their attention 
on actions that will improve patient outcomes and experience” (Case study site Trust Board 
Paper 2014). The stakeholders interviewed in phase 1 suggested working without the WHC-QD 
was now unthinkable, as it had become indispensable.  
Considering the concerns about safety, the significant investment in its development and 
implementation, and its purpose, the researcher assumed the WHC-QD would be seen as 
inherently important by ward staff and engagement in the programme would be guaranteed. 
The WHC-QD would identify areas for improvement, staff would respond accordingly and there 
would be a corresponding reduction in outcome measures such as falls, pressure ulcers and 
medication errors. As shown in Chapter 3, making improvements in healthcare is complex, 
simply reporting performance data rarely leads to behaviour change (Hysong et al., 2006). This 
study has shown programmes should not be assumed to have an inherent value, its value 
should be explored with the end users of the programme.  
It was still surprising however for the researcher to hear participants describe the WHC-QD as a 
‘tick box exercise” or a tool for improving paperwork. The WHC-QD was only seen as important 
through the action and reaction of the ward manager. Feedback Intervention Theory (FIT) 
(Kluger and DeNisi, 1996) suggests people often have competing priorities and therefore have 
to prioritise what receives attention. Staff within all three case study sites confirmed the 
consistent time pressure within the hospital wards. FIT predicts only deficits that receive 
attention are acted upon and will result in change. Simply providing information is not enough 
for change to occur. FIT works by providing new information that redirects a person’s locus of 
attention either towards or away from a task. When attention is directed towards at task, a 
change is more likely to occur which addresses the standard-deficit gap. As the ward manager 
was responsible for receiving, reviewing, interpreting and sharing the WHC-QD information with 
staff, their ability to direct a person’s locus of attention towards the standard-deficit gap would 
determine if an outcome or action would occur. The importance of leaders and ward manager in 
promoting engagement with quality dashboards and audit and feedback was a key finding of 
this study. 
This study found the reaction of the ward manager to a standard-deficit gap was determined by 
contextual factors (Contexts). Factors that influenced the believability of the data, such as the 





was needed. Beer (2016) suggests organisational metrics can be too powerful to be dismissed 
or undermined and staff find it difficult to challenge their accuracy and relevance. When staff do 
try to challenge data it can be seen as naïve, or excuse making. Action was also dependent 
upon the overall performance status of the ward.  Actions or outcomes were more likely to be 
triggered when the standard-performance had previously been identified as an issue. 
Knowledge of the standards was also identified as an important context, as ward managers 
were unable to develop a plan to address the standard-deficit gap if they are unclear what was 
measured.  This was highlighted by the ward manager of case study site B, who knew the ward 
was in an escalation process but was unsure why or what metrics were the trigger, as she did 
not have access to the WHC-QD. Once access was gained, she was able to identify the metric 
and develop a specific action plan to address the deficit.  
The CMO configurations of focus and contextualisation were developed to test how the 
importance of the WHC-QD information could be influenced thought interpretation and 
contextualisation. Change or improvement can only be affected if sense can be made of the 
information. The metrification of information can strip the narrative from situations and diminish 
the impact of dashboards and the true meaning of their purpose can be lost (Espeland, 2015).  
As previously highlighted, many staff considered the WHC-QD as a tick box exercise, and were 
unsure if the information reflected the standard of care on the ward or improved safety. Senior 
managers were aware staff were unhappy with the burden associated with daily checks of 
emergency equipment but referred to the airline analogy to dismiss their concerns. 
If the air hostess stood up at the front when she was doing her safety checks and says, 
the meals are fine, but we didn’t have time to check the safety of the engine today, don’t 
worry we’ve done it every other day for the last two weeks, but we’ve not done it today.  
How many people would feel absolutely safe?” (Participant H) 
Staff were however unsure of the link between compliance with process measures and 
improvement in outcomes. While it was not possible to use the outcome data provided by the 
HCP to demonstrate improvements in patient safety, ward managers were using WHC-QD 
information to develop a focus for improvement via aide memoirs and reminders. Daily 
reminders and discussion via patient safety huddles and handovers enhanced the importance 
of the WHC-QD as its information became embedded within the culture and conversation of the 
ward. While several authors have commented on the importance of timely audit and feedback 





although the information was updated monthly, timely or daily discussion about the information 
had the potential to lead to improvement in outcomes.  
The importance of leaders and ward manager in promoting engagement with quality 
dashboards and audit and feedback has already been highlighted (Flottorp et al., 2010, Jeffs et 
al., 2014a). The study found that staff relied upon their ward manager to determine the 
importance of the WHC-QD. If ward managers were concerned about performance then staff 
had a responsibility to work as a team to reduce those concerns. The likelihood of change 
occurring in response to ward manager concerns was increased in the context of a manager 
who showed clinical leadership and who was respected by their ward team.  
Kluger and DeNisi (1996) suggest the reaction to performance information is determined by the 
meaning attached to the feedback. Feedback loops are cause and effect processes that are 
organised hierarchically. At the top of the hierarchy are goals of self and those at the bottom 
contain physical actions, goals or tasks. When feedback is aimed at goals of self, this can 
cause anxiety and lead to behaviour change. It was clear from the interviews that ward 
managers considered negative performance information to be a reflection of their management 
skill and ability rather than their ability to complete a fridge temperature checklist or prescribe 
observations. As self is subjective, this may also explain why people at different levels of an 
organisation experience the same feedback in very different ways. As negative performance 
information for ward managers are closer to goals of self than for other staff members within the 
ward, their levels of anxiety associated with negative performance was greater.  
8.3.2 Disruption  
One of the functions of the WHC-QD is its ability to measure and track performance. 
Measurement creates uncertainty and anxiety which can be used for individual reflexivity and 
used to drive change (Beer, 2016). The power of systems of measurement is often not directly 
related to what they track or capture but how the possible outcomes of being measured against 
something makes us feel, as with visibility comes scrutiny and judgement (Muller, 2018). The 
evidence from the participants identified the potential for the WHC-QD to cause dissonance 
when negative performance was reported. Cognitive dissonance was developed by Festinger 
(1957) and occurs when we perceive a discrepancy between our behaviour and our self-image. 
The theory predicts that dissonance occurs when a person’s behaviour has a negative effect on 
self-esteem, or there is conflict between a person’s belief in his or her own worth and something 
damages that belief. The dissonance can induce an unpleasant state of anxiety. As dissonance 





dissonance by reducing the importance of one of the dissonant elements, or by adding 
consonant elements such as making an excuse to explain the discrepancy or change the 
dissonance by working harder or triggering a change (Martin et al., 2013, Passer and Smith, 
2019).  
As has already been established negative performance information and the possibility of 
triggering an escalation process had a negative impact on staff morale. Ward managers in 
particular thought they were being judged and their management abilities questioned. This 
caused disruption or dissonance that resulted in the WHC-QD information being dismissed, 
alternative information used to valid their self-worth such as the friends and family test or a plan 
to improve performance and reduce the standard-deficit gap developed. As many of the staff 
interviewed commented on the sense of pride working on their ward this was an importance 
contextual consideration. As negative performance information challenges the basis for feelings 
of pride, this in congruency created disruption or dissonance and influenced motivation for 
action.  
Knowledge of standards was also identified as an important resource and contextual factor in 
improving the quality and safety of care. The interviews identified that other than the ward 
manager, staff working within the care study sites did not access the WHC-QD and were unsure 
what standards were being measured. In case study site B, when a specific standard-deficit gap 
was identified and discussed via ward handovers and safety huddle, knowledge of the particular 
standard increased. Once staff were aware of the standards, to not take the necessary action 
becomes a deliberate omission, rather than an unconscious omission or consequence of 
competing priorities. To deliberately omit to undertake the action, may cause dissonance, 
therefore the associated action is more likely to be taken. 
8.3.3 Avoidance 
As disruption is triggered in response to negative performance information, avoidance is based 
upon staff wanting to avoid receiving negative feedback and the associated scrutiny that 
invariable follows. Beer (2016) suggests the power of metrics and dashboards to facilitate 
change is based upon their ability to render things visible, in the division it creates between 
attention and non-attention, recognition and non-recognition, a causal force exists. The ability to 
affect change is dependent upon how visible those metrics are and to whom. FIT suggests 
people regulate their behaviour by comparing it to goals, standards or benchmarks to which 
they are committed. If a discrepancy is identified between the standard and their behaviour, 





increased effort a person makes to reduce a deficit  can be influenced by the consequence of 
the deficit (Kluger and DeNisi, 1996). 
 Porter (2015) also suggests dashboards succeed by giving direction to the individuals, as they 
create a standard or a norm which an individual, department or organisation can be measured 
against. The desire to move toward the norm or achieve the standard is a persuasive form of 
power (Dixon-Woods et al. 2013, Muller 2018). Participants were concerned about the prospect 
of triggering an escalation process, however their biggest concern was displaying negative 
performance information publicly within their ward. While Porter (1995) believes making 
information visible to the public is a powerful incentive for improving performance, the evidence 
for this is unclear. Although staff recognised the need for greater transparency, Ketelaar et al. 
(2011) could find no evidence to suggest the public release of performance data changed 
patient behaviour or improved care. Although there was no evidence to suggest the public 
realise of performance data had an impact on the behaviours of healthcare professionals, staff 
within the case study sites wanted to avoid publicly displaying negative performance information 
as it would give an negative view of the ward and this may worry patients and relatives. 
Interestingly the observational audit undertaken within the three case study sites showed that 
during that period of observation, only 4% of the total visitors to the ward interacted with the 
PSB. In the phase one data, none of the participants were aware of any conversation with 
patients or relatives regarding the information displayed on the PSB. All 6 visitors who were 
interviewed as part of this study did recommend keeping the PSB as it showed the HCP was 
committed to making improvements. Although staff were concerned about publicly displaying 
information this was more likely to be influenced by the anticipated dissonance created if 
patients or relatives were to use the information to complain about their care. This study could 
find no evidence to suggest information displayed on the PSB influenced care delivery, although 
it has highlighted further research is required to understand how patient safety information 
should be generated and displayed for patients and relatives.  
As the WHC-QD measures performance and has the ability for comparison  these principles 
allow competition to be enacted and judgements to be made (Beer, 2016). Competition was 
initially identified as a mechanism however it became apparent through the interviews that there 
was no evidence to support competition as a mechanism. An awareness of performance was 
identified however as an important context and outcome. Staff were reassured when actions 
taken to improve performance was evident on the PSB and sustained positive WHC-QD 





8.4 Unintended consequences 
While the intention of QD development is based upon making improvements and providing 
reassurance, many authors have warned of the unintended consequences that rise 
inadvertently from health performance measurement (Power, 1997, Lilford et al., 2004, Mannion 
and Braithwaite, 2012, Dahler-Larsen, 2014, Beer, 2016, Greenhalgh et al., 2018, Muller, 2018) 
As metric based indicators or dashboards simplify the complexity of the social world their 
representativeness is often questioned (Espeland, 2015). Several staff members were 
concerned that the WHC-QD was not representative of the complex care provided with the 
ward. However even when metrics, are found to be misrepresentative, Beer (2016) suggests 
they still have the potential to influence behaviour if their use is adopted into social and cultural 
practice.  The main concerns are centred on measurement fixation, tunnel vision and the 
manipulation of data or gaming, which has the potential to invalidate the veracity of a QD.  
Measurement fixation is the emphasis on meeting a target rather than considering the true 
intent of why the target was introduced. The main concern from some staff members was the 
WHC-QD’s inability to address fundamental day-to-day safety concerns such a staffing levels 
and the increasingly complex needs of patients with comorbidities and dependencies. The staff 
interviews did suggest there was an element of measure fixation which is more likely when the 
avoidance of reputational damage is associated with achieving compliance (Illingworth, 2014).  
Within phase 2 several staff members referred to the WMAP as a box ticking exercise, 
suggesting there were elements of measure fixation. Measurement fixation is the emphasis on 
meeting a target rather than considering the true intent of why the target was introduced. 
Interesting most of the concern was focused upon daily emergency equipment checks. As the 
researcher was fortunate to hear the chief Nurses’ rationale for its inclusion or ‘true intent’ the 
need for daily checks was obvious and needed. Contextualising metrics may therefore help with 
QD engagement.  
The role of the auditor had the potential to have an unintended negative impact on engagement 
with the QD data. The participants suggested staff would devalue or discredit data in the 
context of negative performance results based upon the role and behaviour of the WMAP 
auditor. There was a perception that auditors from the corporate nursing team were more likely 
to find problems with the standards of care and give a negative performance score. Power 
(1997) also reminds the reader that those undertaking audit have a responsibility to find the 





the WMAP were from another area of the hospital, moving towards the automatic generation of 
audit data may help remove auditor bias. Successful audit and feedback however only takes 
place in a culture that does not attribute blame  (Power, 1997)  
Although QD have the potential to improve the quality and safety of care consideration must be 
given to the time and cost of their development (Keen et al., 2018a). Power (1997) reminds the 
reader that information is never free and is often expensive in ways that rarely occur to those 
who demand it.  
8.5 Discussion summary 
Muller (2018) suggests we now live in an age of measurement and we should expect the 
demand for measured accountability and transparency to increase as trust decreases. It is 
recognised within the literature that patients can be exposed to additional risks through 
iatrogenic or systematic failures within healthcare. Healthcare has a long history of safety 
concerns and data has been used to highlight concerns (Appendix A) or hide them from view to 
disguise failure (Kennedy 2002). As technology has advanced the development of quality 
dashboards and their use in healthcare has been on the ascendency. 
The use of quality dashboards has been one of the strategies used to reduce risks and improve 
the safety and quality of healthcare within the NHS. The monitoring and publication of 
performance data was expected to act as a catalyst to drive up quality by encouraging a change 
in culture and behaviour for organisations, departments and individuals directly responsible for 
care. 
The scoping review provided limited evidence to suggest dashboards have been proven to drive 
up standards within an organisation or hospital ward, however there was evidence to suggest 
dashboards can encourage a change in culture and behaviour which can improve care 
outcomes if associated with compliance with a standard or procedure. Dashboards themselves 
have no inherent value if people do not engage or respond to them. It may be that individuals 
do not know how to interpret the information, or it is perceived to have little value as the 
information is believed to be inaccurate or has limited contextual value for an individual. The 
value of dashboards comes from the knowledge gained from reviewing the information and how 
that knowledge informs appropriate actions, decisions, and behaviours (Okes, 2013). 
Programme theories were developed from reviewing the literature, interviewing stakeholders 





to work.  The evidence suggests that ward leaders have an important role in promoting staff 
engagement with quality dashboards and how the information is used will determine their 
impact. The key findings from the study identify the three interrelated programme theories of 
Importance, Disruption and Avoidance to explain why and how quality dashboards influence 
care delivery within hospital wards.  
8.6 Strengths and limitations of the study  
The strength of this research was the opportunity to use realist evaluation to develop and test 
theories within three case study sites and explore the impact of the programme with a range of 
staff working within hospital wards. The study includes evidence from the chief nurse to ward 
clerks. There insight and experiences were invaluable and may have been overlooked if an 
outcome based methodology had been used.   
To develop the initial theories, the current evidence base for quality dashboards had to be fully 
explored and critically evaluated. The mixed method approach allowed rich data to be gathered 
and used to test, refine and reject the programme theories. The aim of the study was to 
understand how and why quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards; this 
research provides the evidence to answer these questions.  
As information technology advances and electronic platforms will be increasing used to 
organise care, this will continue to be an area of ongoing development with future research 
opportunities. Currently there are no published realist evaluations that explore how quality 
dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards.  
Although the study was designed to capture information from patients and visitors to the case 
study sites, only 6 visitors were recruited. It was anticipated visitor engagement with the PSB 
would be higher. Although the lack of engagement was an interesting finding of the study, it is a 
limitation of its phase 2 design.  
Due to the mixed method approach, managing large data sets was complex and initial attempts 
to show causation resulted in complex voluminous chapters. Supervisory support and iterative 
data analysis allowed the findings to be refined. As has already been discussed, the time 
between data collection, transcription and analysis of the staff interviews did not allow the topic 
guide to be iteratively developed following each interview. Consideration could have been given 
to a follow up focus group with staff within the case study sites to explore and confirm findings 





One of the limitations of the study was the influence the researcher may have had on participant 
recruitment and data collection. As highlighted, the aim is for researchers to strive to remain 
neutral, however as the researcher was a senior nurse within the case study site, it is 
recognised that this was difficult. Although steps were taken to reduce the influence of the 
researcher’s role on participants by identifying case study sites with no managerial links and 
using the academic supervisor team to cross-reference analytical codes, participants were 
aware of the researcher’s role within the organisation. What is not clear is how this may have 
influenced participant recruitment and participants candour during the interviews. It must also 
be recognised that the phase 1 interviews were conducted with senior managers within the 
organisation. The researcher’s performance during those interviews may have been influenced 
by the status of the participant.  
8.7 Implications for practice  
Quality dashboards are expensive to design, develop and maintain and have the potential to 
capture large volumes of data, most of which was unseen by staff working within the case study 
sites. Although each of the ward managers had developed their own system for reviewing and 
disseminating WHC-QD data, there was no guidance or training on how to use the information to 
its best effect. This research therefore recommends best practice guidelines and an educational 
training package should be developed to support ward managers to use QD information.  
Although WHC-QD was published monthly, when staff discussed the information in ward 
handover and safety huddles, this raised awareness of the standards expected. It is therefore 
recommended information from the WHC-QD be incorporated into daily team discussions.  
As outcomes are triggered by disruption rather than compliance, updates to the standards and 
metrics in line with incidences or patient safety alerts is recommended. This will ensure ongoing 
engagement with the WHC-QD is required if standards are to be maintained.  
As publicly displaying performance information was seen as a positive step towards transparency 
this study also recommends the development of a staff PSB and a patient PSB with consideration 
given to a patient focus group to develop the metrics to be displayed.   
As the approach of the person undertaking the audit had the potential to influence the believability 
of the data, this study recommends auditors should take time to demystify the audit process with 
ward staff. This study therefore recommends auditors engage with staff when they arrive to do 
the audit, share audit standards and discuss any areas for improvement at the time of the visit. 





required. A timely written summary of recommendations for improvement should also be 
provided. As the believability of the data is crucial to activating outcomes, consideration should 
also be given to moving towards automation of audit data, or a ‘cybernetic model’ as 
recommended by McFarlane in 1971. Removing auditor bias and the opportunity for staff to 
dismiss the WHC-QD may lead to greater engagement with the programme. This could be an 
area for future research.  
8.8 Recommendations for future research  
As ward managers were instrumental in responding to the WHC-QD information and developing 
strategies for improvement, further research specifically with ward managers is recommended. 
If best practice guidance is developed and an educational programme for the interpretation of 
QD information is launched, formal evaluation of this programme should also be considered. As 
quality dashboards continue to evolve and electronic documentation, medication administration 
and observations allows more complex data capture, it may be possible to develop quality 
dashboards for every member of staff within a hospital ward. This has the potential to use 
dashboards to influence individual staff members and identify individual training and 
development needs and support based upon performance and is an exciting area for future 
dashboard development and research.  
What was surprising was the lack of engagement with the information displayed on the PSB, as 
HCP are committed to increasing their transparency, consideration must be given to generating 
knowledge on how to develop QD for patients and the public and how the information can be 
shared.  
8.9 Conclusion 
This thesis has used realist evaluation to bring new understanding to how quality dashboards 
influence care delivery within hospital wards and has therefore achieved its aims and 
objectives. Staffing challenges, new treatments and complex patient care means safety in 
healthcare is and will continue to remain important for all concerned. The need for assurance 
and transparency has resulted in quality dashboards becoming part of healthcare providers’ 
organisational culture. Making improvements in safety is complex, quality dashboards have no 
inherent value if people do not engage with or respond to them. As Berwick et al. (2003) 
reminds us “in the pursuit of healthcare quality improvement, measurement is necessary but is 





healthcare it is vital to understand the link between measurement and improvement”. A refined 
programme theory based on the mechanisms of Importance, Disruption and Avoidance and the 
corresponding contextual considerations has brought new understanding to how quality 
dashboards influence care and the behaviour and actions of staff within hospital wards. 
Understanding the contexts, mechanism and outcome configurations brings understanding to 
the link between measurement and improvement and can be used to ensure quality dashboards 
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guidelines and quality 
measures which could 
be used to assess the 
performance of 
hospitals and the 
quality and safety of 












response to the 
public inquiry 
into children’s 





concluded that 171 
deaths may have been 
preventable.  
198 recommendations 
were made which 
included, make 
outcome data 
available to patients 
and the public and 
make healthcare  










Author Title  Context  Recommendations Reference 







The public inquiry 
into the murder of 
























30 day mortality 
rates for cardiac 
operations are 
made available a 






The public disclosure 
of surgical results is 
made available to 
make outcomes 
more transparent 




et al., 2007) 










response to the 
recommendations 
from the Shipman 
Inquiry.  
Suggests the routine 
monitoring of 
mortality rates by GP 
practice.  
To develop expert 
patient panels to help 
improve the quality 
















and safety within 
the NHS 
The focus of the 
report is make 
healthcare safer. It 
asks that HCP 
systematically 
measure and publish 
information about the 
quality of care and 
asks patient’s 
feedback of care to 
be captured.  
A National Quality 
Board to advise the 
department of health 
is to be established. 
Information about the 
safety of HCP is to 
be made available to 
the public.  
(Department 









Author Title  Context  Recommendations Reference 
2009 The Kings 
Fund  




from a study into 












the right information, 
robust governance 
and strong clinical 
leadership to 
improve safety.  
Hospital Boards 
should be aware of 
the patient 









A definition of 
quality for the 
NHS is written 
into the 
legislation  






Experience.  High 
quality healthcare 












A task and finish 
group to look at 
how to measure 
the quality of 
nursing care in 
the NHS 
infrastructure is 
needed collection of 
patient level data. 





Metrics such as 
staffing, skill mix and 
staff experience 
should be linked to 
patient experience.  
(Maben et 
al., 2012)  
2013 Robert 
Francis  








the quality of 






faced while in 
hospital.    
290 
recommendations 
were made, with 







































A summary of 











To develop guidance on 
minimum staffing levels and 
to publish staffing levels on 
each ward daily through a 
twice yearly report. The aim 






















in healthcare  
The report reviews lessons 
from non-healthcare 
industries and recommends 
the development of metrics 
and measuring performance 
















A report from 
the National 
Quality Board.  
A commitment to improve 
quality through 
measurement and identifies 
a need for robust, relevant 
and timely information. 
information on the quality of 
care should be made 
available to level of the 













to learn- A 
commitmen
t to act 








the need for continual 
learning and improvement 
though measurement and 
transparency. Timely data 
on the quality and safety 
and healthcare is needed at 





















Review into the 
quality of care 
and treatment 
provided by 14 










All Hospitals should 
develop an early 
warning system for 
identifying unwell 
patients. 
Data on quality should 




Real time feedback from 
patients should be 
developed.  
Chief Inspector of 
Hospitals to develop a 
methodology to inspect 
hospitals.  
Directors of nursing 
should develop 
evidence based tools to 
determine appropriate 
staffing levels and  
Hospital Boards should 
be made aware of nurse 












Safe staffing for 













in response to 
the Mid 
Staffordshire 
public inquiry.  
The report recommends 
although no single 
nurse patient ratio can 
apply, Safe nursing 
indicators should be 
measured and reported, 
which include the 
number of patient falls, 
pressure ulcers and 
medication errors. A 
commitment to publish 
staffing information, 
staff required vs actual 
staff available, use of 
agency staff and 
compliance with 











Author Title  Context  Recommendations Reference 
2014 Department 












inquiry.   
Appointment of Chief 
Inspectors of Hospitals, 
The development of a 
new hospital rating 
system, The publish the 
clinical outcomes by 
consultants in 10 
specialities.  
To publish the results of 
friends and family test.  
To publish daily ward 
staffing levels and 











Sets out how 
the NHS in 
England needs 
to change to 
meet the needs 
of its 
population.  
The report recommends 
the development of 
transparent performance 
data to help healthcare 
professional see how 
they are performing 











The SOF sets 
out how NHS 
England 
oversees  HCP  
The framework is 
updated each year and 
identifies the metrics 
which will be used to 
assess the quality and 
























A single reporting 
framework across all 
trusts in England to 
measure and monitor 
quality of care and use 




















Sample Category Intervention 
Improvement in 
outcomes 
How care is influenced 
MMAT 
Score 













Public display increases 









IE A range of 
measures: 




Monitoring of vital 















HD Overview of Nurse 
Sensitive Indicators 
Across a range of 
measure 
Use data to engage with 





UK N/A IE Overview of the ST N/A Provides feedback N/A 
Christiansen 






IE An evaluation of the 
Open and Honest 
Care Initiative  
N/A Data with patient stories 









HD Introduction of an 
electronic Patient 
Journey Board 
Reduction of length 
of stay across all 
implementation 
sites.  
Improved communication,  
Structured handovers 
Increased accountability.  
N/A 










Creates competitive spirit 
Provides real time 














Sample Category Intervention 
Improvement in 
outcomes 

















doses of medication  
Dashboard information 
informed RCA meetings 
and senior engagement 















areas for improvement 
and peaks in service 
demand 
N/A 
Daley et al. 
(2013) 
UK Older adult 
mental 
health unit.  
24 staff 
interviews  
SSD  Dashboard 




information sharing,  
Data quality 
Timely access to 
information. 
 Data from dashboard was 









1 Hospital  MS An ethnographic 
study used to 
explore how data 
from Electronic 
Prescribing is used  
Techno vigilance 
allows feedback and 
management 
oversight.   
Timeliness of data 
RCA meetings 
Engagement of 




Field et al 
(2018)  





desktop PC and 
electronic White 
boards.  
Improved compliance with 
documentation standards, 
a clinical intervention 
(spirometry) 
Evaluation 





SSD Audit based 
Dashboard 
Introduction 
None Reported Used to inform business 
planning,  service demand 













Sample Category Intervention 
Improvement in 
outcomes 
How care is influenced 
MMAT 
Score 







HD Staff views on the 
implementation of a 
nursing dashboard  




Useful to see 
improvement efforts 









SSD  Electronic 
Dashboard 
Introduction 







UK 3 Hospitals IE Pilot of the Safety 
Express programme 
Improvements 
against of range of 
nurse sensitive 
indicators 
Public display Reminder 
of performance 
N/A 
Patel et al 
(2018)  
USA 1 Hospital HD Introduction of a 
quality dashboard 
for doctors  
Improvements in 
quality standards P 
value <0.0001 
Improved compliance 
with a range of quality 
measure with intense 

























8 patients  





information helpful.  
Provides focus 
Structures team 
discussion and planning  















Use of a PDSA cycle.  
Engagement with tool, 












Sample Category Intervention Improvement in 
outcomes 











Identifies the contextual 








USA 10 Hospitals  HD Development of an 
Electronic 
Dashboard 
No Evidence Reduced data analysis 
burden. Encourages data 






UK 42 Junior 
Doctors 
MS Dashboard data was 
used to highlight 
prescribing and 
laboratory alerts 

















MS Pilot of a Medication 
Patient Safety 
Thermometer 
Development of a 
patient safety tool to 
measure harm from 
medication errors 
 










HD Development and 
introduction of a 
hospital Dashboard.  
 
Not Reported 
Provides focus for team 
discussions on quality and 
planning.  




Smith et al. 
(2014) 
USA 1 Unit SSD Introduction of a 
Balanced Scorecard  
Improvements in 
reducing length of 











USA 1 Hospital  HD Introduction of a 
dashboard 
Reduced patient 
length of stay, 
Radiology 
turnaround times.  
Increases accountability 
and transparency  
Dashboard data used for 








Appendix C Summary of key features of a QD needed to influence practice 
 
 Key features of QD feedback needed to improved performance or make change in practice    
Given with an educational component (Ivers et al. 2012)  
Feedback is given more intensively, with consideration given to content, format, visual presentation, timing and how the feedback is 
presented and by whom (Ivers et al. 2012). 
The information is considered to be accurate, accessible and timely (Hysong et a.l 2006, Morgan et al.2008) 
The information is meaningful for the individual and provides them with information which informs actions, decisions or behaviours 
(Hysong et al. 2006, Oakes 2013). 
Non punitive (Hysong et al. 2006) 
Information comes from a trusted source (Ivers et al. 2014)  
A target for performance is provided, with goals aligned with personal and organisational priorities (Ivers et al. 2014)  
Goals have to be specific, measurable, achievable, relevant time-bound and a clear action plan is provided when discrepancies  are 
evident (Iver et al. 2014)  
Delivery comes from a trusted source (Ivers et al. 2014)  
Data are about individual or team behaviours and based upon recent performance and within an audit cycle (Ivers et al. 2014)  
The feedback is considered to be non-punitive (Hysong et al.  2006) 
Information should be presented using text, talking and graphics (Ivers et al 2014)  
The greatest improvement in care delivery were noted when performance data were discussed in person with individual staff members 
(Dixon-Woods 2014)  
The opinion of local leaders may be more effective than audit and feedback (Flottrop et al. 2010)  
Staff need to have the capacity and training to interpret and use data in a meaningful way and be given the opportunity by ward 
leaders to make changes in practice (Jeffs et al.2014).   
Ward leaders need to promote staff engagement with QD as a lack of leadership can diminish their impact (Jeffs et al. 2014). 
Summary: Data should be trustworthy, timely, meaningful, useful, and discussed. 






                               How information from QD is used within HCP   Which level of 
 the organisation  
To provide a strategic overview of performance (Trust Board Paper 2014)   Macro/Meso/Micro 
To identify wards that have positive patient outcomes and experience  (Board Paper 2015) Macro/Meso/Micro 
To identify wards that need to improve performance (Trust Board Paper 2014) Macro/Meso/Micro 
To measure performance and recognise success (Christiansen et al., 2014, Dixon-Woods et al., 2013, Jeffs 
et al., 2014, Power et al., 2012, Weiner et al., 2015) 
Macro/Meso/Micro 
To provide assurance the care reaches the standard expected by the organisation (Trust Board Paper 2015). Macro/Meso/Micro 
To inform Board reports (Trust Board Paper 2014). Macro/Meso 
To provide  assurance reports for regulators (Trust Board Paper 2014).  Macro 
To highlight specific challenges within wards and identify specific areas for improvement (Jeffs et al. 2014) Meso/Micro 
To bring focus in safety briefings, team meetings and handover between clinical teams  (Jeffs et al. 2014) Micro 
To ask for help from senior managers (Trust Board Paper 2014)  Micro 
To inform root cause analysis, governance and performance meetings (Coleman et al. 2013) Meso/Micro 
To reduce the spread of misinformation and anecdotal reporting (Anand 2014)  Meso/Micro 
To act as an aide memoire to remind staff of their wards priorities and areas for improvement (Jeffs et 
al .2014) 
Micro 
Unintended consequences of QD 
Identifying poor performance can lead to ward stigmatisation and associated anxiety for staff whom work within those areas 
(Illingworth, 2014) 
Resources can be diverted from genuine quality improvement initiatives to superficial steps to address a particular metric (Lester et 
al. 2011, Illingworth, 2014).   
Behaviours such as gaming or measure fixation are more likely if a reward is associated with achieving compliance  (Conrad & Ulsu 
2011, and Okes, 2013 
Where staff engage in measure fixation or gaming, although wards metrics may improve there will be no real change in practice or 





Appendix D How does information from QD influence practice 
How does information from QD influence practice  
It acts as an aide memoire to remind staff of their wards priorities and areas for improvement (Jeffs 2015) 
Making information more accessible allows areas for improvement to be easily identified and provides a focus for change (Dazi 
2008). 
Identifying areas for improvement allows resources or support to be prioritised, performance to be tracked, and assurance to be 
given to governments, regulators and Hospital Boards (Mannion, et a.l 2009, Department of Health 2014). 
It reassurance managers and staff that changes made to improve patient outcomes actually made a difference (Jeffs et al. 2014). 
Reassures staff working within the micro level of the organisation that senior manager’s support and are engaged in efforts to improve 
the quality of care (Coleman et al. 2013, Dixon-Woods et al. 2013) 
Indicates a commitment and collective responsibility from all levels of staff within the organisation to improve care (Coleman et al. 
2013, Dixon-Woods et al. 2013) 
If the QD metrics are aligned to organisational priorities, it suggests what is being measured is important (Lloyd 2017) 
Gives permission and an opportunity for staff members to make suggestions or change practice to improve care (Coleman et al. 
2013, Dixon-Woods et al. 2013). 
Improves awareness and compliance with standards (Flottrop et al. 2010) 
When specific areas for improvement are identified, staff are motivated to make a change in practice to improve patient care. 
(Coleman et al. 2013, Dixon-Woods et al. 2013) 
When areas for improvement are identified, staff are motivated to make a change in practice to avoid managerial scrutiny (Power et 
al. 2012 Coleman et al. 2013, Dixon-Woods et al. 2013) 
Staff want to avoid publicly displaying negative performance information, as it may worry patients and give a negative view of the 
ward. This will motivate staff to make improvements and reassure patients the care within their ward is safe. (The Health 
Foundation 2015)  
Once quality dashboards and their metrics become part of the culture of a ward, staff often experience peer pressure to make 
improvements and maintain performance (Jeffs et al. 2014).  
Staff need to have the capacity and training to interpret and use data in a meaningful way and be given the opportunity by ward 
leaders to make changes in practice (Jeffs et al. 2014).   
Summary: Focus and Aide Memoire for change: Raises awareness of performance, standards and areas to improve. 
Importance of safety: Suggests a collective commitment to improve care and peer pressure to maintain standards 





Appendix E NICE Safe Nurse Indicators 
Safe Nurse Indicators  
Patient reported outcome measures.  
Focus: Nursing care, Pain management, communication  
Safety outcome measures 
Fall, Any fall a patient has 
Pressure Ulcers, pressure ulcers developed or worsened after admission to 
hospital.  
Medication administration errors. Any error in the  preparation, administration 
or omission of medication.  
Staff reported measures 
Missed breaks, nursing overtime,  
Ward nursing establishment measures,  
Submission of Hard Truth’s data. Planned, required and available nursing staff 
on each shift. Reliance upon temporary nursing staff.  
Compliance with mandatory training  
Nursing red flags  
•Unplanned omission in providing patient medications.  
•Delay of more than 30 minutes in providing pain relief. 
•Patient vital signs not assessed or recorded as outlined in the care plan. 
•Delay or omission of regular checks on patients to ensure that their 
fundamental care needs are met as outlined in the care plan. Carrying out 
these checks is often referred to as 'intentional rounding' and covers aspects 
of care such as: 
◦Pain: asking patients to describe their level of pain level using the local pain 
assessment tool.  
◦Personal needs: such as scheduling patient visits to the toilet or bathroom to 
avoid risk of falls and providing hydration. 
◦Placement: making sure that the items a patient needs are within easy reach. 
◦Positioning: making sure that the patient is comfortable and the risk of 
pressure ulcers is assessed and minimised. 
•A shortfall of more than 8 hours or 25%  
•Less than 2 registered nurses present on a ward during any shift. 












































































Appendix M Site Selection Letter 





Contextualising risk, reducing harm:  
How do quality dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards?  A realist 
evaluation 
 
As you are aware, over the last 18 months the Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust have 
introduced the Ward Health Check Dashboard and Ward Health Check Notice Board to every 
ward area. Within the published literature there is limited information which explains how 
dashboards influence care delivery within hospital wards which is why I am looking to identify 
three ward areas within the Leeds Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust to participant in phase two 
of a research study exploring the role of quality dashboards and how they influence care.  
 
Ethical approval has been granted by the Heath Research Authority, IRAS Reference 
Number: 196077, Date of approval [to be inserted]. Permission has also been given by Leeds 
Teaching Hospitals NHS Trust Research and Innovation department  
The selection criteria for inclusion in the study is a follows:  
Case Study Site A: A hospital ward which has been “green” for 2 months or longer within 
the last 12 months.  
Case Study Site B: A hospital ward which has been “red” for 2 months or longer within the 
last 12 months.  
Case Study Site C: A hospital ward which has been changed its position from green to red 
within the last 12 months.  
The purpose of identifying case sites with different levels of performance data is to explore 
the extent in which competition is a driver for change and to understand healthcare 
professionals respond to positive or negative information about the care they provide. 
Case study sites which would be excluded from the study would be  
 Maternity Wards and Children’s wards  
 Any ward restricted for security or infection prevention reasons 
I would therefore be grateful if I could arrange a meeting with you or your team to identify 
three ward areas which may be suitable for the study. If you require any further information 
please contact me via telephone on 0xxxx or email sean.willis@nhs.net.  
 
I look forward to hearing from you  
 





Post Graduate Research Student. School of Healthcare, University of Leeds. 
 
Email sean.willis@nhs.net  
 
Enclosed:  
Staff Participant Information Sheet v3 
















































































Appendix U Supervisors Coding 
As a novice researcher, support was asked from the academic supervision team to 
develop the initial codes for the analytical framework. To support learning for the 
researcher, two identical transcripts were chosen at random and sent uncoded to 
two academic supervisors. Independently they were asked to reviewed the data 
and identify codes for the analytical framework. The codes identified by the 
academic supervisors were compared to the researcher’s codes. The following 
























Appendix V Taxonomy of dysfunctional consequences of 
Health Performance Measurement Systems 
Poor measurement 
1 Measurement fixation occurs when there is an emphasis on meeting the target 
rather than supporting the spirit of the measure. The potential for measurement 
fixation may be mitigated by involving front-line clinicians and professionals in the 
construction of measures to ensure that they are grounded in the realities of service 
delivery. 
2 Tunnel vision has been defined as a focus on the dimensions of performance 
that are included in the measurement system, displacing other important but 
unmeasured aspects of performance. 
3 Myopia involves an excessive concentration on immediate and short-term issues 
to the exclusion of important long-term considerations. 
4 Ossification emerges for example when organisational paralysis results from an 
excessively rigid system of performance measurement. 
5 Anachronism is a risk for all performance measurement systems. All data have 
built in obsolescence. In performance measurement, no matter how much 
investment there is in keeping systems up to date, there is a lag effect between 
data capture, processing, dissemination and use. This leads to the defence that the 
data do not help solve current problems, as they do not apply today.. 
6 Quantification privileging, the preoccupation with reducing complex social 
phenomena to numbers, and the attendant loss of the appreciation of qualitative or 
softer aspects of healthcare that may be missed or downplayed in assessments. 
Misplaced incentives and sanctions 
7 Overcompensation manifests when payments are made to providers over and 
above what is required for them to meet performance targets.  
8 Under-compensation occurs in contrast when the incentives for performance are 
low-powered, trivial or non-existent. Why try hard when there is little at stake? This 
phenomenon can be exacerbated by having few or no penalties for poor 
performance or non-participation in improvement activities.  
9 Insensitivity is where assessment is a blunt instrument for capturing the overall 





10 Increased inequality can result when organisations are financially rewarded for 
their performance. If this money is invested in improved services, then those 
patients of high-performing services will benefit to a greater degree than patients of 
underperforming providers. 
11 Complacency is a lack of ambition for improvement brought about by 
perceptions that one’s comparative performance is adequate. For example, a 
middling performance reflected in hospital league tables can appear satisfactory 
and may inhibit attempts to react to incentives and sanctions or strive for further 
improvements. 
12 Silo-creation can be seen when staff are attracted to join highly rated hospitals 
and are less attracted to poorly ranked organisations. The implication of this is that 
performance measures move from being a neutral description to influencing 
performance, and exacerbating relative differences between organisations. 
Breach of trust 
13 Misrepresentation is the deliberate manipulation of data by staff , this can 
range from creative accounting to fraud.   
14 Gaming manifests in the altering of behaviour or reporting to obtain strategic 
advantage.  
15 Misinterpretation can be defined as incorrect inferences about performance, 
often stemming from the difficulty of accounting for the full range of potential 
influences on performance. 
16 Bullying can occur when uncomfortable levels of pressure and coercion on staff 
are brought about by a demanding performance improvement climate.  
17 Erosion of trust is the lowering of levels of confidence that the local population 
has in their health service following a poor performance assessment. 
18 Reduced staff morale may arise when the esprit de corps falls in organisations 
assessed as underperforming. Staff collectively loses belief in the organisation’s 
mission, work or goals. If performance measures are applied unfairly, organisational 
members may feel that they have been misjudged or shown in a poor light. 
Politicisation of performance systems 
19 Political grandstanding is an omnipresent risk. If the purpose of the 
measurement system or the use of the data it produces are politicised, then the 





20 Creating a diversion is closely related to political grandstanding. Governments 
under pressure can look for a distraction. Announcing a new or revamped 
performance system, with a promise that the improved data it produces will solve 
the problem eventually, can be politically helpful.  
(Mannion and Braithwaite, 2012) 
